GIFT  OF 


The  Oriental  Policy 
of  the  United  States 


By 
HENRY  CHUNG,  A.  M. 

Compiler  of  Korean  Treaties,  Korean  Envoy 
to  the  Paris  Conference 


With  Introductory  Note  by 
JEREMIAH  W.  JENKS,  Ph.  D.,  LL.D. 

Director  of  Far  Eastern  Bureau 
Research  Professor  of  Government  and  Public  Admin- 
istration ;  New  York  University 


NEW  'YORK  CHICAGO 

Fleming     H.     Revell     Company 

LONDON  AND  EDINBURGH 


Copyright,  1919,  by 
FLEMING  H.  REVELL  COMPANY 


xf     . 


New  York:  158  Fifth  Avenue 
Chicago:  17  North  Wabash  Ave. 
London :  2 1  Paternoster  Square 
Edinburgh :  75  Princes  Street 


To 

The  Chinese  Students  in  America 

whose  mission  it  is  to  emancipate  their  country 
from  the  iron-bound  traditions  of  the  past  and 
to  instil  the  spirit  of  Western  civilisation  into 
their  ancient  culture,  so  that  China  henceforth 
will  be  not  a  passive  and  self-contained  nation 
but  a  progressive  and  dynamic  power  taking 
its  place,  along  with  the  United  States,  in  the 
family  of  the  world1  s  democracies 


485510 


Introductory  Note 

By 
JEREMIAH  W.  JENKS,  Ph.D.,  LL.  D. 

THE  publication  of  a  book  on  the  Oriental 
policy  of  the  United  States  is  peculiarly 
timely. 

In  connection  with  the  discussion  and  ap- 
proval of  the  Treaty  of  Peace  with  Germany, 
and  in  connection  with  the  much  discussed 
League  of  Nations,  it  is  essential  that  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  now  determine  its 
Oriental  policy.  It  seems  probable  that  the 
former  policy  of  the  territorial  integrity  of  China 
and  the  Open  Door,  with  fair  dealing  and  jus- 
tice, should  be  stated  anew  with  a  more  vigorous 
determination  to  give  it  positive  effect.  If  the 
policy  is  to  be  modified,  the  change  should  be 
made  promptly  and  the  world  should  know  it. 

It  is  fortunate  that  this  book  is  written  by  a 
citizen  of  the  Far  East,  a  Korean.  The  people 
of  the  United  States  need  to  see  clearly  the 
view-point  of  the  Orientals.  There  is  little  dif- 
ficulty in  getting  the  view-point  of  the  Japanese. 
In  fact,  it  is  impossible  for  any  reader  of  the 
public  press  to  avoid  getting  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment's view-point.  It  is  much  more  difficult 
to  know  what  the  Chinese  are  thinking  because 
of  the  great  variety  of  opinions  published  in  the 


,'-8:  :«•':  M'*.«  'iN-TKODirCTOEY  NOTE 

press.  Even  the  policy  of  the  government  of 
China  is  varying  and  undetermined,  although 
the  sentiments  of  the  Chinese  people  now  seem 
to  be  crystallizing.  On  the  other  hand,  it  has 
been  almost  impossible,  owing  to  the  Japanese 
censorship,  to  get  an  authoritative  judgment  or 
statement  regarding  Korean  opinion. 

This  book  is  admirably  written,  and  although 
I  should  not  find  it  possible  to  agree  in  all  par- 
ticulars with  the  policies  advocated  and  the 
views  expressed,  I  believe  it  of  very  great  im- 
portance to  the  American  people  that  this  view 
be  known  and  understood  in  America. 

The  book,  aside  from  expressions  of  opinions, 
contains  very  valuable  information.  Public  men 
in  the  United  States  will  find  the  documents 
published  in  the  appendices  of  decided  interest. 
They  have  not  been  heretofore  readily  acces- 
sible, but  they  are  important. 

It  is  especially  desirable  at  this  moment  to 
be  informed  as  fully  as  possible  regarding  the 
relations  of  Korea  and  Japan  at  the  time  when 
the  Japanese  Government  is  asking  to  have  its 
influence  over  scores  of  millions  of  the  people 
in  China  extended  and  strengthened.  The 
whole  civilization  of  the  Orient,  as  well  as  the 
relations  commercial,  political  and  social,  be- 
tween the  Orient  and  the  West  are  swinging  in 
the  balance. 

The  public  opinion  of  America  and  of  Europe 
are  determining  factors.  Everything  that  can 
throw  real  light  upon  the  situation  is  valuable. 

This  book  contains  much  of  importance.  It 
should  be  widely  read. 

J.W.J. 


Preface 

THE  world's  greatest  war  has  come  to  an 
end,  and,  in  so  far  as  we  are  able  to 
judge,  autocracy  and  militarism  have 
been  driven  from  Europe  once  for  all. 

Now  the  all-important  question  is :  "  Is  this 
the  last  war,  or  has  the  Peace  Conference  failed 
to  solve  the  problem,  thereby  sowing  seeds  for 
another  world  war — perhaps  more  horrible  than 
the  one  just  concluded?  " 

Political  cynics  all  over  the  world  are  already 
beginning  to  criticize  the  work  of  the  Peace 
Conference  as  being  no  better  than  that  of  the 
Congress  of  Vienna;  they  assert  that  all  the 
statesmen  of  the  leading  Powers  went  to  the 
Peace  Conference  with  the  intention  of  getting 
out  of  it  as  much  of  material  gain  for  their  re- 
spective countries  as  they  could,  and  that  they 
have  obtained  as  much  as  they  had  expected  al- 
though not  as  much  as  they  wanted;  that  the 
"  Fourteen  Points  "  were  made  a  political  re- 
volving door  to  admit  whatever  the  Powers 
wanted  to  have  included,  and  to  exclude  nearly 
everything  that  did  not  serve  their  purposes  of 
nationalistic  gain ;  and  that  "  self-determina- 
tion "  of  weaker  nations  turned  out  to  be  selfish 

9 


10  PEEFACE 

determination  of  stronger  Powers.  These  are 
extreme  views,  unpleasant  to  be  reminded  of, 
but,  perhaps,  they  are  not  without  foundation. 
The  League  of  Nations  is  as  yet  nothing  more 
than  a  mere  experiment,  basing  its  strength 
upon  the  moral  support  of  humanity.  Will  it  be 
a  new  Holy  Alliance,  or  will  it  serve  as  the 
framework  for  a  world  organization  that  will  ' 
bind  humanity  into  a  mosaic  of  lasting  peace 
and  mutual  good-will?  The  Peace  Conference 
has  virtually  recognized  the  validity  of  secret 
treaties  made  prior  to  and  during  the  war.  Will 
the  Powers,  under  the  guidance  of  the  League 
of  Nations,  abandon  secret  diplomacy  and  dis- 
continue their  economic  exploitation  of  less  civ- 
ilized lands,  thereby  surrendering  the  particular 
purpose  of  individual  states  to  the  common  will 
of  mankind?  Since  the  League  of  Nations  is  a 
league  of  free  nations,  will  it  not,  even  if  it  be- 
comes a  complete  success,  be  but  another  nail 
driven  into  the  coffin  of  the  already  crushed 
nations,  whose  claims  to  the  right  of  resurrec- 
tion were  denied  them  at  the  Peace  Table?  It 
must  be  remembered  that  a  right  to  revolt 
against  foreign  oppression  is  an  inalienable 
right — a  right  upon  the  foundations  of  which 
the  Fathers  of  the  American  Revolution  built 
their  nation.  Peace  at  any  price — especially,  at 
the  price  of  the  political  aspirations  of  nations 
whose  people  are  crying  for  justice  and  free- 


PREFACE  11 

dom — is  the  worst  kind  of  tyranny.  It  is,  how- 
ever, quite  possible  in  this  pregnant  century, 
that  a  new  international  standard  of  moral  rec- 
titude will  be  born  of  mankind,  which  will  bring 
pressure  to  bear  upon  the  League  so  that  this 
new  world  organization  will  slowly  succeed  in 
disentangling  itself  from  the  many  things  that 
have  bound  us  in  the  past,  and  be  guided  in  its 
actions  by  a  sense  of  justice  that  plays  no 
favourites. 

These  are  more  or  less  academic  speculations 
that  occupy  the  minds  of  political  students  at 
the  present  as  the  aftermath  of  the  war  and  the 
peace  settlements.  But  the  most  vital  question 
that  is  bound  to  engage  the  attention  of  the 
statesmen  of  the  world  is  the  Far  Eastern  ques- 
tion. 

The  open  door  in  the  Far  East  cannot  be 
maintained  permanently  by  a  balance  of  rival 
powers  under  the  guidance  of  intrigue.  China 
must  not  be  left  to  herself,  staggering  under  the 
strain  of  "  spheres  of  influence,"  as  she  has  been 
during  the  last  twenty  years.  The  present 
Eastern  question  is  far  more  menacing  to  the 
future  peace  of  the  world  than  was  the  Balkan 
problem  ten  years  ago.  And  if  the  Powers  of 
the  world  do  not  solve  it  now  by  peaceful 
methods,  then  they  must  be  prepared  to  solve  it 
ten  years  hence  on  the  field  of  battle.  It  must 
be  remembered  that  China  has  one-fourth  of 


12  PBEFACE 

the  world's  population  and  an  unlimited  supply 
of  natural  resources — especially  in  coal  and  iron 
— to  be  exploited  for  peace  or  war.  If  this  res- 
ervoir of  power  is  permitted  to  be  dominated  by 
one  nation — especially  by  such  an  ambitious 
empire  as  Japan — then  it  is  obvious  that  the 
world  cannot  be  made  "safe  for  democracy"; 
there  will  be  a  drawn  dagger  at  the  heart  of  the 
United  States  and  of  the  British  possessions 
in  the  Far  East.  Consolidation  of  Asia  under 
Japanese  domination  is  the  vision  of  the  Japa- 
nese statesmen;  and  toward  the  attainment  of 
this  national  goal  there  is  unity  of  purpose 
among  Japanese  leaders.  With  this  in  view, 
Korea  was  annexed,  Manchuria  was  absorbed, 
Inner  Mongolia  and  Fukien  province  are  being 
overwhelmed,  and  last  but  not  least,  Japan  has 
obtained  from  the  Powers  at  the  Peace  Confer- 
ence the  official  recognition  of  her  paramount 
interests  in  Shantung.  At  the  present  rate  of 
Japanese  aggression,  China  cannot  last  very 
long.  Shall  she  be  left  to  her  own  fate,  or  will 
the  Powers  of  the  West  take  an  active  interest 
in  the  Far  Eastern  affairs  and  save  her  national 
entity?  The  United  States  is  not  interested  in 
any  particular  European  or  Asiatic  problem,  in- 
dividual in  character.  But  the  United  States  is 
interested  in  a  problem  that  has  far-reaching 
effects  on  the  world's  peace  and  the  welfare  of 
mankind.  What  are  her  obligations,  by  treaty, 


PBEFACB  13 

by  policy,  by  moral  rights,  to  her  sister  Republic 
in  the  East?  These  are  some  of  the  questions 
the  author  has  in  mind  in  presenting  the  follow- 
ing chapters. 

The  author  is  not  unaware  of  the  possible 
criticism  on  the  part  of  the  reader  that  Parts  I 
and  II  lack  coordination.  But  the  opinion  of 
the  writers  on  the  Far  Eastern  questions  are  so 
often  conflicting,  even  diametrically  opposed  to 
each  other  at  times  between  those  who  regard 
the  Japanese  as  a  "  model  people  "  and  those 
who  regard  them  as  "treacherous  savages"  mas- 
querading in  the  garb  of  civilization,  that  it  is 
almost  impossible  for  the  average  American 
reader  to  have  a  clear-cut  conception  as  to  what 
the  Oriental  policy  of  the  United  States  ought  to 
be  unless  he  knows  the  subtle  undercurrent  that 
directs,  in  a  large  measure,  the  course  of  public 
opinion  in  the  West  with  regard  to  Japan's  for- 
eign policy.  In  this  respect  the  author  feels 
justified  in  considering  the  two  parts  as  sup- 
plementary to  each  other. 

In  preparing  this  volume,  the  author  had  at 
his  disposal  abundant  Oriental  sources.  But  he 
took  pains  to  use  as  much  as  possible  only  those 
facts  that  had  been  corroborated  by  Western 
historians  and  publicists  of  unquestioned  integ- 
rity, in  order  that  the  reader  may  have  available 
references  for  the  fuller  support  of  the  present 
author's  statements. 


14  PEEFACB 

In  conclusion,  the  author  wishes  to  express 
his  sincere  appreciation  of  the  kind  encourage- 
ment and  constructive  criticism  given  him  by 
Professor  Hartley  Burr  Alexander,  who  has 
aided  him  to  a  deeper  insight  into  and  higher 
appreciation  of  Western  culture. 

New  York.  HENRY  CHUNG. 


Contents 

PAtT  I 

The  Development  of  "the  Policy 
INTRODUCTION         .        .        .        .        .21 

I.  THE  OPENING  OF  THE  EAST     ...      25 

1.  Japan. 
\    2.  Korea. 

^3.  China. 

II.  CHINA  IN  THE  TWENTIETH  CENTURY         .      49 
*4i .  "  Spheres  of  Influence  "   versus  "  Open       * 

Door." 

2.  The  Boxer  Uprising. 

3.  The  Russo-Japanese  Struggle. 

III.  AMERICAN  RIVALRY  WITH  JAPAN      .        .      62 

1.  The  American  Fleet  in  the  Far  East. 

2.  American  and  British  Policies. 

3.  "Dollar  Diplomacy." 

4.  The  Twenty-one  Demands. 

5.  China  and  the  European  War. 

/  IV.    THE  LANSING-ISHII  AGREEMENT      .        .83 

1.  The  Diplomatic  Procedure. 

2.  Reception  of  the  Agreement. 

3.  Effect  on  Japanese  Attitude. 

•/V.      PRESENT  POLICIES  AND  OPPORTUNITIES     ,     100 

1.  Japanese  Plans  and  Ambitions. 

2.  American  Duties  and  Opportunities, 

'5 


16  CONTENTS 

PART  II 

An  Undercurrent  Shaping  the  Policy: 

Japan's  Control  of  Publicity 
INTRODUCTION 113 

I.  THE  OFFICIAL  ESPIONAGE        .        .        .116 

1.  The  Philosophy  of  the  System. 

2.  Spies  in  Other  Lands. 

3.  Espionage  in  Japan  and  Korea. 

II.  THE  GOVERNMENT  CENSORSHIP        .        .129 

1.  Press  Censorship. 

2.  Censorship  of  Postal  and  Telegraphic  Com- 

munications. 

III.  PUBLICITY  PROPAGANDA  .        .        .        .144 

1.  Official  Publications. 

2.  Government  Agencies  in  Foreign  Lands. 

3.  Manipulation  of  Foreign  Visitors  in  Japan. 

CONCLUSION 167 

Comparison  of  Russian  and  Japanese  Diplomacy. 


PART  III 

Documents  in  the  Case 

.  A.  Treaty  Between  the  United  States  and  Japan  .      177 

The  Emigration  Treaty    Between   China  and    the 

United  States          .          .          .         .         .         .192 

C.  Protocol    Between   China  and   the   Treaty  Powers 

Respecting  the  Settlement  of  the  Boxer  War        .      198 
~~^D.  The  Hay  Doctrine  of  the  "  Open  Door  "  in  China      21 1  \ 
E.    The  Anglo-Japanese  Alliances      ,         ,         ,          ,2.16 


CONTENTS  17 

F.  Senate     Resolution     Requesting    the   President   to 

Transmit  to  the  Senate  the  Official  Correspond- 
ence Between  the  United  States  and  Korea          .     227 

G.  The  President's  Reply 228 

H.  The  Korean-American  Treaty     .         .         .         .229 
J.    Petition  from  the   Koreans  of  Hawaii  to  President 

Rodsevelt 241 

J.    American  Policy  in  the  Cases  of  Korea  and  Belgium     245 
K.  Korea  Under  Japan    .         .         .         .         .         .258 

L.  The  Root-Takahira  Agreement  Concerning  China  266 
M.  Count  Okuma's  Message  to  the  American  People 

Concerning  China  .  .  .  .  .270 

N.  The  Twenty-One  Demands  .  .  „  .271 
O.  A  Resume  of  Japan's  Procedure  in  Connection 

with  the  Twenty-One  Demands  .  .  .  276 
P.  The  Revised  Demands  Presented  by  Japan  to  China  278 
Q.  China's  Concession  to  the  Demands  .  .  .285 
R.  American  Note  to  China  and  Japan  Concerning  the 

Agreement  .  .  .  .  .  .  .286 

S.  The  Peking  Petition 287 

T.  The  Lansing-Ishii  Agreement  .  i  .  .289 
U.  The  New  Sino-Jap'anese  Military  Agreement  .  292 
SELECTED  BIBLIOGRAPHY 296 


Maps 


Possessions  of  the  Great  Powers  in  the  Pacific    .    Frontispiece 
^'Spheres  of  Influence"  in  China — 1898  and  1918     .       49 

Railways  in  China,  1915 63 

-*Trade  Routes  of  the  Pacific 83 

China  in   1919,  Showing  Railways  and  Spheres  of  In- 
fluence   .  ...     101 


PART  I 
The  Development  of  the  Policy 


Introduction 

SOME  years  ago  Ex-Premier  Kang  Yu- 
Wei  in  an  address  before  a  group  of 
Chinese  in  California  made  a  statement 
that  if  China  had  been  a  strong  and  aggressive 
empire,  California  would  be  to-day  a  part  of 
Chinese  territory.1  If  we  reflect  for  a  moment 
that  at  the  time  of  the  American  occupation  of 
the  Pacific  coast,  China  was  nearer  to  it  than 
any  other  great  empire  excepting  Japan,  and 
that  travel  between  China  and  California  was 
less  difficult,  before  the  time  of  railroads,  than 
that  across  the  continent,  we  shall  see  that  this 
utterance  from  the  wise  Chinese  is  not  an  empty 
remark.  As  early  as  1860  there  were  34,933 
Chinese  in  the  United  States.8  And  it  would 
have  been  a  comparatively  easy  matter  for 

1  Kang  was  premier  under  the  late  Emperor  Kwang-Hsu,  and  was 
the  leader  of  the  reform  movement  of  1898.  He  has  been  the  head 
of  Pao  Huang  Hwei  (empire  reform  association),  and  is  known 
among  the  Chinese  as  the  "  Modern  Sage."  He  made  a  trip  around 
the  world  in  1905-06  at  which  time  the  writer  heard  him  in  Cali- 
fornia. 

2 «  Thirteenth  Census  of  U.  S.,  Abstract "  (1910),  p.  79. 
21 


22    THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  POLICY 

China,  had  she  been  a  powerful  nation,  to  send 
colonies  to  the  Pacific  coast  before  that  part  of 
the  continent  became  a  part  of  the  United 
States.' 

It  is  also  easy  to  believe  that  had  the  Ameri- 
can Government,  impelled  by  imperial  tenden- 
cies, encouraged  its  merchants  and  seamen  by 
subsidy  and  ample  protection,  the  American 
"  sphere  of  influence  "  would  be  to-day  larger 
than  that  of  any  other  nation  in  China,  and 
American  merchants  would  be  enjoying  the 
iion's  share  of  the  Oriental  trade.  The  enterpris- 
ing Yankees  who  sailed  to  all  parts  of  the  globe 
as  merchants  and  fishermen  were  not  at  all  slow 
in  getting  their  share  of  the  Oriental  trade.  Thus 
the  first  American  merchant  vessel  appeared  in 
Chinese  waters  in  1784;*  and  the  commerce  of 
the  United  States  in  the  palmy  days  of  its  Ori- 
ental trade  was  second  in  volume  among  that  of 
the  Western  nations.  But  American  statesmen 
of  the  early  period  believed  that  there  was 
"  room  enough  for  our  descendants  to  the  thou- 
sandth and  thousandth  generation "  on  this 

•  In  1850  California  had  a  population  of  92,597  (most  of  whom 
went  out  there  after  gold  was  discovered  in  1848)  ;  Oregon  had  only 
13,294;  and  the  territory  of  Washington  was  not  yet  set  off  from 
Oregon,  which  act  came  on  March  2,  1853. 

*  For  a  full  account,  see  Callahan,  "  American  Relations  in  the 
Pacific  and  the  Far  East,"  Johns  Hopkins  University  Studies,  XIX : 
I3ff. ;   also,  Coolidge,  "The  United  States  as  a  World  Power," 
3'3ff- 


INTBODUCTKXff  23 

continent,8  and  the  American  Government  was 
too  busily  occupied  with  internal  problems  to 
safeguard  the  commercial  interests  of  its  citi- 
zens in  the  Far  East.  The  intercourse,  there- 
fore, between  North  America  and  the  Orient, 
built  up  at  the  close  of  the  eighteenth  century, 
was  practically  abandoned  in  later  years,  and  so 
remained  until  the  new  efforts  of  the  middle  of 
the  nineteenth  century. 

The  industrial  revolution  of  the  nineteenth 
century  inaugurated  indeed  a  new  political 
regime  in  Europe  and  in  America.  By  utiliza- 
tion of  steam,  electricity,  and  labour-saving  ma- 
chinery, an  industrial  nation  can  produce  manu- 
factured articles  far  beyond  its  own  needs.  Two 
things  are  essential  to  commercial  expansion  of 
a  nation — to  find  raw  material  either  at  home  or 
abroad,  and  to  find  a  market  for  manufactured 
goods.  Commerce  has  become  the  greatest  of 
all  political  interests.  Territories  are  sought  to 
enlarge  commerce,  and  great  armies  and  navies 
are  maintained  to  enforce  commercial  rights  in 
foreign  lands.  The  United  States,  which  had 
remained  hitherto  a  self-contained  nation,  could 
no  longer  hold  its  isolated  position.  With  the 
acquisition  of  the  Philippine  Islands,  and  the 
coming  of  the  "  spheres  of  influence  "  in  China, 
the  United  States  was  forced  to  become  an 

»  Jefferson's  First  Inaugural  Address,  Richardson,  «  Messages  and 
Papers  of  the  Presidents,"  1 :  321-24. 


24    THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  POLICY 

active  participant  in  Oriental  politics.  From 
now  on,  American  diplomacy  was  what  the  Jef- 
fersonian  Republicans  might  have  called  ag- 
gressive imperialsm. 


THE  OPENING  OF  THE  EAST 

i.    JAPAN 

WHEN  Commodore  Perry  reached 
Japan  in  1853,  he  presented  to  the 
Emperor  of  Japan  President  Fill- 
more's  letter  asking  for  the  friendship  and  com- 
mercial intercourse  of  the  two  nations.  The 
American  Government  had  long  since  wanted  to 
open  Japan  to  American  trade.  In  1815  Secre- 
tary Monroe  had  planned  to  send  Commodore 
Porter  to  open  Japan  to  trade.  In  1837  the 
American  ship  Morrison  had  arrived  in  Yedo 
Bay,  Japan,  in  hope  of  opening  up  trade,  but  had 
been  driven  away  by  bombardment.  The  mo- 
tive of  the  American  Government  in  its  attempt 
to  open  Japan  in  1853  was,  as  stated  in  Presi- 
dent Fillmore's  letter  to  the  Japanese  Emperor, 
"  friendship,  commerce,  a  supply  of  coal  and 
provisions,  and  protection  for  our  shipwrecked 
people."  The  American  whale  industry  in  the 
Pacific  Ocean  about  this  time  was  estimated  at 
about  $17,000,000.  In  several  instances  Ameri- 
can whalers  had  been  wrecked  on  the  Japanese 
coasts  and  the  crews  had  been  maltreated  by  the 
Japanese  officials,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Lawrence 


26     THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  POLICY 

in  1846,  and  the  Ladoga  in  1848.  Then,  too,  it 
was  quite  necessary  for  ocean  liners  plying  be- 
tween California  and  China  to  stop  over  in  Jap- 
anese ports  to  provision  themselves.  In  addi- 
tion to  all  these  material  reasons,  there  was 
some  sense  of  moral  duty  on  the  part  of  Chris- 
tian America  to  open  up  heathen  Japan  to  the 
penetrating  rays  of  Christian  civilization.  In- 
deed, as  early  as  1816,  John  Quincy  Adams 
urged  the  opening  of  Japan  as  a  duty  of  Chris- 
tian nations. 

Between  1854,  when  the  first  American-Jap- 
anese treaty  was  signed  at  Yokohama,  and  1899, 
when  the  Western  nations  recognized  the  full 
sovereignty  of  Dai  Nippon,  many  significant 
historical  events  happened  in  the  Sunrise  King- 
dom. It  was  during  the  early  part  of  this 
period  that  the  Japanese  embassies  returned 
from  Europe  and  America  with  the  astonishing 
discovery  that  "  it  is  not  the  foreigners,  but  we 
ourselves  who  are  barbarous."  Japanese  stu- 
dents were  sent  abroad  to  learn  Western  arts 
and  sciences;  foreign  teachers  were  employed 
to  reorganize  the  school  system ;  the  army  was 
organized  after  the  Western  model,  and  the  navy 
changed  from  fishermen's  junks  to  iron-clad 
men-of-war;  and  feudal  barons  were  forced  to 
give  up  their  powers  to  the  central  government. 
In  short,  Japan  emerged  from  a  state  of  mediae- 
val feudalism  into  that  of  a  modern  constitu- 


THE  OPENING  OF  THE  EAST  27 

tional  monarchy,  strongly  centralized  and  highly 
efficient  in  its  working  order.  In  the  Boxer  up- 
rising, 1900,  she  joined  hands  with  the  Western 
nations,  and  in  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  1904-5, 
she  completely  surprised  the  world  with  the 
efficiency  of  her  military  organization.  It  was 
the  first  time  since  the  Turk  had  pounded  the 
gates  of  Vienna  that  a  heathen  nation  of  the 
East  had  shown  itself  able  successfully  to  meet 
a  Christian  power  of  the  West  on  the  military 
field.  With  good  reason  did  President  Roose- 
velt pay  high  tribute  in  his  message  to  Con- 
gress, 1906,  to  the  spirit  and  methods  of  Japan 
in  her  acceptance  and  promotion  of  modern 
civilization ;  and  it  was  largely  through  the  in- 
strumentality of  President  Roosevelt  that  the 
peace  negotiations  at  Portsmouth  were  brought 
to  a  successful  issue.  When  in  1908  Japan  sent 
her  first  envoy,  Viscount  Shuzo  Aoki,  to  the 
United  States  with  the  rank  of  Ambassador,  it 
was  the  culmination  of  the  long  friendship  be- 
tween the  two  countries. 

American  relations  with  Japan  in  interna- 
tional questions  have  always  been  fair,  and  Jap- 
anese statesmen  have  looked  up  to  the  United 
States  for  moral  support  in  their  struggle  for 
recognition  by  the  Western  Powers.1  They 

1  The  United  States  was  the  first  of  Western  nations  to  with- 
draw the  right  of  extra-territoriality  from  Japan  by  a  treaty  signed 
Nov.  22,  1894.  See  Part  III. 


28     THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  POLICY 

knew  the  American  lack  of  sinister  designs 
in  foreign  lands,  and  had  the  utmost  faith 
in  the  American  sense  of  fair  play,  until  the 
question  of  Japanese  immigration  and  citizen- 
ship in  America  came  up.  This  embarrassing 
question  was  complicated  by  discriminatory 
laws  passed  by  some  of  the  western  states  of 
the  American  Union — especially  California — 
against  aliens  not  qualified  for  citizenship.  The 
labour  element  on  the  Pacific  coast  carried  on  a 
crusade  against  the  Japanese  on  the  grounds 
that  the  market  for  labour  was  cheapened  by  the 
presence  of  the  Orientals.  Politicians  found  a 
popular  issue  in  vehement  denunciations  of  the 
Japanese.  For  a  time  the  Japanese  question  in 
California,  serving  as  a  football  in  local  politics, 
furnished  a  source  of  grave  complications  be- 
tween America  and  Japan. 

It  is  not  the  purpose  of  this  study  to  trace  the 
historical  relations  between  the  United  States 
and  Japan,  nor  to  deal  with  the  Japanese  prob- 
lem within  the  United  States.  Many  excellent 
volumes  have  been  written  on  these  topics.8 

1  On  the  historical  relations  between  Japan  and  the  United  States, 
P.  J.  Treat,  «  Early  Diplomatic  Relations  Between  the  United  States 
and  Japan ; "  John  W.  Foster,  "  American  Diplomacy  in  the 
Orient  ;"W.  E.  GrifBs,  «  America  in  the  East;"J.  M.  Callahan, 
"  American  Relations  in  the  Pacific  and  the  Far  East,"  are  among 
the  best  accounts.  For  full  treatment  of  the  Japanese  question  in 
the  United  States,  see  :  Sidney  L.  Gulick,  «  The  American  Japanese 
Problem ; "  K.  K.  Kawakami,  « American  Japanese  Relations, 


THE  OPENING  OF  THE  EAST  29 

Suffice  it  to  say  here  that  the  present  friendship 
between  the  United  States  and  Japan  is  largely 
traditional,8  although  the  recent  Imperial  .Com- 
mission headed  by  Viscount  Ishii  painted  over 
the  ugly  spots  of  local  friction  with  a  fresh  var- 
nish of  alliance  against  the  "  Common  Enemy,"4 
and  the  Japanese  question  in  the  United  States 
is  still  an  unsettled  issue.  No  unbiased  student 
of  international  relations  will  deny  that  a  sover- 
eign nation  has  a  right  to  close  its  doors  to 
undesirable  immigrants,  or  that  citizenship  is  a 
privilege  to  be  granted  and  not  a  universal  right 
to  be  claimed  by  every  alien  that  comes  to  its 
shores.  But  in  the  interest  of  fairness,  the  ques- 
tion presents  itself,  should  the  United  States, 
the  champion  of  world  democracy,  continue  to 
deny  its  citizenship,  which  is  open  to  all  other 
races,  including  the  blacks  from  the  jungles  of 
Africa,  to  Asiatics  permanently  settled  in  this 
country,  who  have  educational  and  financial 
qualifications  for  all  the  duties  and  obligations 
of  American  citizenship?  The  future  affairs  of 
the  world  must  be  settled  by  both  the  white  and 

Asia  at  the  Door ;  "  Harry  Alvin  Mills,  "  The  Japanese  Problem  in 
the  United  States ;  "  Lindsay  Russell,  "  America  to  Japan ;  "  Monta- 
ville  Flowers,  «'  Japanese  Conquest  of  American  Opinion ;  "  J.  F. 
Steiner,  "  The  Japanese  Invasion." 

3  Cf.  K.  K.  Kawakami,  «  Japan  and  the  United  States,"  Atlantic 
119:671-81,  May,  1917. 

*See  Viscount  Ishii's  speeches  during  his  visit  in  America,  1917, 
together  with  editorial  comments  on  them  by  the  American  press. 


30     THE  DEVELOPMENT  OP  THE  POLICY 

the  yellow  races.  Let  it  be  known  to  the  states- 
men of  the  world — especially  to  the  American 
statesmen — that  the  ultimate  welfare  of  the  hu- 
man race  depends  largely  upon  the  wise  ad- 
justment of  the  relations  between  these  two 
dominant  races,  that  the  peace  of  the  world 
cannot  be  "  planted  upon  the  tested  founda- 
tions of  political  liberty,"  unless  this  compli- 
cated problem  is  correctly  solved.  Surely  the 
American  public  should  not,  through  indiffer- 
ence, leave  this  problem  to  the  hands  of  agita- 
tors and  propagandists,  when  a  lasting  solution 
can  be  made  only  in  the  light  of  its  best  reason 
and  highest  wisdom. 

2.    KOREA 

Before  passing  to  the  Chinese  question,  it 
might  be  worth  our  while  to  take  a  glance  at  the 
closing  chapter  of  the  least  known  nation — once 
a  nation — in  Asia. 

The  United  States  was  the  first  Western 
*  power  to  enter  the  gates  of  Korea.6  The  first 
article  of  the  Korean-American  treaty  signed  at 
Wonsan,  Korea,  May  22,  1882  (ratifications  ex- 
changed at  Seoul,  Korea,  May  19,  1883),  reads 
as  follows: 

"  There  shall  be  perpetual  peace  and  friend- 
ship between  the  President  of  the  United  States 

"For  early  diplomatic  intercourse  between  America  and 
Korea,  see  Foster,  "American  Diplomacy  in  the  Orient," 
chap.  IX. 


THE  OPENING  OF  THE  EAST  31 

and  the  King  of  Chosen  and  citizens  and  sub- 
jects of  their  respective  governments.  If  other 
powers  deal  unjustly  or  oppressively  with  either 
government,  the  other  will  exert  their  good 
offices,  on  being  informed  of  the  case,  to  bring 
about  an  amicable  arrangement,  thus  showing 
their  friendly  feelings." 

Interpreting  this  diplomatic  phraseology  into 
every-day  language,  it  meant  that  America 
would  stand  sponsor  for  the  political  independ- 
ence and  territorial  integrity  of  Korea.  And 
the  simple-minded  Korean  Government  from 
the  Emperor  down  literally  believed  in  it.  In 
fact,  they  had  no  reason  to  doubt  the  sincerity 
of  the  United  States.  They  saw  the  splendid 
work  of  American  philanthropy  through  mis- 
sionary channels ;  the  integrity  of  the  American 
Government  was  exemplified  by  the  integrity  of 
American  citizens  there.  They  thought  that 
there  was  at  least  one  great  nation  that  was  un- 
selfish and  honest  and  upon  which  they  could 
rely  for  support,  as  it  was  provided  in  the 
Korean-American  treaty,  whenever  their  na- 
tional life  was  in  jeopardy.  American  citizens 
were  accorded  greater  privilege  than  any  other 
foreigners  -  in  Korea.  The  first  Korean  rail- 
way— Seoul-Chemulpo  line — was  built  and 
owned  by  an  American  concern;  the  first  elec- 

"  Complete  text  of  the  treaty  reprinted  in  Senate  Docu- 
ment, No.  342,  64th  Congress,  1st  Session. 


32    THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  POLICY 

trie  plant  in  Korea  was  installed  by  the  Edison 
Company  in  1895.  The  first  and  largest  elec- 
tric road  and  water  works  in  Korea  were  built 
and  owned  by  Americans.7  The  richest  gold 
mine  in  Korea  was  given  to  an  American  firm. 
Dr.  Horace  N.  Allen,  former  American  minister 
to  Korea,  thus  describes  the  gaining  of  the  con- 
cession :  "As  the  result  of  a  long  train  of  circum- 
stances, it  had  become  known  to  me  exactly 
which  district  was  considered  the  richest  by  the 
natives,  and  it  was  this  district,  twenty-five  by 
thirty  miles  in  extent,  that  I  named  in  the  con- 
cession."* It  must  be  remembered  that  America 
did  not  get  all  these  concessions  from  Korea  by 
force  as  European  nations  got  theirs  in  China. 
They  were  given  to  American  concerns  by  the 
Korean  Government  in  return  for  the  good  will 
and  friendship  of  the  United  States. 

Numerous  other  American  industries  in  Korea 
might  be  mentioned,  but  it  is  enough  to  say  that 
while  Korea  was  an  independent  nation,  the 
American  business  man  had  the  best  of  the  ad- 
vantages open  to  foreigners  in  Korea.  After 
mapping  out  her  imperial  program,  and  through 
the  clever  use  of  her  publicity  propaganda* 
Japan  convinced  the  American  public — espe- 

TSee  Horace  N.  Allen,  "Things  Korean,"  chap.  XIV; 
Thomas  F.  Millard,  "  The  Far  Eastern  Question,"  chap.  XII, 
"  The  Open  Door  in  Korea." 

8  Allen,  "  Things  Korean,"  pp.  232-233. 

9  See  Part  II. 


THE  OPENING  OF  THE  EAST  33 

cially  official  Washington — that  she  must  have 
Korea  in  order  to  preserve  peace  in  the  Far 
East.  "Japan  began  and  carried  through  this 
whole  matter,"  said  Homer  B.  Hulbert,  an 
American  educator  and  for  some  time  political 
adviser  to  the  Korean  Emperor,  "  by  clever  use 
of  misinformation  and  broken  promises,  which 
successfully  hoodwinked  the  American  pub- 
lic."10 

The  first  obvious  step  taken  by  the  United 
States  in  handing  Korea  over  to  Japan  was  at 
the  beginning  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  when 
Japan  violated  Korean  neutrality  and  exacted 
certain  concessions  from  the  Korean  Govern- 
ment under  "  military  necessity."  The  Secre- 
tary of  State,  John  Hay,  instructed  the  American 
minister  at  Seoul,  Horace  N.  Allen,  to  observe 
strict  neutrality  and  not  cable  the  text  of  any 
agreement  that  Korea  and  Japan  might  come 
to."  This  was  undoubtedly  done  to  avoid  recog- 
nition of  Korea's  appeal  against  Japanese  ag- 
gressions. 

The  next  move  the  United  States  made  to  aid 
Japan  in  this  game  of  Oriental  politics  was  the 
recall  of  Dr.  Allen  from  Korea.  Dr.  Allen  had 
stayed  in  Korea  over  twenty  years  and  was 
highly  esteemed  by  both  the  natives  and  for- 

10  Homer  B.  Hulbert,  "  The  Passing  of  Korea,"  p.  462. 

"Cablegram  sent  from  Washington,  Feb.  23,  1004;  re- 
corded in  Senate  Document,  No.  342  p.  n,  O4th  Congress, 
ist  Session. 


34    THE  DEVELOPMENT  OP  THE  POLICY 

eigners.  When  the  Japanese  began  to  tighten 
their  grip  in  the  peninsula,  he  told  his  govern- 
ment a  few  unpalatable  truths  about  what  the 
Japanese  were  doing  in  Korea.  Immediately 
subtle  influences  were  put  in  operation  at  Wash- 
ington intimating  that  Minister  Allen  was  a 
persona  non  grata  to  the  Japanese.  As  a  result 
Dr.  Allen,  despite  his  unquestioned  integrity 
and  long  years  of  loyal  service  to  his  govern- 
ment, was  summarily  recalled,  to  the  great  sur- 
prise and  indignation  of  American  communities 
in  Korea. 

When  hostilities  began  between  Russia  and 
Japan,  America  was  officially  neutral,  but  her 
sympathies  were  with  Japan.  There  were  three 
possible  reasons  for  this:  (1)  Japan  through  her 
publicity  propaganda  created  a  favourable  opin- 
ion of  herself  in  America;12  (2)  Japan  bor- 
rowed vast  sums  of  money  from  America  for 
war  purposes,  and  Japanese  success  was  natu- 
rally wished  for  by  American  capitalists;  (3)  at 
the  beginning  of  the  war  Japan  was  thought  of 
by  the  outside  world  as  an  "  under-dog  "  trying 
to  get  loose  from  the  brutal  clutch  of  the  Rus- 
sian Bear.  An  incident  which  happened  at 
Chemulpo  Harbour  immediately  preceding  the 
naval  encounter  of  the  two  belligerents  fur- 

"  For  various  methods  of  controlling  American  public 
opinion  by  Japan  in  regard  to  Japanese  affairs,  see  Part  II, 
"Japan's  Control  of  Publicity."  See  also  Flowers,  "Japanese 
Conquest  of  American  Opinion." 


THE  OPENING  OF  THE  EAST  35 

mshes  an  illuminating  illustration  of  American 
attitude  toward  the  three  nations  directly  con- 
cerned in  the  war, — Japan,  Russia,  and  Korea. 

On  February  9,  1904,  Admiral  Uriu,  the  com- 
mander of  the  Japanese  fleet,  sent  an  ultimatum 
to  the  captain  of  the  Variag,  the  Russian  war- 
ship lying  in  the  harbour  of  Chemulpo,  that  he 
would  give  the  Russian  ships  until  twelve 
o'clock  to  leave  the  harbour,  and  if  they  had  not 
moved  by  four  o'clock  that  afternoon,  the 
Japanese  fleet  would  come  in  and  sink  them  at 
their  anchorage — in  a  neutral  port  of  a  neutral 
country. 

There  were  at  that  time  in  the  harbour  four 
other  foreign  war-ships :  the  Talbot  (British),  the 
Elba  (Italian),  the  Pascal  (French),  and  the 
Vicksburg  (American).  The  commander  of  the 
British  war-ship,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that 
Great  Britain  was  an  ally  of  Japan,  was  indig- 
nant at  the  insolence  of  the  Japanese  Admiral, 
and  invited  the  commanders  of  the  other  for- 
eign ships  to  a  conference  on  board  the  Talbot 
to  decide  what  action  should  be  taken.  "  The 
British,  French,  and  Italian  commanders  at  once 
decided  that  Admiral  Uriu  was  proposing  to 
commit  a  gross  breach  of  international  law,  and 
they  unanimously  resolved  to  give  the  Russian 
shipsjvhatever  protection  they  could.  A  mes- 
sage was  sent  to  the  commander  of  the  Variag 
informing  him  of  this  determination,  and  ad- 


36    THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  POLICY 

vising  him  to  refuse  to  leave  the  harbour.1* 
But  the  captain  of  the  Vicksburg  explained  to 
the  other  commanders  that  he  had  received  ex- 
plicit instructions  from  his  government  to  re- 
main strictly  neutral  in  the  coming  event.  And 
the  American  war-ship  Vicksburg,  with  its  proud 
name,  skulked  into  the  inner  harbour  of  safety. 
The  Russian  naval  officers  keenly  resented  this 
action  of  the  Vicksburg,  and  the  Russian  press 
made  bitter  references  to  this  incident  as  well 
as  to  the  generally  pro-Japanese  tendency  in 
America  at  that  time  as  a  breach  of  the  historic 
friendship  between  America  and  Russia." 

At  the  time  of  the  Portsmouth  Conference 
between  Russia  and  Japan,  July,  1905,  the 
Koreans  in  Hawaii  sent  their  two  delegates, 
Syngman  Rhee  and  P.  K.  Yoon,  to  present  a 
petition  to  President  Roosevelt,  asking  that  he 
"  see  to  it  that  Korea  may  preserve  her  autono- 
mous government."  The  delegates  were  re- 
ceived unofficially,  and  their  petition  was  given 
a  sympathetic  consideration.  But  this  did  not 

"For  full  discussion  of  this  incident,  see  Millard,  "The 
New  Far  East,"  chap.  V. 

14  Ever  since  the  birth  of  the  American  nation,  there  has 
been  no  serious  friction  of  any  kind  between  the  United 
States  and  Russia.  During  the  Civil  War  the  Russian  fleet 
anchored  outside  the  New  York  Harbour.  It  was  generally 
understood,  although  not  officially  stated,  that  in  case  Eng- 
land and  France  took  sidoc  with  the  South,  Russia  would 
intervene  on  behalf  of  the  North.  Thus  the  Russian  fleet 
gave  no  small  moral  support  to  the  cause  of  the  Union. 

JB  See  full  text  of  the  petition,  Part  III,  I. 


THE  OPEOTNG  OF  THE  EAST  37 

change  the  President's  settled  policy  toward 
Korea.  When  the  Emperor  of  Korea  sent 
Homer  B.  Hulbert  to  present  his  letter  to  Presi- 
dent Roosevelt  asking  for  aid  against  Japan's 
aggression,  Mr.  Hulbert  was  refused  an  inter- 
view by  both  the  President  and  Secretary  of 
State  Root  on  one  excuse  after  another  until  it 
was  too  late.18  "  So  far  from  pleading  the  case 
of  Korea  with  Japan,  America  was  the  first  to 
fall  in  with  and  give  its  open  assent  to  the 
destruction  of  the  old  administration.  On  the 
first  intimation  from  Japan  it  agreed,  without 
inquiry  and  with  almost  indecent  haste,  to  with- 
draw its  minister  from  Seoul." 

When  the  United  States  declared  neutrality 
at  the  beginning  of  the  recent  European  war, 
the  very  men  who  ignored  treaty  obligations 
and  handed  over,  as  far  as  America  was  con- 
cerned, the  "  Belgium  of  the  East "  to  Japan, 
Theodore  Roosevelt  and  Elihu  Root,  were  the 
loudest  in  denouncing  the  Wilson  Administra- 
tion for  not  going  to  war  against  Germany  in 
defense  of  Belgian  neutrality.  There  was  no 
treaty  binding  upon  the  United  States  to  defend 
Belgium  against  the  unrighteous  aggressor  as  in 
the  case  of  Korea.  The  Democratic  President 
and  Congress  retaliated  by  publishing  the  ac- 

18  For  a  full  description  of  Hulbert's  mission,  see  Part 
III,  J,  "American  Policy  in  the  Cases  of  Korea  and  Bel- 
gium." 

"  F.  A.  McKenzie,  "  Tragedy  of  Korea,"  p.  131. 


38    THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  POLICY 

counts  of  the  Roosevelt  and  Root  Administra- 
tion ignoring  Korea's  appeal  in  the  last  days 
of  her  struggle  against  Japan.18  For  the  first 
time  the  part  played,  or  not  played,  by  the 
United  States  in  that  tragedy  in  the  Far  East 
came  to  light.  When  newspaper  reporters  in- 
terviewed Root  on  the  subject,  he  refused  to 
comment  on  it.  Alvey  A.  Adee,  who  was  the 
Second  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  under  Root, 
and  who  is  the  star  witness  of  the  Korean  case 
at  Washington,  also  refused  to  comment  on  the 
matter,  but  said,  "  It  is  ancient  history,  any- 
how." u 

Korea  was  the  bone  of  contention  of  the  East 
for  a  number  of  years.  It  was  only  through  a 
favourable  combination  of  circumstances  that 
Japan  was  enabled  to  occupy  it.  Russia  gave 
her  consent  to  Japanese  occupation  as  her  war 
indemnity;  England  welcomed  the  expansion  of 
her  ally's  influence  on  the  mainland  of  Asia  to 
checkmate  the  Russian  advance  and  to  protect 
the  British  interests  in  the  East,  so  that  she 
might  concentrate  her  navy  in  the  North  Sea  to 
counteract  Germany.  But  the  United  States, 
instead  of  gaining  something  by  the  "  deal," 
lost  all  the  advantages  she  had  held  before.  Be- 
fore the  Russo-Japanese  War,  American  busi- 
ness men  enjoyed  the  largest  share  of  foreign 

" Senate  Document,  No.  342,  64th  Congress,  1st  Session. 
19 Nezv  York  Times,  March  6,  1916. 


THE  OPENING  OF  THE  EAST  39 

trade  in  Korea  and  Manchuria.20  But  now  their 
place  is  taken  by  Japanese.  The  American  policy 
then,  as  now,  was  not  motivated  by  material 
gains.  The  statesmen  at  Washington  were  con- 
vinced that  Korea  was  utterly  "  incapable  of  in- 
dependence " — the  same  kind  of  conviction  that 
Metternich  had  toward  Italy,  George  III  to- 
ward American  colonies,  and  the  statesmen  of 
the  Central  Powers  toward  Serbia,  Belgium, 
and  all  the  constituent  states  of  Austria-Hun- 
gary. The  principle  of  "  no  people  must  be 
forced  under  sovereignty  under  which  it  does 
not  wish  to  live  "  '  was  as  yet  too  far  off  an 
ideal  to  be  a  common  expression  of  American 
statesmen. 

The  Korean  people  learned  too  late  that  there 
is  no  such  a  thing  as  international  honesty,  and 
that  treaty  obligations  backed  by  no  force  are 
not  worth  the  paper  upon  which  they  are 
written.  The  United  States  was  the  first  of 
Western  nations  to  enter  Korea,  the  first  to 
enjoy  the  preferential  treatment  and  commer- 
cial advantages  in  that  land,  and  the  first  to 
desert  her  in  the  time  of  her  dire  need  of  Amer- 
ican friendship.  Dr.  Allen  well  sums  up  the 
case  of  Korean-American  treaty  obligations  in 
the  following  words : 

20  See  Allen,  "  Things  Korean/'  pp.  215,  ff. 
"From  President  Wilson's  Message  to  Russia,  May  26. 
1017. 


40    THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  POLICY 

"  Korea  has  taken  that  treaty  to  mean  just 
what  the  words  say,  while  we  seem  to  have 
utterly  disregarded  the  solemn  promise  we 
therein  voluntarily  made,  that  we  would  lend 
her  our  good  offices  should  she  be  oppressed  by 
a  third  power ;  thus  breaking  faith  with  a  people 
who  trusted  us  implicitly,  and  who  consented  to 
the  opening  of  her  doors  on  this  guarantee  of 
friendly  aid."  * 

Thus  the  United  States  of  America  "  sneered 
at  freedom  and  lent  arms  to  the  tyrant "  in  the 
demolition  of  a  civilization  that  began  long  be- 
fore David  became  the  king  of  Israel.28 


3.    CHINA 

A  prominent  Western  historian  and  scientist 
won  distinction  for  a  time  by  his  advocacy  of 
a  novel  idea  that  a  nation,  like  an  individual,  has 
its  infancy,  maturity,  senility,  and  final  extinc- 
tion.24 This  idea  was  supported  by  a  few  super- 
ficial observers  of  Oriental  politics  who  main- 
tained that  the  Eastern  nations  had  long  since 
reached  the  summit  of  their  evolution,  and  that 
no  further  progress  in  the  future  was  to  be  ex- 

28  Allen,  "  Things  Korean,"  p.  214. 

aFor  antiquity  of  Korean  civilization,  see  W.  E.  Griffis, 
;'  Corea— The  Hermit  Nation  "  ;  H.  B.  Hulbert,  "  The  Pass- 
ing of  Korea." 

34  See  John  William  Draper,  "  History  of  the  Intellectual 
Development  of  Europe." 


THE  OPENING  OF  THE  EAST  41 

pected.25  Interesting  though  these  theories  may 
be,  they  have  little  historical  foundation.  A  na- 
tion may  have  ebbs  and  flows  of  civilization  in 
the  cycle  of  its  life,  but  there  is  no  reason  for 
its  predestined  maturity  and  decay  except 
through  its  adoption  of  wrong  institutions. 
Egypt  in  Africa,  Italy  in  Europe,  and  China  in 
Asia  furnish  ample  evidences  to  upset  the 
theory  of  an  analogy  between  the  life  of  a 
nation  and  that  of  an  individual. 

When  China  opened  her  gates  to  the  treaty 
powers  of  the  West,  her  civilization  was  at  its 
ebb.  The  China  that  Marco  Polo  found  in  the 
thirteenth  century  was  undoubtedly  in  a  higher 
stage  of  civilization  than  the  China  of  the  nine- 
teenth century.  The  "  foreign-devil  "  notion 
and  the  spirit  of  exclusiveness  were  not  the  atti- 
tude of  China  toward  foreigners  in  the  Middle 
Ages.  On  the  contrary,  the  alien  then  enjoyed 
in  China  rights  and  privileges  such  as  he  could 
enjoy  in  few,  if  any,  countries  of  modern  times. 
"  The  imperial  government  placed  the  aliens 
practically  on  the  same  footing  as  its  own  sub- 
jects: it  opened  to  them  public  employments 
and  extended  to  them  the  fullest  protection. 
Olopun,  .one  of  the  Nestorians  who  entered 
China  in  the  Tang  Dynasty,  was  raised  to  the 

26  See  Henry  Sumner  Maine's  "Ancient  I«aw"  and  his  the- 
ory of  progressive  and  non-progressive  races  together  with 
the  theories  advanced  by  his  followers  along  the  same  line. 


42    THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  POLICY 

rank  of  high  priest  and  national  protector  by 
Emperor  Kautsung.  Marco  Polo,  though  a 
Venetian  by  birth,  was  appointed  to  the  office 
of  prefect  of  Yangchow,  which  he  held  for  three 
years."  "• 

When  the  Portuguese  first  entered  the  Can- 
ton  River  in  1517,  they  were  received  in  a 
kindly  spirit.  But  their  greedy  and  high-handed 
methods  in  their  relations  with  the  natives 
turned  the  feeling  of  amity  into  one  of  hatred, 
and  caused  the  Ming  Emperor  in  1545  to  issue 
an  edict  to  attack  the  foreigners.  The  Span- 
iards made  their  appearance  in  .1575,  but  they 
were  as  cruel  and  greedy  as  the  Portuguese,  and 
failed  to  restore  the  prestige  of  Westerners  in 
the  eyes  of  the  Chinese.  The  successive  events 
of  European  expansion  in  the  East, — the  con- 
quest of  the  East  Indies,  and  the  forcible  occu- 
pation of  parts  of  India  and  the  Malay  Penin- 
sula by  Portuguese  adventurers,— awakened  the 
suspicions  of  the  Chinese  as  to  the  ulterior 
motives  of  the  foreigners  rapidly  flocking  to 
their  shores.  At  this  early  period  of  European 
intercourse,  China  unfortunately  received  a  bad 
impression  that  all  Europeans  were  barbarians 
and  adventurers. 

Commercial  relations  between  England  and 

China  began  in  J635,  when  Captain  John  Wed- 

dell  was  sent  to  China  with  a  small  fleet  of 

*V.  K.  W,  Koo,  "The  Status  of  Aliens  in  China,"  p.  igt 


THE  OPENING  OF  THE  EAST  43 

vessels.  Later  two  missions— one  under  the 
Earl  of  Macartney  in  1793,  and  the  other  under 
Lord  Amherst  in  1816 — were  sent  to  China 
from  England  for  the  purpose  of  arriving  at  a 
better  understanding  in  regard  to  the  trade 
relations  between  the  two  countries.  Lord 
Napier  was  appointed  as  Commercial  Superin- 
tendent of  the  British  Government  in  China  in 
1833,  when  the  control  of  the  British  trade  at 
Canton  passed  out  of  the  hands  of  the  East 
India  Company.  All  the  British  had  accom- 
plished during  the  two  hundred  years  of  com- 
mercial intercourse  with  China  was  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  trading  post  in  Canton.  Their 
attempt  to  enter  into  a  cordial  relationship  with 
China  on  the  basis  of  international  comity  and 
mutual  understanding  had  been  a  complete  fail- 
ure. The  Chinese  continued  to  suspect  the 
motive  of  the  foreigner  and  treated  him  as  a 
barbarian.  This  suspicion  and  hatred  was  in- 
tensified when  opium  was  forced  upon  China 
through  the  muzzles  of  the  British  men-of-war, 
and  the  Chinese  Government  was  compelled  to 
submit  to  the  demands  of  the  British.27 
The  treaty  of  Nanking,  signed  at  the  close  of 

27  The  treaty  was  signed  in  i&2.at  the  close  of  the  "  Opium 
War."  By  this  treaty,  the  island  of  Hongkong  was  ceded  to 
Great  Britain,  an  indemnity  was  paid  for  the  opium  des- 
troyed, official  correspondence  was  to  be  carried  on  on  equal 
terms,  and  Canton,  Amoy,  Foochow,  Ningpo,  and  Shanghai 
were  opened  to  foreign  trade  as  treaty  ports,  where  for- 
eigners could  reside. 


44    THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  POLICY 

the  first  Anglo-Chinese  War,  did  not  settle  all 
the  pending  issues  between  the  Chinese  and  the 
British.  The  constant  friction  between  the 
Chinese  and  the  British  officials  in  regard  to 
their  respective  rights,  and  the  continuance  of 
opium  smuggling  by  the  British  merchants  at 
Canton  and  Hongkong,  furnished  causes  for  an- 
other war.  This  time  the  French,  actuated 
partly  by  the  desire  to  seek  reparation  for  the 
massacre  of  a  missionary  in  West  Kwangsi,  and 
partly  by  the  spirit  of  imperial  aggrandizement, 
joined  with  the  English  in  war  against  China. 
The  allied  forces  took  Canton,  and  then  carried 
war  to  the  north.  The  Chinese  were  forced  to 
sue  for  peace,  and  the  war  was  brought  to  a 
close  by  the  treaty  oLTient^iiQ,  signed  June  26, 
1859.  The  treaty  provided  among  other  things 
the  right  of  residence  by  foreign  ministers  in 
Peking,  the  opening  of  five  additional  treaty 
ports,  and  the  toleration  of  the  Christian  re- 
ligion.58 The  Chinese,  later  on,  tried  to  evade 
the  carrying  out  of  these  provisions.  Tins 
caused  the  allied  armies  to  make  an  expedition 
to  Peking,  where  they  burned  the  Summer 
Palace  as  a  punitive  measure,  and  compelled  the 
Chinese  Government  to  sign  another  treaty  on 
October  22,  1860.  In  addition  to  the  terms  of 

"At  this  time  the  United  States  and  Russia  also  made 
treaties  with  China,  although  they  took  no  part  in  the  con- 
flict. 


THE  OPENING  OP  THE  EAST  45 

the  treaty  of  Tientsin,  Koj&loon  was  ceded  to 
the_.British  and  Tientsin  was  opened  as  a  treaty 
port.  Foreign  ministers  for  the  first  time  took 
up  their  residence  in  Peking,  Anson  Bur lingame 
representing  the  United^  States.29 

Repeated  defeats  and  humiliations  caused  the 
Chinese  Government  to  make  feeble  attempts 
at  reform.  In  1867  the  first  Chinese  embassy 
was  sent  to  foreign  countries  for  the  purpose  of 
winning  for  China  more  favourable  treatment 
from  Western  nations.  The  embassy  was  headed 
by  Anson  Burlingame,  who  had  completed  his 
term  as  the  first  American  minister  to  China. 
This  was  the  beginning  of  American  prestige  in 
the  Far  East.  Minister  Burlingame,  through 
his  personal  integrity  and  diplomatic  foresight, 
won  the  respect  and  confidence  of  the  Chinese. 
He  convinced  the  Chinese  Government  that  his 
country  of  all  Western  nations  had  IIP  ulterior 
motives  in  Chinese  territory.80  The  most  notable 
achievement  of  the  embassy  was  the  conclusion 
of  the  treaty  of  1808  with  the  United  States. 
"  It  stipulated  the  territorial  integrity  of  China 
by  disavowing  any  right  to  interfere  with  its 
eminent  domain  or  sovereign  jurisdiction  over 

29  For  Burlingame's  career  as  the  American  minister  to 
China,  see  U.  S.  "  Diplomatic  Correspondence,"  1862-68, 
China ;  Martin's  "  Cathay,"  pt.  II,  chap.  II. 

80  See  U.  S.  "  Diplomatic  Correspondence,"  1868,  pt.  I,  pp. 
493,  502,  601;  1870,  pp.  317,  332 ;  1871,  p.  166;  Martin's 
"  Cathay,"  p.  374 ;  Speer's  "  China,"  p.  429. 


46    THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  POLICY 

its  subjects  and  property;  it  recognized  the 
right  of  China  to  regulate  its  internal  trade  not 
affected  by  treaty;  provided  for  the  appoint- 
ment of  consuls ;  secured  exemption  from  perse- 
cution or  disability  on  account  of  religion; 
recognized  the  right  of  voluntary  emigration; 
pledged  the  privilege  of  residence  and  travel  in 
either  country  on  the  basis  of  most  favoured 
nation;  granted  the  privilege  of  schools  and 
colleges;  disavowed  the  intention  to  interfere 
in  the  domestic  administration  of  China  in  re- 
spect to  public  improvements,  but  expressed 
the  willingness  of  the  United  States  to  aid  in 
such  enterprise  when  requested  by  China." ' 

All  these  outward  signs  of  change  and  reform 
did  not  affect  the  core  of  China.  The  depths  of 
Chinese  conservatism  were  like  those  of  a  vast 
ocean  undisturbed  by  the  surface  ripples  of  wars 
and  treaties.  The  literati  of  China  were  as  firm 
as  ever  in  their  belief  that  China  was  the  center 
of  the  world's  culture — hence  the  name,  "Middle 
Kingdom  " — and  that  all  the  foreign  nations 
were  barbarians.  When  the  first  imperial 
audience  for  foreign  ambassadors  was  held  in 

81  Foster,  "American  Diplomacy  in  the  Orient,"  pp.  365- 
366.  The  voluntary  emigration  clause  of  this  treaty  was 
revised  later,  and  exclusion  laws  were  passed  against  Chinese 
labourers.  For  voluminous  findings  of  investigating  com- 
mittees, debates  in  Congress,  editorial  comments  pro  and  con 
on  the  subject,  see  "  Select  List  of  References  on  Chinese 
Immigration,"  compiled  by  A.  P.  C.  Griffin,  Library  of  Con- 
gress, Washington,  1904. 


THE  OPENING  OF  THE  EAST  47 

Peking  in  1873,  it  took  place  in  the  "  Pavilion 
of  Purple  Light,"  a  hall  used  for  receiving 
tributary  nations.  Something  decidedly  violent 
was  needed  to  stir  the  complacency  of  the 
Chinese  and  upset  their  naive  attitude  of 
superiority.  Now  Jajgan  was  ready  to  play  her 
role  in  Eastern  politics. 

For  centuries  China  considered  Korea  as  a 
vassal  nation  *  and  Japan  as  an  archipelago  of 
barbarous  tribes.  Japan  patiently  forebore  the 
insolence  of  China  during  the  early  period  of 
Meiji  Era  with  the  anticipation  of  coming  back 
at  her  later.  After  the  internal  troubles  were 
settled  and  the  country  was  thoroughly  organ- 
ized on  a  modern  basis,  the  Japanese  statesmen 
launched  the  program  of  imperial  expansion, 
and  hastened  military  and  naval  preparations 
with  astonishing  rapidity  for  what  they  deemed 
to  be  the  inevitable  conflict  with  China.  When 
they  thought  they  were  sufficiently  prepared, 
they  struck  the  blow  in  1894,  and  China  was 
completely  prostrated.83 

*  Korea  had  her  autonomy  in  all  its  essentials.  Dynasties 
changed,  wars  and  treaties  were  made  with  foreign  countries 
without  regard  to  China.  See  Bishop,  "  Korea  and  Her 
Neighbours  " ;  Griffis,  "  Corea— The  Hermit  Nation  " ;  Long- 
ford, "  The  Story  of  Korea  " ;  McKenzie,  "  The  Tragedy  of 
Korea  " ;  Hulbert,  "  The  History  of  Korea." 

"For  the  causes  of  the  war,  see  Sengman  Rhee,  "The 
Spirit  of  Korean  Independence,"  pp.  16/1-173  (Korean)  ; 
"U.  S.  Foreign  Relations,"  1894,  Appendix  I,  pp.  5-23; 
Williams,  "History  of  China,"  pp.  437-444;  Griffis,  "Corea," 
pp.  460-462;  Henry  Norman,  "The  People  and  Politics  of 


48    THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  POLICY 

The  United  States  performed  an  important 
mission  during  and  at  the  close  of  the  war. 
When  the  war  was  declared,  both  belligerent 
countries  intrusted  the  archives  and  property  of 
their  legations  and  consulates  and  the  interests 
of  their  subjects  in  the  enemy  country  to  the 
care  of  the  United  States  ministers  and  consuls 
in  the  respective  countries.  At  the  close  of  the 
conflict,  peace  overtures  were  made  through 
American  ministers  both  at  Peking  and  Tokyo." 
Thus  the  United  States  proved  herself  a  dis- 
interested friend  to  both  China  and  Japan,  and 
established  the  foundation  for  further  diplo- 
matic achievements  in  the  East.  The  Emperor 
of  Japan,  soon  after  the  close  of  the  war,  sent  a 
letter  to  the  President  of  the  United  States  ex- 
pressing his  cordial  thanks  for  the  good  offices 
of  the  United  States  during  the  war.  •  A  similar 
sentiment  was  expressed  by  China  through  Li 
Hung  Chang  on  his  visit  to  the  United  States 
in  1896.* 

the  Far  East,"  pp.  259-266;  Curzon,  "Far  East,"  pp.  196- 
208. 

For  the  events  of  the  war,  see  "  Foreign  Relations,'5  1894, 
Appendix  I,  pp.  44-104;  Williams,  "China,"  pp.  444-459; 
"  Vladimir,"  "  The  China-Japan  War,"  London,  1896,  pts.  II 
and  III,  Appendix  D,  F-H.  For  results  of  the  war,  see  J.  H. 
Wilson,  U.  S.  A.,  "  China,  Travels  in  the  Middle  Kingdom/' 
chap.  XX. 

"For  peace  negotiations,  see  "Foreign  Relations,"  1894, 
Appendix  I,  pp.  29-106;  1895,  P-  969;  "History  of  Peace 
Negotiations  Between  China  and  Japan,*'  officially  revised, 
Tientsin,  1895 ;  Williams,  "  China,"  p.  459. 

"See  "Memoirs  of  U  Hung  Chang,"  edited  by  W.  F. 
Mamiix,  Shanghai,  1912. 


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II 

CHINA  IN  THE  TWENTIETH  CENTURY 

i.    "  SPHERES  OF  INFLUENCE  "  vs.  "  OPEN  DOOR  " 

THE  position  of  China  at  the  opening  of 
the  twentieth  century  was  peculiar. 
The  China-Japanese  War,  1894-95,  re- 
vealed the  utter  helplessness  of  China.  When 
the  three  European  powers — Germany,  France, 
and  Russia — sent  a  notice  to  Japan  to  withdraw 
from  the  mainland  of  Asia  and  to  return  to 
China  the  conquered  territory  of  the  Liaotung 
Peninsula,  they  did  not  do  so  with  the  altruistic 
motive  of  helping  China  preserve  her  territorial 
integrity.  Their  action  was  motivated,  as  was 
proved  by  subsequent  events,  by  a  desire  to  curb 
the  expansion  of  Japanese  influence  on  the 
Asiatic  mainland,  and  to  appropriate  for  them- 
selves, in  time,  what  Japan  wanted  as  a  prize  of 
her  victory.  The  downfall  of  China  was  pre- 
dicted, and  the  partition  of  that  vast  empire 
among  civilized  nations  was  freely  discussed. 
Then  arose  the  "  sphere  ofjnfluence  "  doctrine. 
This  peculiar  modern  doctrine,  paraphrased, 

49 


50    THE  DEVELOPMENT  OP  THE  POLICY 

means  that  each  nation  that  has  some  interest 
in  China  shall  map  out  a  certain  district  as  its 
own  sphere  in  which  it  will  have  a  paramount 
influence,  and  out  of  which  other  nations  must 
stay.  In  case  of  final  partition,  each  district 
thus  mapped  out  will  become^  a  territory  of  its 
respective  owner.  Even  in  far-off  China,  as  in 
Europe  proper,  the  spirit  of  European  rivalry 
was  based  on  the  theory  and  practice  of  bal- 
ance of  power.  And  every  incident  was  utilized 
as  a  pretext  to  press  upon  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment claims  for  leases,  concessions,  and  privi- 
leges of  one  kind  or  another. 

Germany  fired  the  opening  gun  in  this  Euro- 
pean lease  scramble  in  China.  In  1897  two  Ger- 
man missionaries  were  killed  by  a  Chinese  mob. 
The  German  Government  lost  no  time  in  seiz- 
ing this  opportunity.  German  men-of-war  ap- 
peared promptly  in  Kiaochow  Bay,  occupied 
the  city,  demanded,  as  an  indemnity,  the  lease  of 
Kiaochow  for  ninety-nine  years,  and  the  recog- 
nition of  a  German  sphere  of  influence  in  the 
greater  part  of  Shantung  Peninsula.  These  de- 
mands were  complied  with  by  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment in  the  treaty  signed  March  8,  1898. 

This  move  of  Germany  turned  loose  the 
pent-up  ambition  of  European  nations  to  ex- 
ploit China.  Russia,  who  had  already  held  rail- 
road franchises  in  northern  Manchuria,  now  ap- 
proached China  with  cajolery,  intimidation,  and 


CHINA  IN  THE  TWENTIETH  CENTURY    61 

promises  of  aid  in  case  of  further  aggression  by 
other  European  nations,1  and  succeeded  in  leas- 
ing Port  Arthur,  Talienwan,  and  the  adjacent 
waters  as  naval  bases.  The  Manchurian  Rail- 
way Company  under  Russian  control  was  given 
the  right  to  construct  a  branch  line  to  Port 
Arthur.  England  forced  China  to  sign  a  lease 
of  Weihaiwei  together  with  the  adjacent 
waters,  July  1,  1898.  In  like  manner  France 
occupied^Kwangchow  Bay  under  a  ninety-nine 
year  lease;  and  Italy  obtained  the  right  to  de- 
velop the  port  of  Sanmun.  In  April,  1898, 
England  and  Russia  made  an  agreement  that 
Russia  should  have  her  sphere  of  influence  to 
the  north  of  the  Great  Wall  of  China,  and  Eng- 
land to  have  hers  to  the  south. 
VThe  movement  for  the  partition  of  China  was 
thus  well  under  way.  Unless  some  counteract- 
ing influence  was  introduced,  China  no  longer 
could  maintain  her  national  entity.  The  United 
States  with  her  newly  acquired  insular  posses- 
sions in  the  East  could  not  afford  to  be  in- 
different to  the  partition  of  China.  There  were 
two  courses  open  to  her:  She  had  either  to 
deviate  entirely  from  her  traditional  foreign 
policy  and  seize  her  share  of  land  and  commer- 
cial advantages  in  China,  regardless  of  justice 
and  fairness  to  the  Chinese,  or  to  exercise  her 

1  For  Russian  intrigues  in  China,  sec  Rhee,  "  The  Spirit  of 
Korean  Independence,"  pp.  173,  if. 


62    THE  DEVELOPMENT  OP  THE  POLICY 

good  offices  to  preserve  the  integrity  of  the 
Chinese  Empire.     She  chose  the  nobler  way. 

On  September  6, 1899,  the  Secretary  of  State, 
John  Hay,  addressed  notes  to  England,  Ger- 
many, and  Russia,  and  later  to  France,  Italy, 
and  Japan,  declaring  the  "  open  door  "  doctrine 
in  China.2  This  formal  protest  of  the  United 
States  in  behalf  of  China  requested  the  Powers 
to  give  their  official  assurances  to  the  effect: 
(1)  that  they  would  not  interfere  with  any 
treaty  port  or  vested  interest  in  their  respective 
spheres  of  influence;  (2)  that  the  Chinese  tariff 
should  continue  to  be  collected  by  Chinese  of- 
ficials; (3)  that  they  would  not  discriminate 
against  other  foreigners  in  the  matter  of  port 
dues  or  railroad  rates.8  England  expressed  her 
willingness  to  sign  such  a  declaration,  and  other 
powers,  while  carefully  avoiding  to  commit 
themselves,  showed  their  accord  with  the  prin- 
ciples set  forth  by  Mr.  Hay.  These  principles, 
together  with  the  principle  of  the  territorial  and ' 

2  For  full  discussion  of  diplomatic  intercourse  between  the 
United  States  and  other  powers  and  the  part  played  by  John 
Hay,  consult  W.  R.  Thayer,  "Life  and  Letters  of  John 
Hay,"  2.  vols.,  1915. 

8  This  doctrine  is  being  violated  by  Japanese  in  Manchuria 
now.  Japanese  merchants  through  government  subsidies, 
special  railway  rebates,  preferential  customs  treatment,  and 
exemption  from  internal  taxation,  have  monopolized  the 
Manchurian  market.  Consult  Millard,  "The  Far  Eastern 
Question,"  chaps.  XV-XX;  Hollington  K.  Tong,  "American 
Money  and  Japanese  Brains  in  China,"  Review  of  Reviews, 
53:452-455,  April,  1916;  "Japan,  China,  and  American 
Money,"  Harper's  Weekly,  62 : 298-299,  March  25,  1916. 


CHINA  IN  THE  TWENTIETH  CENTUEY    63 

administrative  integrity  of  China,  were  empha- 
sized by  the  American  Government  in  the  settle- 
ment of  the  Boxer  trouble  in  China,  and  since 
then  the  principle  of  the  "  open  door  "  in  China 
has  become  an  American  doctrine,  recognized  as 
such  by  the  Powers  just  as  the  time-honoured 
Monroe  Doctrine  is  recognized. 

2.  THE  BOXER  UPRISING 
The  rapid  foreign  exploitation  of  Chinese 
territory,  the  introduction  of  Christianity  into 
China,  the  constant  bullying  of  the  natives  by 
foreigners,  aroused  the  Chinese  to  concerted 
action.  To  the  fogyish  Chinese  mind,  every- 
thing foreign  was  repulsive.  They  could  not 
distinguish  the  work  of  an  American  missionary 
from  the  opium  traffic  of  a  British  merchant. 
The  only  way,  they  thought,  that  they  could 
enjoy  again  the  undisturbed  peace  of  the  old 
times  was  to  drive  all  the  "  foreign  devils  "  out 
of  the  country.  Prince  Tuan,  an  influential 
reactionary,  formed  an  organization  known  as 
the  Society  of  Boxers  to  expel  all  foreigners 
from  China.  This  movement  was  secretly  en- 
couraged by  the  Empress  Dowager,  who  was 
holding  the  supreme  power  in  China  after  the 
coup  d'etat  in  1898,  and  by  all  the  reactionary 
officials  under  her.  The  movement  spread  like 
wild-fire,  and  the  army  of  Boxers  joined  by  im- 
perial forces  occupied  Peking.  Foreign  repre- 


54    THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  POLICY 

sentatives  fled  to  the  British  Legation.  Many 
tragic  ;ncidents  occurred  to  both  the  Chinese 
and  the  foreigners  in  China  during  the  struggle.4 
Promptly  an  expeditionary  force  composed  of 
English,  French,  German,6  Russian,  Japanese, 
and  American  soldiers  marched  to  Peking  and 
lifted  the  siege.  The  imperial  court  fled  west- 
ward, and  later  appointed  Li  Hung  Chang  as  its 
representative  to  negotiate  with  the  Powers. 

This  was  the  most  critical  period  of  Chinese 
history  in  recent  times.  China  had  incurred 
"well-nigh  universal  indignation,"  as  Minister 
Wu  expressed  it,  when  he  was  presenting  a 
cablegram  from  his  emperor  to  President  Mc- 
Kinley,  asking  for  American  aid  in  settling  her 
difficulties  with  the  Powers.  The  Powers,  with 
good  reason,  looked  upon  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment as  hostile,  and  many  of  them — especially 
Russia — were  willing  to  consent  to  the  partition 
of  China.  But  the  United  States  insisted  on  re- 
garding the  outrages  as  the  work  of  insurrec- 
tionists, and  remained  on  friendly  terms  with 
the  constituted  authorities,  thus  firmly  uphold- 
ing the  territorial  and  administrative  integrity 

*For  full  account  of  the  Boxer  War,  consult  Paul  Henry 
Clemants,  "The  Boxer  Rebellion,"  Columbia  University 
Studies  in  History,  Economics,  and  Public  Law,  vol.  66, 
1915;  Rhee,  "Spirit  of  Korean  Independence,"  pp.  175,  ff. ; 
11  Foreign  Relations,"  1900,  pp.  77,  ff. 

8  The  German  troops  remained  at  Kiaochow  and  took  no 
part  in  the  expedition,  although  the  allied  forces  were  led  by 
Field-Marshal  Count  von  Waldersee  chosen  as  Generalissimo 
to  satisfy  the  Kaiser. 


CHINA  IN  THE  TWENTIETH  CENTUEY    56 

of  China.  Then,  too,  many  a  wise  statesman  in 
the  world  saw  a  condition  of  general  anarchy 
and  the  possibility  of  world  war  over  the  spoils, 
in  case  China  were  partitioned.  It  was  much 
better  for  a  nation  like  England,  which  enjoyed 
the  largest  foreign  trade  in  China,  to  restore 
the  status  quo,  and  enjoy  the  commercial  privi- 
leges, than  to  take  the  chance  of  losing  them  by 
partition.  Thus  the  Powers  finally  followed  the 
lead  of  the  United  States  in  preserving  China 
as  a  nation  and  maintaining  there  the  principle 
of  the  "  open  door." 

The  final  protocol  settling  the  difficulties  con- 
sequential to  the  Boxer  Uprising  was  signed  on 
September  7,  1901.  China  agreed:  (1)  to  pun- 
ish those  who  were  responsible  for  and  who 
took  part  in  foreign  massacres;  (2)  to  adopt 
adequate  measures  to  prevent  recurrence  of 
such  disorders;  (3)  to  indemnify  the  losses  sus- 
tained by  foreign  nations  and  individuals;  (4)  to 
improve  trade  relation  with  foreign  nations. 

During  the  lengthy  negotiation  prior  to  the 
signing  of  this  protocol  the  United  States  threw 
the  weight  of  its  influence  on  the  side  of  modera- 
tion, urging  the  powers  not  to  make  the  burden 
too  heavy  •  for  China.  The  total  indemnity 
($333,000,000  approximately)  imposed  upon 
China  was  far  in  excess  of  the  actual  losses  sus- 
tained by  the  powers.  The  share  that  was  as- 
signed to  the  United  States  was  a  little  over 


66    THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  POLICY 

$24,000,000,  whereas  the  actual  loss  sustained 
by  the  American  Government  and  its  citizens 
was  only  about  $11,000,000.  Once  more  the 
American  Government  deviated  from  the  grab- 
it-all  spirit  of  modern  diplomacy,  and  in  1907 
returned  the  amount  in  excess  of  actual  losses. 
The  Chinese  Government,  in  return,  sent  Tang 
Shao  Yi  as  its  special  envoy  to  thank  the  United 
States,  and  decided  to  use  the  money  thus  re- 
turned by  the  American  Government  to  educate 
Chinese  students  in  American  colleges  and  uni- 
versities.' This  step  taken  by  the  American 
Government  was  an  act  of  simple  justice,  and  it 
remains  to  be  seen  whether  the  European 
Powers  who  took  advantage  of  China's  prostra- 
tion to  demand  far  heavier  indemnities  than 
their  claims  justified  will  yet  take  similar  action/ 

3.  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  STRUGGLE 
After  the  protocol  was  signed,  other  nations 
withdrew  their  forces  from  China,  but  Russia 
retained  her  forces  in  Manchuria  and  gradually 
strengthened  her  position  in  eastern  China. 
She  not  only  retained  all  vantages  gained  prior 
to  and  during  the  Boxer  Uprising,  but  was 

6  There  were  679  Chinese  students  (male  alone)  in  Ameri- 
can colleges  and  universities  in  1916,  according  to  the 
Directory  of  Foreign  Students,  published  by  the  Committee 
on  Friendly  Relations  Among  Foreign  Students,  Interna- 
tional Y.  M.  C.  A.,  New  York  City. 

1  Washington  Post  June  19,1007;  opinion  of  Judge  Charles 
Sumner  Lobinger  of  the  American  Court  in  Shanghai,  China, 
Nebraska  State  Journal,  October  n,  1917. 


CHINA  IN  THE  TWENTIETH  CENTURY    67 

secretly  pressing  upon  the  Chinese  Government 
for  further  concessions.  This  serious  situation 
led  to  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  of  1902  to 
put  a  check  upon  Russian  influence.  The 
United  States  entered  a  formal  protest  at 
Petrograd  and  succeeded  in  getting  a  definite 
promise  from  the  Russian  Government  not  to 
oppose  the  opening  of  two  Manchurian  cities, 
Mukden  and  Antung,  to  foreign  commerce  by 
China.  This  did  not,  however,  check  the  out- 
stretching clutch  of  the  Northern  Bear,  and 
Russian  influence  in  Manchuria  kept  on  increas- 
ing. 

Japan  was  now  ready  to  make  an  active  re- 
sistance. Her  attempts  to  negotiate  with 
Russia  the  question  of  neutrality  and  the  "  open 
door  "  in  Manchuria  and  China  were  fruitless.8 
Feeling  that  she  was  strong  enough  to  combat 
her  rival,  and  that  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance 
safeguarded  her  from  the  attack  of  a  third 
power  in  alliance  with  Russia,  she  struck  the 
first  blow  on  February  10,  1904.  Secretary  Hay 
promptly  sent  identical  notes  to  Russia  and  to 
Japan,  expressing  the  wish  of  the  United  States 
that  the  neutrality  and  administrative  entity  of 
China  should  be  respected  by  the  belligerents. 
In  reply  both  Russia  and  Japan  agreed  to  re- 

*For  the  complete  diplomatic  correspondence  between 
Russia  and  Japan  prior  to  the  opening  of  hostility,  see 
"Russo-Japanese  War,"  published  by  Collier  &  Son,  New 
York. 


58    THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  POLICY 

spect  Chinese  neutrality  outside  of  Manchuria. 
On  January  10,  1905,  Hay  addressed  circular 
notes  to  the  powers  to  the  effect  that  it  was  the 
wish  of  the  United  States  that  the  war  would 
not  result  in  any  concession  of  Chinese  terri- 
tory. This  note  met  with  the  hearty  approval 
of  Germany,  Austria-Hungary,  France,  Great 
Britain,  and  Italy. 

The  greatest  single  stroke  of  diplomacy  that 
established  American  dignity  and  prestige  in 
the  Pacific  basin  since  the  declaration  of  the 
"  open  door  "  doctrine,  was  the  mediation  of 
President  Roosevelt  on  behalf  of  the  two  bel- 
ligerent nations.  Russia  was  completely  pros- 
trated, and  Japan,  though  victorious,  was  at  the 
end  of  her  financial  resources.  On  June  8, 1905, 
President  Roosevelt  made  a  formal  appeal  in 
the  interest  of  the  civilized  world  to  the  em- 
perors of  Japan  and  Russia  to  cease  hostilities 
and  open  direct  negotiations.  Both  nations 
complied  with  the  request  and  sent  their  envoys 
to  the  United  States  to  open  a  peace  conference. 
The  conference  began  its  regular  sessions  at 
Portsmouth,  New  Hampshire,  on  August  8th, 
and  the  treaty  was  signed  September  5th. 
More  than  once  during  the  negotiations,  the  en- 
voys came  to  points  of  controversy  and  were 
unable  to  reach  an  agreement.  The  Russian 
commission  was  headed  by  the  astute  diplomat, 
Count  Witte,  who  made  a  most  favourable  im- 


CHINA  IN  THE  TWENTIETH  CENTUEY    59 

pression  and  drew  to  himself  the  sympathetic 
interest  of  the  public.  In  presenting  the  cause 
of  his  country,  he  capitalized  the  situation 
created  by  his  striking  personality.  He  con- 
ceded every  demand  made  by  Japan,  but  refused 
tp_  pay  a  single  ruble  of  indemnity.  President 
Roosevelt  unofficially  advised,  restrained,  and 
urged  the  envoys  to  compromise  their  differ- 
ences. Russia  finally  agreed  to  recognize 
Japan's  paramount  interest  in  Korea;  to  trans- 
fer, with  the  consent  of  China,  her  lease  of  Port 
Arthur,  Talienwan,  and  adjacent  territories  to 
Japan ;  and  to  evacuate  Manchuria  and  leave  its 
doors  wide  open  to  the  trade  of  the  world. 
^By  the  result  of  this  conference  Japan,  per- 
haps, got  as  much  as  she  had  expected,  although 
not  as  much  as  she  wanted.  The  Japanese 
envoys  went  home  somewhat  disgruntled — at 
least  outwardly  so — and  when  they  reached 
home  they  had  to  have  police  protection  from 
howling  mobs.  Japanese  dailies  made  bitter 
comments  to  the  effect  that  Japan  won  all  the 
battles  in  the  war,  and  lost  all  the  spoils  on  the 
green  table.  Later,  when  the  anti-American 
feeling  was  high  as  an  echo  of  the  anti-Japanese 
sentiment- in  California,  more  than  one  period- 
ical in  Japan  referred  to  the  diplomatic  "  loss  " 
sustained  by  Japan  at  the  Portsmouth  confer- 
ence as  the  result  of  American  intervention. 
The  close  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War  marks 


60    THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  POLICY 

the  beginning  of  new  political  relations  between 
the  East  and  the  West.  Up  to  this  time  the 
Western  nations — especially  the  United  States — 
looked  upon  the  East  with  sympathetic  regard. 
But  now,  one  of  the  nations  of  the  effete  East 
had  proved  herself  equal  to  a  Western  Power  in 
the  field  of  military  operations,  and  able  to  give 
as  well  as  take  blows.  From  now  on  the  West 
must  necessarily  change  its  attitude  toward  the 
East  from  that  of  patronage  to  one  of  recog- 
nition on  the  basis  of  honour  and  equality. 
The  United  States  has  the  proud  distinction  of 
having  opened  Japan  and  Korea  to  modern 
civilization,  and  of  having  saved  China  from 
disintegration  after  the  Boxer  rebellion.  Japan 
knew  the  honourable  intentions  of  the  United 
States  in  the  Orient,  and  looked  up  to  her  for 
moral  support  in  her  struggle  for  recognition 
from  the  Western  Powers.  And  the  United 
States  regarded  Japan  as  one  of  her  brightest 
proteges  and  took  pride  in  having  played  such 
an  important  part  in  bringing  a  secluded 
mediaeval  nation  up  to  the  first  rank  among  the 
modern  civilized  nations.  All  this  era  of  good 
feeling  and  mutual  trust  ended  with  the  Ports- 
mouth conference.  Henceforth  Japan  was  to 
be  a  rival  of  the  United  States  in  the  theater 
of  Eastern  commerce  and  politics.  Japan,  a  new 
recruit  in  the  field  of  commercial  and  political 
expansion  of  the  world,  must  necessarily  in- 


CHINA  IN  THE  TWENTIETH  CENTUBY    61 

fringe  upon  the  rights  of  the  pioneer  nations 
of  the  West,  including  the  United  States,  in 
order  to  realize  her  dream  of  greatness.  And 
the  United  States,  for  the  safeguarding  of  its 
interests,  was  compelled  to  lay  certain  restric- 
tions upon  Japan,  such  as  restriction  of  Japa- 
nese immigration  into  the  United  States  and  its 
insular  possessions,  and  vindication  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  "  open  door  "  and  the  political  in- 
tegrity of  China.  Japan  in  turn  resented  these 
restrictions  as  an  obstruction  of  her  imperial 
progress.  But  she  is  at  present  in  no  position 
to  make  a  vigorous  protest  to  the  United  States. 
Economically,  the  United  States  is  her  second 
best  customer,  China  being  the  first;  and  from  a 
military  standpoint,  the  United  States  is  far 
superior  both  in  man-power  and  in  resources. 
Japan  feels  that  she  must  "  eat  worms  "  for  the 
time  being.  She  prefers  to  have  all  negotia- 
tions not  satisfactory  to  her  postponed  indefi- 
nitely until  such  time  when  she  will  be  in  a 
position  to  make  demands  as  well  as  to  make 
"  appeals."  She  must  be  content  to  cover  her 
wounds  with  diplomatic  grace.  In  1914,  when 
Secretary  Bryan  handed  the  American  reply  to 
the  Japanese  note  concerning  the  pending 
California  Alien  Law  question,  Ambassador 
Chinda  said,  "Will  this  be  final?"  Secretary 
Bryan  replied,  "  There  is  nothing  final  between 
friends." 


Ill 

AMERICAN  RIVALRY  WITH  JAPAN 

i.    THE  AMERICAN  \F£,EET  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

SUBSEQUENT* American  policies  in  the 
Far  East  have  been  along  the  path  laid 
down  by  John  Hay.  The  Root-Takahira 
agreement  exchanged  at  Washington,  Novem- 
ber 30,  1908,  outlined  the  mutual  position  of  the 
United  States  and  Japan  regarding  China  as 
follows:  (1)  to  encourage  the  free  and  peaceful 
development  of  their  commerce  on  the  Pacific ; 
(2)  to  maintain  the  status  quo  in  the  Pacific,  and 
to  preserve  the  principle  of  equal  commercial 
opportunity  in  China;  (3)  to  reciprocally  "re- 
spect the  territorial  possessions  belonging  to 
each  other  in  said  region  ";  (4)  to  preserve  and 
maintain  the  independence  and  integrity  of 
China;  (5)  the  two  governments  will  communi- 
cate with  each  other  in  case  the  status  quo  or  the 
principle  of  equal  opportunity  is  threatened  as 
above  defined. 

It  was  not  a  formal  treaty  but  merely  an 
agreement — a  "  gentlemen's  agreement  " — rely- 

62 


AMERICAN  EIVALRY  WITH  JAPAN     63 

ing  upon  the  mutual  trust  and  honour  of  the 
contracting  parties  for  the  observance  of  its  pro- 
visions. Japan  was  anxious  to  convince  the 
United  States  that  she  had  no  sinister  designs 
on  the  mainland  of  Asia,  and  the  United  States 
was  desirous  of  assuring  Japan  that  the  result 
of  the  Russo-Japanese  War  did  not  change  the 
"  open  door  "  status  in  China.  American  policy! 
toward  both  China  and  Japan  has  always  been 
non-aggressive.  In  trying  to  befriend  both,  the 
United  States  has,  unintentionally,  in  minor 
matters,  played  into  the  hands  of  the  more 
clever  and  aggressive  of  the  two  nations.  The 
visit  of  the  American  fleet  to  Asiatic  waters  in 
1908  may  be  cited  as  illustration  of  this. 

In  1907  when  President  Roosevelt  decided  to 
send  the  American  fleet  around  the  world,  the 
Chinese  were  anxious  to  have  the  fleet  pay  a 
visit  to  China,  j  They  had  looked  up  to  the 
United  States  for  moral  support,  if  not  active 
assistance,  in  their  struggle  for  national  stability. 
Their  attitude  was  not  without  foundation. 
During  the  Boxer  settlement,  the  United  States 
was  China's  one  friend  among  the  nations  of 
the  West,  and  it  was  through  American  effort 
that  a  degree  of  moderation  in  the  demands 
made  was  secured.  \ln  October,  1907,  Secretary 
of  War  William  Howard  Taft  said  in  his  speech 
at  Shanghai  that  "  the  United  States  and  others 
who  sincerely  favour  the  'open  door'  policy 


64    THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  POLICY 

will,  if  they  are  wise,  not  only  welcome,  but 
encourage  this  great  Chinese  Empire  to  take 
long  steps  in  administrative  and  governmental 
reforms,  in  the  development  of  her  natural  re- 
sources and  the  improvement  of  the  welfare  of 
her  people."  'This  statement,  though  unof- 
ficially made,  assumed  somewhat  of  an  official 
nature,  as  it  was  from  a  great  American  states- 
man who  was  to  be  the  next  president  of  his 
country  and  as  it  was  made  before  a  large 
gathering  of  both  foreigners  and  Chinese  in 
that  great  metropolis  of  the  East.  \  The  Chinese 
wished  to  reciprocate  the  good  will  of  America 
in  refunding  the  balance  of  Boxer  indemnity,  by 
welcoming  the  American  fleet  to  their  shores.  V\ 
As  soon  as  this  move  in  China  was  known  ai 
Tokyo,  action  was  taken  with  the  characteristic 
Japanese  celerity  to  checkmate  the  Chinese  at- 
tempt to  gain  American  favour  and  recognition. 
The  Japanese  Government  immediately  dis- 
patched an  invitation  which  reached  Washing- 
ton one  day  ahead  of  that  of  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment. Subtle  influences  were  exerted  to 
defeat  Chinese  expectations.  The  Japanese  had 
apparently  three  reasons  for  their  attempt  to 
frustrate  the  plans  of  the  Chinese  Government 
in  inviting  the  American  fleet  to  Chinese  waters : 

1  Secretary  Taft  was  welcomed  at  Shanghai,  China,  Octo- 
ber 8,  1907,  "  The  World's  Almanac  and  Encyclopedia,"  1908. 
P-  314- 


AMERICAN  EIVALBY  WITH  JAPAN     65 

(1)  After  the  war  with  Russia  the  Japanese  had 
created  among  the  Oriental  nations  an  impres- 
sion that  their  fighting  force  was  equal,  if  not 
superior,  to  that  of  any  Western  nation,  and 
they  did  not  want  a  first-class  foreign  fleet  to 
anchor  off  Chinese  waters  and  destroy  that  im- 
pression. (2)  They  wanted  to  make  the  Ori- 
ental peoples  feel  that  Japan  was  the  only 
Asiatic  nation  recognized  on  the  basis  of  equal- 
ity by  Western  Powers;  and  if  the  American 
fleet  visited  both  Japan  and  China  it  would 
elevate  China  to  the  same  plane  with  Japan. 
(3)  The  Japanese  wanted  to  keep  the  relation 
between  China  and  the  United  States  as  distant 
and  non-intimate  as  possible,  so  that  they  could 
allude  to  China  as  a  backward  nation  that  must 
need  the  tutelage  of  Japan,  while  to  China  they 
could  intimate  that  her  aspirations  for  recogni- 
tion and  equal  treatment  by  Western  Powers 
were  useless  except  through  Japan,  and  that, 
indeed,  China's  solution  of  her  national  prob- 
lems must  be  in  following  Japanese  leadership.  \ 

European  residents  in  China,  who  were 
none  too  eager  to  have  American  prestige  in 
China  and  the  cordial  relation  between  China 
and  the  United  States  enhanced,  heartily  en- 
cored Japanese  sentiment.  Through  W.  W. 
Rockhill,  the  American  minister  to  China,  who 
Was  then  in  Japan  on  his  way  back  from  Amer- 
ica, official  Washington  was  informed  of  the  in- 


66    THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  POLICY 

advisability  of  sending  a  fleet  to  China.  The 
original  plan  was  revised  and  a  part  of  the 
American  fleet  visited  Amoy  instead  of  Shang- 
hai— the  original  city  designated  by  both  the 
Chinese  and  American  residents  in  China  for 
the  welcome  of  the  fleet.  This  was  a  great  dis- 
appointment to  both  the  Chinese  and  the 
Americans  in  China,  who  had  planned  an  elab- 
orate welcome  to  the  fleet  in  the  greatest  center 
of  communication  and  commerce  in  the  East. 
The  "  number  two  fleet  and  number  two  ad- 
miral are  coming  to  China,  while  the  number 
one  fleet  and  number  one  admiral  are  going 
to  Japan,"  said  the  Chinese  papers.  All  their 
enthusiasm  was  dampened,  and  the  reception 
was  perfunctory.  The  news  of  the  Chinese  re- 
ception of  the  American  fleet  was  scattered 
abroad  through  the  channels  of  Japanese  pub- 
licity as  being  cold  and  unappreciative,  and  as 
showing  the  backward  condition  of  China. 

2.  AMERICAN  AND  BRITISH  POLICIES 
With  the  incoming  of  the  Taft  and  Knox 
administration,  the  American  policy  in  the 
Orient  assumed  a  more  active  form.  Both 
President  Taft  and  Secretary  of  State  Knox  had 
some  knowledge  of  what  was  taking  place  in  the 
East  subsequent  to  the  Russo-Japanese  War. 
After  singeing  the  outstretching  paws  of  the 
Northern  Bear,  Japan  occupied  her  place  in  the 


AMERICAN  EIVALEY  WITH  JAPAN     67 

sun  with  other  first-class  Powers  of  the  world, 
and  was  ready  to  play  the  role  of  mistress  of 
Asia.  England's  fear  and  suspicion  of  Russian 
domination  in  the  East,  which  had  been  the 
nightmare  of  English  statesmen  for  the  past 
half  a  century,  now  faded  away.  In  place  of  the 
Russian  phantom  stalked  the  ever-threatening 
figure  of  the  German  Superman  with  Kultur  in 
one  hand  and  Weltpolitik  in  the  other.  German 
industries  were  monopolizing  the  markets  of 
the  world  by  both  business  efficiency  and 
"  dumping,"  and  the  German  navy  was  growing 
by  leaps  and  bounds.8 

In  the  Anglo-Russian  rivalry  it  had  been 
merely  a  question  of  protecting  British  posses- 
sions and  commercial  interests  in  the  East;  but 
now  the  very  existence  of  the  British  Empire 
was  threatened  by  the  Weltpolitik.  English 
statesmen  realized  the  vital  need  of  readjust- 
ment of  their  policy  to  meet  changed  conditions. 
They  buried  the  hatchet  with  Russia  by  allow- 
ing her-  a  free  hand  in  Mongolia  in  return  for 
the  safeguarding  of  British  interests  in  China. 

*  Many  excellent  books  have  been  written  on  Kultur,  Welt' 
Politik,  growth  of  the  German  navy,  "dumping,"  Anglo- 
German  rivalry,  etc.,  leading  up  to  the  war.  The  following 
are  a  few  typical  references:  Reventlow,  " Deutschland's 
auswartige  Politik";  Tardieu,  "France  and  the  Alliances," 
von  Btilow,  "  Imperial  Germany "  ;  Bernhardi,  "  Germany 
and  the  Next  War  "  ;  Rohrbach,  "  Der  Deutsche  Gedanke  in 
der  Welt "  ;  Dawson,  "  Evolution  of  Modern  Germany "  ; 
Price,  "  Diplomatic  History  of  the  War  of  1914  " ;  publica- 
tions of  various  governments  engaged  in  the  war. 


68    THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  POLICY 

In  European  politics,  Russia  and  Great  Britain 
regarded  each  other  as  allies ;  and  in  matters  of 
Asiatic  policy  they  cooperated,  as  illustrated  in 
the  division  of  Persia  into  spheres  of  influence 
assumed  by  their  respective  governments.'  The 
Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  of  1902,  defensive  in 
character,  was  renewed  in  1905  and  again  in 
1911.  Japan  promised  to  protect  British  posses- 
sions in  Asia,  and  Great  Britain  in  turn  con- 
sented to  the  free  hand  of  the  Japanese  in  Man- 
churia, and  to  support  Japan, — or  at  least,  not 
to  oppose  her, — in  whatever  measures  she 
deemed  necessary  in  firmly  establishing  her 
sphere  on  the  mainland  of  Asia.  England  also 
settled  all  differences  with  France  on  an  ami- 
cable basis,  supported  her  against  Germany  in 
the  Moroccan  question  in  1907,  and  formed  an 
entente  to  offset  the  Triple  Alliance.'  The  pro- 
tection of  British  interests  in  the  Mediterranean 
was  left  to  the  French  just  as  the  possessions  in 
the  East  were  left  to  the  care  of  the  Japanese. 
Thus  the  British  fleet  was  able  to  concentrate 
in  the  North  Sea  to  meet  any  exigency  that 
might  occur,  and  to  bottle  up  the  German  fleet 

"The  Anglo-Russian  Agreement  of  August  31,  1907,  re- 
garding Persia  has  never  been  made  public.  See  Review  of 
Reviews,  45:49-53,  January,  1912,  "Persia,  Russia,  and 
Shuster." 

*  For  England's  part  in  Moroccan  question,  see  J.  Holland 
Rose,  "The  Origins  of  the  War,"  chap.  IV,  "Morocco"; 
Perseus,  "Morocco  and  Europe:  The  Task  of  Sir  Edward 
Grey,"  Fortnightly  Review,  85 :  609-624,  April,  1906. 


AMEBICAN  BIVALRY  WITH  JAPAN     69 

in  case  of  hostility,  as  was  so  effectively  done  at 
the  opening  of  the  great  war. 

This  realignment  of  British  policy  produced 
two  outstanding  conditions  in  world  politics: 
the  isolation  of  Germany,  and  the  supremacy  of 
Japan  in  the  EastA  Germany  was  not  in  favour 
of  having  Japan  dominate  Manchuria  and 
Korea  and  occupy  the  premier  commercial  posi- 
tion on  the  Asiatic  mainland,  but  she  was  too 
busily  engaged  to  oppose  the  Entente  Powers  in 
Europe  to  make  any  effective  resistance  against 
Japan's  encroachment  in  China.  K  The  only  na- 
tion that  was  in  a  position  to  assist  China  to 
preserve  her  autonomy  against  foreign  aggres- 
sion was  the  United  States.  The  United  States 
has  political  reasons  and  commercial  interests 
as  well  as  a  sense  of  moral  obligation  which 
should  lead  her  to  help  China  preserve  her  na- 
tional integrity.  The  Hay  "  open  door  "  doc-\ 
trine,  promoted  by  the  American  Government 
and  agreed  to  by  other  nations,  provided  equal- 
ity of  commercial  privileges  in,  and  the  preser- 
vation of  the  political  independence  and  terri- 
torial integrity  of  China.!  By  virtue  of  its  origin 
and  of  the  leadership  of  John  Hay,  the  United 
States  was  made  an  unofficial  sponsor  for  this 
doctrine,  which  is  still  in  existence.  Politically, 
domination  of  China  by  one  power  means  the 
lessening  of  American  influence  and  prestige  in 
the  Far  East,  anc}  a  direct  menace  to  the  Ameri- 


70    THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  POLICY 

can  insular  possessions.  » Commercially,  the 
monopoly  of  the  Chinese  market,  or  of  the  mar- 
ket of  one  province,  as  in  the  case  of  Manchuria, 
signifies  the  driving  out  of  American  trade  in 
the  monopolized  territory.  There  were  ample 
reasons  for  the  United  States  to  propose  to 
neutralize  the  Manchurian  railways.  '  But  the 
immediate,  occasion  that  enabled  Secretary 
Knox  to  make  the  neutralization  proposaljvvas 
a  concession  to  buildthe  Chinchow-Aigun  rail- 
way given  by  the  Chinese  Government  to,.ag 
American  concern.  Thus  by  neutralizing  all 
railways~m~Manchuria,  America  had  its  share  of 
monopoly  to  give  up. 

The  proposal  provided  "  to  take  the  railroads 
of  Manchuria  out  of  Eastern  politics  and  place 
them  under  an  economic  and  impartial  adminis- 
tration by  vesting  in  China  the  ownership  of  its 
railroads;  the  funds  for  that  purpose  to  be  fur- 
nished by  the  nationals  of  such  interested 
powers  as  might  be  willing  to  participate  and 
who  are  pledged  to  the  policy  of  the  open  door 
and  equal  opportunity,  the  powers  participating 
to  operate  the  railway  system  during  the  period 
of  the  loan  and  enjoy  the  usual  preference  in 
supplying  materials.  .  .  .  The  advantages  of 
such  a  plan  are  obvious.  It  would  insure  un- 
impaired Chinese  sovereignty,  the  commercial 
and  industrial  development  of  the  Manchurian 
provinces,  and  furnish  a  substantial  reason  for 


AMERICAN  RIVALRY  WITH  JAPAN     71 

the  solution  of  the  problems  of  fiscal  and  mone- 
tary reforms  which  are  now  receiving  such  ear- 
nest attention  of  the  Chinese  Government.  It 
would  afford  an  opportunity  for  both  Russia 
and  Japan  to  shift  their  onerous  duties,  respon- 
sibilities and  expenses  in  connection  with  these 
railways  to  the  shoulders  of  the  combined 
powers,  including  themselves.  Such  a  policy, 
moreover,  would  effect  a  complete  commercial 
neutralization  of  Manchuria,  and  in  so  doing 
mak*  a  large  contribution  to  the  peace  of  the  | 
world  by  converting  provinces  of  Manchuria  ' 
into  an  immense  commercial  neutral  zone." ' 

On  November  6,  1909,  Secretary  Knox  sent  a 
formal  note  to  the  British  Government,  asking 
British  cooperation  in  the  American  proposal. 
On  November  25th,  Sir  Edward  Grey  sent  his 
reply,  expressing  the  approval  of  his  govern- 
ment of  the  principle  involved  in  the  plan,  with- 
out, however,  committing  itself  to  any  definite 
agreement.  Secretary  Knox  presented  his  pro- 
posal simultaneously  to  Russia  and  Japan  on 
December  18,  1909.  There  was  a  general  cry  of 
"  confiscation  "  in  both  countries,  despite  the 
fact  that  the  plan  provided  a  legitimate  compen- 
sation for  their  Manchurian  railroads  properly 
and  impartially  appraised.  Their  charge  of 
'•"  confiscation  "  is  ironically  amusing  when  we 

'From  a  statement  given  to  the  press  by  the  State  De- 
partment, Washington,  January  6,  1916. 


72    THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  POLICY 

recall  that  their  titles  to  the  Manchurian  rail- 
roads were  based  on  nothing  short  of  their  own 
confiscation  of  Chinese  property. 

Russia  rejected  the  plan  on  January  22,  1910, 
and  Japan  on  February  24,  1910.  Great  Britain 
and  France  stood  by  the  decision  of  their  re- 
spective allies — Japan  and  Russia.  The  Ameri- 
can public,  instead  of  supporting  its  statesman 
in  his  attempt  to  give  a  legitimate  protection  to 
American  interests  abroad,  condemned  the 
Knox  policy  in  China  and  also  in  Central 
America  as  "  dollar  diplomacy." 

3.  "  DOLLAR  DIPLOMACY  " 
This  "  dollar  diplomacy  "  was  soon  changed 
with  the  coming  in  of  the  Democratic  adminis- 
tration in  1913,  and  the  American  Far  Eastern 
policy  was  correspondingly  weakened.  The  new 
government  of  the  Chinese  Republic,  after  the 
revolution  of  1911-12,  was  in  dire  need  of  funds, 
and  decided  to  borrow  money  from  the  bankers 
of  the  United  States,  Great  Britain,  France, 
Germany,  Japan,  and  Russia.  The  terms  of  this 
loan — commonly  known  as  the  "  six-power 
loan  " — were  none  too  agreeable  to  the  Chinese. 
They  provided  how  the  money  thus  borrowed 
should  be  spent,  and  what  measures  the  creditor 
nations  should  take  to  collect  the  money  in  case 

"See  Fish,  "American  Diplomacy,"  p.  459;  F.  C.  Howe, 
"Dollar  Diplomacy,"  Annals  of  American  Political  and 
Social  Science,  68 : 312-320,  November,  1916. 


AMERICAN  RIVALRY  WITH  JAPAN     73 

China  failed  to  meet  her  part  of  the  agreement 
as  provided  in  the  terms.  The  Chinese  were 
afraid  that  such  an  arrangement  might  Egyp- 
tianize  their  country;  yet  they  had  no  alterna- 
tive. Money  they  must  have  to  pay  the  soldiers 
and  to  meet  foreign  and  domestic  obligations 
incidental  to  the  revolution.  The  loan  nations 
were  withholding  recognition  of  the  Republic  of 
China  to  press  their  terms  on  the  newly  born 
republic. 

President  Wilson  promptly  reversed  the  pol- 
icy of  the  previous  administration,  and  led  the 
way,  on  March  18,  1913,  to  the  recognition  of 
the  new  Republic  of  China.  He  withdrew  gov- 
ernment support  of  the  "  six-power  loan,"  de- 
claring that  "  the  conditions  of  the  loan  seem  to 
us  to  touch  very  nearly  the  administrative  inde- 
pendence of  China  itself,  and  this  administration 
does  not  feel  that  it  ought,  even  by  implication, 
to  be  a  party  to  those  conditions."  As  a  result, 
the  American  bankers  withdrew  from  the  syndi- 
cate. It  must  be  remembered  that  doing  busi- 
ness in  an  unstable  country  like  China  is  not  like 
carrying  on  a  commercial  transaction  in  the 
United  States.  Foreign  capital  is  insecure  in  a 
country  where  bandit  raids  and  political  revolu- 
tions are  of  common  occurrence,  unless  it  be 
backed  by  its  government.7  Here  is  where  the 


TSee  Tyler  Dennett,  "The  Road  to  Peace,  via  China, 
Outlook,  117: 168-169,  October  3,  1917. 


74    THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  POLICY 

principle  of  "  trade  follows  the  flag  "  comes  in. 
Commercial  exploitation  is  usually  the  pioneer 
of  political  exploitation.  There  is  no  question 
that  this  act  of  President  Wilson  is  just  and 
statesman-like,  and  in  line  with  the  American 
traditional  foreign  policy.  It  invoked,  as  it 
should  have  done,  universal  approval  both  at 
home  and  abroad.8  But  from  the  Chinese  point 
of  view,  the  withdrawal  of  American  bankers 
from  the  "  six-power  loan  "  was  a  disappoint- 
ment. 

The  United  States  has  always  stood  for  jus- 
tice and  fair  play  to  China,  and  has  more  than 
once  thrown  its  weight  toward  the  preservation 
of  the  administrative  and  territorial  integrity  of 
that  tottering  nation.  Had  the  American  bank- 
ers stayed  in  the  group,  and  been  supported  by 
the  American  Government,  it  would  have  made 
the  United  States  a  participant  in  foreign  inter- 
ests in  China;  and  the  State  Department  at 
Washington  would  have  an  opportunity  to  wield 
a  moral  lever  in  urging  moderation  on  the  part 
of  other  creditor  nations,  as  was  done  by  John 
Hay  in  the  Boxer  settlement.  But,  as  it  was, 
the  United  States  became  a  disinterested  power 
— an  outsider  with  respect  to  the  international 
struggle  for  zones  of  influence  in  China — leav- 

*See  "Recognition  at  Last,"  Independent,  74:1009-1010, 
May  8,  1913;  "U.  S.  Recognizes  China,"  Outlook,  104:41, 
May  10,  1913. 


AMERICAN  RIVALRY  WITH  JAPAN     75 

ing  the  infant  republic  to  its  own  fate  amid  a 
pack  of  wolfish  nations.  The  Sherman  anti- 
trust law  would  be  an  asset  in  the  development 
of  world  trade,  should  it  be  made  an  interna- 
tional commercial  code.  But  it  is  a  fatal  mis- 
take to  apply  this  restriction  to  American  for- 
eign trade  alone,  while  other  foreign  capital  is 
not  only  protected  but  supported  and  subsidized 
by  interested  governments,  and  foreign  invest- 
ors are  even  sometimes  encouraged  to  resort  to 
illegitimate  business  methods  for  the  capture  of 
foreign  markets.9  The  failure  of  American 
statesmen  to  appreciate  this  fact  has  caused 
American  trade  and  investment  in  China  to  de- 
cline, whereas  its  powerful  competitor,  Japanese 
trade,  has  increased  by  leaps  and  bounds,  and 
is  still  so  increasing. 

In  1914  China  decided  to  build  a  naval  base 
on  the  coast  of  Fukieni  British,  American,  and 
Japanese  firms  were  bidding  against  one  an- 
other to  supply  the  material.  Finally  the  Beth- 
lehem Steel  Corporation  succeeded  in  getting 
the  contract  for  the  work.  Japan  immediately 
made  representations  to  the  State  Department 
through  Ambassador  Chinda  that  the  entrench- 
ment of  American  interest  in  Fukien  Province, 
which  is  in  the  Japanese  "  sphere,"  and  the 

"For  Japanese  trade  methods  in  China,  see  Tong,  "Amer- 
ican Money  and  Japanese  Brains  in  China,"  Review  of  Re- 
views, 53:452-455,  April,  1916;  idem  in  Harper's  Weekly, 
62:298-299,  March,  1916. 


76    THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  POLICY 

building  of  a  naval  base  with  American  money 
on  Chinese  coast  right  opposite  to  Formosa 
would  be  an  "  unfriendly  act"  Secretary  Bryan 
promptly  sent  a  cablegram  to  Minister  Reinsch 
at  Peking  to  inform  the  Chinese  Government 
that  the  United  States  would  not  support  the 
American  interest.  Thus  American  capital,  in- 
stead of  receiving  subsidies  and  protection  from 
its  home  government,  as  does  Japanese  capital, 
was  hampered  by  American  political  leaders. 


4.  THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 
*  The  greatest  diplomatic  struggle  that  China 
has  had  since  the  Boxer  settlement  in  1900-01 
was  with  Japan  in  1915  over  what  was  known  as 
the  Twenty-one  Demands,  made  upon  China  by 
Japan."  These  demands  embody  serious  en- 
croachments of  Chinese  rights,  such  as  that  the 
Chinese  Government  must  employ  influential 
Japanese  as  advisers  in  political,  financial,  and 
military  affairs;  that  the  policing  of  important 
places  in  China  must  be  jointly  administered  by 
Japanese  and  Chinese;  that  China  must  pur- 
chase from  Japan  fifty  per  cent,  or  more  of  its 
munitions  of  war,  and  that  Japanese  experts 
must  be  employed  in  the  arsenals.  There  is  no 


"Concerning  Japan's  control  of  public  opinion  in  con- 
nection with  the  Twenty-one  Demands,  see  Part  II,  Chapter 
III,  §  III. 


AMEBICAN  KIVALRY  WITH  JAPAN     77 

question  but  that  had  China  conceded  to  these 
demands  in  toto,  the  Eastern  Republic  would  be 
a  dependency  of  Japan  to-day.* 

The  demands  were  first  presented  to  the 
Chinese  Government  on  January  18,  1915,  when 
representatives  of  several  important  news  serv- 
ices and  papers  were  absent  from  Peking  in 
Japan.  Japan  had  intended  to  intimidate  China 
into  concession  of  these  demands  in  secret. 
When  the  news  began  to  leak  out,  Japan, 
through  her  diplomatic  representatives  abroad, 
denied  the  demands;  when  denial  was  no  longer 
possible,  she  gave  out  a  false  series  of  demands 
for  publication  abroad."  When,  however,  the 
real  demands  began  to  come  to  light  from  the 
Chinese  official  source,  not  only  the  Chinese 
themselves,  but  the  foreigners  in  China  were 
alarmed  and  indignant.  The  British  commer- 
cial interests  in  China  made  vigorous  represen- 
tations to  their  home  government  for  protest 
against  Japan's  demands.  American  mission- 
aries in  China  sent  a  memorial  to  President 
Wilson  asking  for  American  mediation  in  the 
crisis.12 

There  was  a  general  uproar  of  indignation  in 
the  House  of  Commons  when  the  news  of  the 
demands  reached  London.  But  the  British  Gov- 

11  Eleven  articles  published  in  the  London  Times,  as  com- 
ing from  the  Japanese  Embassy  at  London,  quoted  by  Mil- 
lard,  "  Our  Eastern  Question,"  pp.  146-147. 

u  See  the  text  of  the  memorial,  Part  III,  S. 


78    THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  POLICY 

ernment  was  in  no  position  to  oppose  Japan. 
'There  was  only  one  nation  that  was  in  a  posi- 
tion to  make  an  effective  resistance  to  the  Jap- 
anese aggression  in  China,  and  that  nation  was 
the  United  States.  But  all  the  American  Gov- 
ernment did  was  to  make  an  inquiry  of  Japan  as 
to  what  she  was  doing  in  China,  basing  the 
right  of  inquiry  on  the  American-Japanese 
agreement  of  1908  regarding  China:  "Should 
any  event  occur  threatening  the  status  quo  .  .  . 
or  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity  ...  it 
remains  for  the  two  governments  to  communi- 
cate with  each  other  in  order  to  arrive  at  an  un- 
derstanding as  to  what  measures  they  may  con- 
sider it  useful  to  take."  *  > 

Publicity  compelled  Japan  to  modify  some- 
what the  original  demands.  On  April  26,  1915, 
the  Japanese  minister  at  Peking  presented  re- 
vised demands  in  twenty-four  articled  On  May 
7th  Japan  delivered  to  the  Chinese  Government 
an  ultimatum  providing  that  unless  a  satisfac- 
tory reply  be  given  to  the  demands  by  six 
o'clock  on  the  ninth  day  of  May,  "  the  Imperial 
Japanese  Government  will  take  such  steps  as 
they  may  deem  necessary."  The  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment waited  as  long  as  it  could,  hoping  for 
foreign  aid  to  relieve  the  pressure.  But  none 
came.  After  the  agreements  had  been  made 
and  the  demands  granted,  the  American  Gov- 

*  See  full  text  of  the  agreement,  Part  III,  I,. 


AMERICAN  RIVALRY  WITH  JAPAN     79 

ernment  notified  the  Chinese  Government,  on 
May  16,  1915,  to  the  effect  that  "  it  cannot  rec- 
ognize any  agreement  or  undertaking  which  has 
been  entered  into,  or  which  may  be  entered  into 
between  the  governments  of  China  and  Japan 
impairing  the  treaty  rights  of  the  United  States 
and  its  citizens  in  China,  the  political  or  terri- 
torial integrity  of  the  Republic  of  China,  or  the 
international  policy,  commonly  known  as  the 
open  door  policy."  An  identical  note  was  sent 
to  the  Japanese  Government.  \ 

5.  CHINA  AND  THE  EUROPEAN  WAR 
After  the  United  States  severed  its  diplomatic 
relations  with  Germany,  February  3,  1917, 
President  Wilson  sent  a  note  to  China  advising 
her  to  follow  the  American  example^  It  was 
largely  through  the  influence  of  Dr.  Paul  S. 
Reinsch,  the  American  minister  at  Peking,  in 
combination  with  the  Chinese  liberals,  that 
China  was  persuaded  to  follow  the  American 
lead  and  was  brought  into  the  ranks  of  the 
Allies." 

\  During  the  short  period  of  the  attempted  res- 
toration of  the  monarchy  by  Chang  Hsun  and 

14  See  Part  III,  R. 

a  For  a  full  account  of  China's  entering  the  war  and  the 
reasons  for  it,  see  Stanley  K.  Hornbeck,  "Tricks  That  are 
Vain — in  Chinese  Politics,"  Review  of  Reviews,  56: 172-175, 
August,  1917;  "China's  Part  in  the  War,"  the  Illustrated 
London  News,  151 :  249,  September,  1917. 


80    THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  POLICY 

Kang  Yu  Wei,18  in  the  summer  of  1917,  when 
China  was  on  the  verge  of  shipwreck,  Secretary 
Lansing  sent  a  sympathetic  note  to  the  Chinese 
Government  through  Minister  Reinsch,  ex- 
pressing regret  for  the  dissensions  in  China,  and 
the  hope  that  stable  government  would  be  es- 
tablished, and  extending  America's  sincere  good 
wishes.  This  note  was  severely  criticized  by  the 
Japanese  press  as  an  infringement  of  Japan's 
paramount  interest  in  China.  }  Japan  does  not 
give  any  direct  advices  to  Mexico,  the  Nippon- 
ese press  argued,  and  why  should  the  United 
States  attempt  to  exercise  any  influence  over 
China,  the  country  over  which  Japan  has  as 
much  tutelage  as  the  United  States  has  over 
Mexico?  YAny  advice  to  be  given  China  by  the 
United  States,  the  Japanese  suggested,  ought  to 
have  been  given  through  Japan."  This  haughty 
attitude  of  Japan  brought  forth  some  sharp  re- 
torts on  the  part  of  the  American  press.\  Said 
the  New  York  Morning  Telegraph:  "  Why  should 
the  United  States  of  America,  the  most  power- 
full  democracy  in  the  world,  consult  the  Japa- 
nese monarchy,  recently  delivered,  in  part,  from 


19 


See  "China  Foils  a  Royalist  Coup,"  New  York  Times, 
Current  History,  6,  pt.  2:259-260,  August,  1917;  Carl  Crow, 
"  Chang,  the  Unchanging,"  Sunset  Magazine,  39 :  12-13,  Au- 
gust, 1917. 

"The  comparison  of  the  Japanese  position  in  China  with 
the  American  position  in  Mexico  is  a  hobby  of  the  Jap- 
anese publicists:  see  statement  by  K.  K.  Kawakami,  quoted 
by  Millard  in  "  Our  Eastern  Question,"  p.  297. 


AMERICAN  EIVALEY  WITH  JAPAN     81 

paganism  before  admonishing  the  Chinese  peo- 
ple? .  .  .  To  have  advised  with  Japan  would 
have  been  officially  acknowledging  the  para- 
mountcy  of  Japan  in  that  section  of  the  world. 
This  we  will  never  do," 

j  It  will  be  of  particular  interest  to  the  Amer- 
ican reader  to  know  that  Japan  did  her  best  to 
keep  China  out  of  the  war,  feeling  that  Japanese 
interests  would  be  better  served  if  China  were 
not  a  belligerent.  Japan  preferred  to  deal  with 
China  herself ;,'  she  did  not  care  to  have  China 
given  a  voice  at  the  Peace  table.  I  Late  in  1915, 
on  the  advice  of  the  European  Allies,  China 
practically  completed  plans  for  entering  the 
war.  On  that  occasion,  Viscount  Ishii,  then 
Japanese  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  said  to  the 
European  Ambassadors  at  Tokyo:  "Japan  could 
not  view  without  apprehension  the  moral  awak- 
ening of  400,000,000  Chinese  which  would  re- 
sult from  their  entering  the  war."  |  Japan's  op- 
position was  so  definite  and  so  potent  that  the 
Chinese  plan  of  entering  the  war  was  blocked. 
Not  until  March,  19l7,,_aiter  obtaining  secret 
promises  from  the  European  Allies  that  they 
would  support  Japan's  claims  at  the  Peace  table 
and  that  Japan  would  not  be  interfered  with  in 
carrying  out  her  program  in  China,  and  when  it 
became  clear  that  Japan  was  not  able  to  check- 
mate the  combined  efforts  of  the  European 
Allies  and  the  United  States  to  bring  China  into 


82    THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  POLICY 

the  war  on  the  side  of  the  Allies,  Japan  with- 
drew her  objection.18  The  Chinese  Govern- 
ment, after  formally  declaring  war  upon  Ger- 
many, offered  to  send  100,000  troops  to  Europe 
to  help  the  Allies ;  but  Japan,  unwilling  to  have 
China  take  so  active  a  part,  vetoed  the  plan.  ^ 

n  See  official  dispatch  from  M.  Krupensky,  former  Russian 
Ambassador  at  Tokyo,  to  Minister  ^  of  Foreign  Affairs  in 
Petrograd,  February  8,  1917,  cited  in  The  Secret  Treaties 
and  Understandings,  published  by  the  Russian  Revolutionary 
Government. 


%JW  ^Srtf 


IV 

THE  LANSING-ISHII  AGREEMENT 

i.    THE  DIPLOMATIC  PROCEDURE 

A  LATE  development  of  the  American 
Oriental  policy  is  the  Lansing-Ishii 
agreement  of  November  2,  1917,  based 
on  notes  exchanged  between  Secretary  of 
State  Lansing  and  Ambassador  Ishii,  the  head 
of  the  Japanese  War  Mission  which  visited 
the  United  States.  The  obvious  purpose  of  this 
mission,  as  was  announced  by  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment, was  to  follow  the  example  of  the  Eng- 
lish, French,  and  Italian  War  Missions  to 
America  in  furthering  the  better  understanding 
between  America  and  Japan,  and  the  closer  co- 
operation in  the  war  against  the  "Common 
Enemy."  *  But  a  closer  investigation  of  the 
accomplishments  of  this  mission  in  America 
reveals  something  deeper  than  these  obvious 
reasons.  The  Japanese  War  Mission,  like  all 

'See  addresses  of  Ambassador  Kikujiro  Ishii  at  various 
places  in  America,  New  York  Times,  Current  History, 
VI:  429-430,  September,  1917;  ibid.,  VII:  50-52,  October, 
1917. 


84    THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  POLICY 

other  Japanese  undertakings,  had  an  ulterior 
motive. 

There  are  three  outstanding  issues  between 
the  United  States  and  Japan  that  must  be  settled 
sooner  or  later.  They  are  the  "  open  door  " 
question  in  China,  the  question  of  immigration, 
and  the  question  of  Japanese  citizenship  in 
America.  The  first  of  these  hinders  commercial 
development  and  political  expansion  of  Japan, 
and  the  other  two  are  an  open  insult  to  the 
honour  and  integrity  of  Japan, — at  least,  the 
Japanese  think  so.  The  purpose  of  this  mission 
was  to  reach  a  satisfactory  agreement  concern- 
ing the  first  of  these  three  issues, — blindly  satis- 
factory to  America  and  selfishly  gratifying  to 
Japan.  A  brief  review  of  what  the  mission  has 
accomplished  unmistakably  points  to  this  con- 
clusion. 

Japan  could  not  have  selected  a  better  man  to 
head  this  mission  than  Viscount  Ishii,  whose 
knowledge  of  international  etiquette,  and  whose 
rhetorical  perfection  in  the  English  language 
are  equal  to  that  of  the  best  in  the  West.*  In 
his  speech  before  the  United  States  Senate,  the 
Japanese  ambassador  inspired  thunderous  ap- 
plause by  declaring,  "  We  of  Japan  took  up  arms 
against  Germany  because  a  solemn  treaty  was 
not  to  us  a  scrap  of  paper.  We  did  not  enter 

*  See  "  Japanese  Mission,"   Review   of  Reviews,   56 : 361, 
October,  1917. 


THE  LANSING-ISHII  AGREEMENT       85 

into  this  war  because  we  had  any  selfish  interest 
to  promote  or  any  ill-conceived  ambition  to 
gratify."  These  statements  are  ironically 
amusing  when  we  remember  what  Japan  has 
done  in  Korea  despite  all  her  solemn  treaty  obli- 
gations to  the  Hermit  Kingdom ;  *  and  more 
recently  in  China,  ignoring  not  only  her  treaty 
obligations  with  China  and  other  treaty  powers, 
but  breaking  faith  with  her  ally — England.8 
When  Japan  declared  war  upon  Germany, 
August  15,  1914,  Count  Okuma,  then  Premier 
of  Japan,  telegraphed  to  an  American  magazine 
assuring  "  the  people  of  America  and  of  the 
world  that  Japan  has  no  ulterior  motive,  no 
desire  to  secure  more  territory,  no  thought  of 
depriving  China  or  other  peoples  of  anything 
which  they  now  possess."'  The  sincerity  of 
this  statement  was  tested  when,  in  less  than 
a  year,  Japan  made  the  well-known  Twenty- 
one  Demands  upon  China.  Japanese  statesmen 
stated  more  than  once  that  Japan  was  to  take 
Tsingtau  with  the  intention  of  returning-  it  to 

*  Congressional  Record,  vol.  55,  No.  124,  p.  7040,  August 
30,  1917. 

4  For  Japan's  perfidy  with  Korea,  consult  F.  A.  McKenzie, 
"  The  Tragedy  of  Korea,"  chapter  on  "  Treaty-Making  and 
Treaty-Breaking." 

8  For  Japan's  aggressions  on  China  despite  her  treaty 
obligations  to  the  contrary,  consult  Millard,  "Our  Eastern 
Question,"  chapters  on  "Japan's  Aggressions  on  China." 

"Cablegram  sent  to  the  Independent  (New  York),  Au- 
gust 24,  1914,  published  in  the  Independent,  August  31,  1914, 
vol.  79,  p.  291,  $ee  Par*  HI,  M, 


86    THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  POLICY 

China.'  All  the  treaties,  promises,  and  declara- 
tions made  by  the  Japanese  statesmen  concern- 
ing their  policy  on  the  Asiatic  mainland  have 
so  far  been  mere  scraps  of  paper.  Yet  this 
ambassador  extraordinary  from  Japan  blandly 
told  the  most  august  body  of  American  law- 
makers that  Japan  respected  treaty  obligations 
and  had  entered  the  war  unselfishly. 

At  the  public  dinner  given  in  honour  of  the 
Japanese  Mission  by  Mayor  Mitchel,  in  New 
York  City,  September  29,  1917,  Viscount  Ishii 
outlined  the  Japanese  policy  in  China  as  follows : 

"  Circumstances  for  which  we  were  in  no 
sense  responsible  gave  us  certain  rights  in 
Chinese  territory,  but  at  no  time  in  the  past  and 
at  no  time  in  the  future  do  we  or  will  we  seek 
to  take  territory  from  China  or  to  despoil  China 
of  her  rights.  We  wish  to  be  and  always  con- 
tinue to  be  the  sincere  friend  and  helper  of  our 
neighbour,  for  we  are  more  interested  than  any 
one  else,  except  China,  in  good  government 
there.  Only  we  must  at  all  times  for  self-pro- 
tection prevent  other  nations  from  doing  what 
we  have  no  right  to  do.  We  not  only  will  not 
seek  to  assail  the  integrity  or  the  sovereignty 
of  China,  but  will  eventually  be  prepared  to  de- 

'This  promise  has  never  been  fulfilled.  See  Millard, 
"  Our  Eastern  Question,"  chapter  on  "  Japan's  Seizure  of 
Kiaochow,"  and  Part  III,  S;  also,  World's  Work, 
35:125-126,  December,  1917;  Independent,  79:293,  August 
31,  1914. 


THE  LANSING-ISHII  AGBEEMENT       87 

\ 

fend  and  maintain  the  integrity  and  independ- 
ence of  China  against  any  aggressor.  .  .  . 
The  door  is  always  open.  It  always  has  been 
open ;  it  always  must  remain  open  to  representa- 
tives of  these  vast  commercial  interests  repre- 
sented so  well  in  this  great  gathering  of  kings 
of  commerce.  We  went  to  China  where  the 
door  was  open  to  us  as  to  you,  and  we  always 
have  realized  that  there  nature  gave  us  an  ad- 
vantage. There  was  no  need,  there  is  no  need 
to  close  that  door  on  you,  because  we  welcome 
your  fair  and  honest  competition." 

Then  he  described  what  the  American  public 
had  heard  concerning  Japanese  activities  in 
China  as  false  rumours  manufactured  by  the 
German  propagandists  in  China  and  America  to 
estrange  the  friendship  between  the  United 
States  and  Japan.  These  public  declarations  of 
the  Japanese  ambassador  were  cheered  by  more 
than  a  thousand  public  men ;  they  were  flashed 
all  over  the  country,  and  were  hailed  every- 
where by  the  press  as  the  keynote  of  the  Jap- 
anese Monroe  Doctrine  based  on  "broad  and 
altruistic  principles." 9  "  The  statement  should 
relieve  the  hyper-sensitive  alarm  over  the  pur- 
pose of  Japan  in  the  East,"  said  Ex-President 

f  See  "  Japan's  New  Pledge  Regarding  China,"  New  York 
Times,  Current  History,  VII :  356-357,  November,  1917. 

9  See  "  The  Japanese  Mission,"  Independent,  92 :  79,  Octo- 
ber 13,  1917;  "Japan,  America,  and  the  East,"  Outlook, 
117:200,  October  10,  1917. 


88    THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  POLICY 

Taft  in  his  telegram  to  the  United  Press  on 
October  1st,  commenting  on  the  Ishii  declara- 
tion. "  It  manifested  a  spirit  of  friendship  to 
the  United  States  and  a  pledge  to  maintain  and 
preserve  China  from  spoliation  which  was  most 
reassuring." 

On  November  2,  1917,  formal  notes  were  ex- 
changed between  Secretary  Lansing  and  Am- 
bassador Ishii.  The  agreement  in  main  pro- 
vides: (1)  that  the  United  States  recognizes 
Japan's  special  interests  in  China  based  on  terri- 
torial propinquity ;  (2)  that  both  the  United 
States  and  Japan  recognize  the  principle  of 
"  open  door  "  and  integrity  of  China."  Besides 
these  formal  agreements  contained  in  the  note, 
"A  complete  and  satisfactory  understanding 
upon  the  matter  of  naval  cooperation  in  the 
Pacific  for  the  purpose  of  attaining  the  common 
object  against  Germany  and  her  allies  has  been 
reached  between  the  representatives  of  the  im- 
perial Japanese  navy  who  are  attached  to  the 
special  mission  of  Japan  and  the  representatives 
of  the  United  States  navy."  * 

2.    RECEPTION  OF  THE  AGREEMENT 
With  the  exception  of  a  few  publicists  who 

10  Press  dispatches  from  New  York,  October  I,  1917. 
"See  Part  III,  T. 

"From  the  official  statement  given  to  the  press  by  the 
State  Department,  November  6,  1917. 


THE  LANSING-ISHII  AGBEEMENT       89 

know  the  Eastern  politics  and  are  familiar  with 
the  methods  of  Japanese  diplomacy,18  this  new 
agreement  between  the  United  States  and  Japan 
received  the  most  favourable  comment  in  the  ; 
press  and  from  the  public  men  in  America.14 
Apparently  it  cleared  away  the  threatening 
cloud  on  the  Eastern  horizon ;  put  an  end  to  the 
yellow  peril ;  and  solved  the  perplexing  Eastern 
question,  together  with  its  corollary — the  ques- 
tion of  the  mastery  of  the  Pacific.  Even  louder  * 
praises  came  from  Japan.  From  the  Japanese 
publicity  channels  and  officially  manipulated 
press,  we  heard  that  the  news  of  the  agreement 
was  heralded  throughout  the  Empire  as  a  new 
bond  of  the  time-honoured  friendship  between 
America  and  Japan ;  that  in  the  Japanese  mind 
this  new  agreement  signalized  the  permanent 
peace  in  the  Pacific  basin,  and  expressed  the 
cordial  friendship  of  America  and  Japan  to- 
ward China  in  a  genuine  spirit  of  helpfulness. 

Amid  all  these  tumults  of  applause,  both  in 
America  and  Japan,  the  Associated  Press  re- 
ceived the  following  cablegram  from  its  Peking 
agent,  dated  October  26th,  which  dispatch, 
owing  to  the  supreme  prestige  of  Japan  at  that 

"See  "The  Proper  Interpretation  of  the  Agreement," 
Nation,  105 : 563-565,  November  22,  1917,  by  Herald  Monk 
Vinacke. 

14  See  "  Monroe  and  Ishii  Doctrine,"  Independent,  92 :  309, 
November  17,  1917;  for  press  editorials,  see  Literary  Digest, 
November  17,  1917,  vol.  55:  pp.  15-16. 


90    THE  DEVELOPMENT  OP  THE  POLICY 

moment,  received  practically  no  publicity  in  the 
American  press : 

"  The  Japanese  are  exerting  every  effort,  of- 
ficially and  unofficially,  to  close  the  Chinese  arms 
monopoly  contract,  carrying  control  of  the 
Nanking  iron  deposits  and  the  employment  of 
Japanese  military  advisers  and  a  director  of  the 
new  arsenal  at  Nanking.  It  is  asserted  by  the 
Japanese  that  they  are  extending  credit,  and 
not  making  a  loan,  and  consequently  that  they 
are  not  violating  the  six  Powers'  exclusive 
rights  to  make  political  loans. 

"  This  view  is  not  shared  by  the  French  and 
the  English  and  a  large  section  of  the  Chinese 
press,  as  well  as  diplomatic  circles,  which  unite 
in  denouncing  the  deal  as  a  revival  of  the  most 
objectionable  feature  in  Japan's  demands  pre- 
sented to  China  in  May,  1915,  known  as 
'  Group  Five.'  The  principal  provisions  of 
those  demands,  which  were  twenty-one  in  num- 
ber, concerned  the  appointment  of  Japanese 
military  and  political  advisers  for  China  and 
Japanese  supervision  over  the  manufacture  or 
purchase  by  China  of  munitions  of  war. 

"  Minister  Reinsch  has  advised  the  Foreign 
Office  that  China  has  invariably  taken  the  posi- 
tion that  it  would  hold  the  remainder  of  the  iron 
deposits  for  national  use  whenever  Americans 
have  sought  development  rights,  and  that  con- 
sequently the  United  States  now  would  insist 


THE  LANSING-ISHII  AGREEMENT       91 

that  American  interests  be  given  consideration 
in  the  Chinese  iron  industry.  The  ministers  of 
several  other  countries  have  taken  the  same 
position." 

To  the  average  American  mind  it  is  quite  in- 
credible that  Japan  should  assure  the  United 
States,  through  her  special  mission,  of  her  inten- 
tion of  preserving  China's  integrity  and  the 
principle  of  equal  opportunities  in  the  East,  and 
at  the  same  time  secretly  attempt  to  undermine 
these  very  principles."  Still  more  incredible  is 
the  Chinese  protest  against  the  friendly  and 
altruistic  intentions-  of  Japan  that  the  Island 
Empire  "  not  only  will  not  seek  to  assail  the 
integrity  or  the  sovereignty  of  China,  but  will 
eventually  be  prepared  to  defend  and  maintain 
the  integrity  and  independence  of  China  against 
any  aggressor."  The  Lansing-Ishii  agreement 
is  bitterly  resented  by  the  Chinese."  It  was 

"World's  Work  (New  York),  35:125-126,  December, 
1917.  This  attempt  of  Japan  has  resulted  in  the  appoint- 
ment of  Baron  Yoshiro  Sakatani  as  the  Japanese  Financial 
Adviser  to  the  Chinese  Government,  and  in  the  conclusion 
of  the  new  Sino-Japanese  Military  Agreement  (Part  III, 
U)  of  March  19,  1918;  see  Hollington  K.  Tong,  "What 
Japan  Really  Wants  of  China,"  Millard's  Review  (Shang- 
hai), IV 1264-267,  April  20,  1918;  "Japan  Completing  Finan- 
cial Control  of  China,"  ibid.,  IV :  457-459,  May  25,  1918. 

"See  Frederick  Moore,  "The  Japanese  Menace  to 
China,"  World's  Work,  35 : 106-207,  December,  1917. 

"At  a  mass  meeting  of  Chinese  students  in  Tokyo,  Ja- 
pan, resolutions  were  adopted  condemning  the  declarations 
of  Viscount  Ishii  in  America  as  hypocritical  professions  to 
conceal  the  real  designs  of  Japan  toward  China, — New 
Korea  (San  Francisco),  p.  3,  November  8,  1917. 


92    THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  POLICY 

criticized  not  only  by  the  press  of  the  Eastern 
republic,  but  by  the  government  officials  as 
well.  Formal  representations  were  made  by 
the  Chinese  Government  both  at  Tokyo  and  at 
Washington  to  the  effect  that  "  the  Chinese 
Government  will  not  allow  itself  to  be  bound  by 
any  agreement  entered  into  by  other  nations," 
that  China  is  an  independent  nation,  and  ought 
not  to  be  the  subject  of  negotiations  between 
foreign  countries."  China  is,  indeed,  surprised 
"  that  America,  of  all  countries,  should  have 
taken  this  step  and  lent  herself,  however  un- 
willingly, to  Japanese  imperial  schemes,"  as  the 
Peking  Gazette  puts  it.19 

This  protest  from  China  is  not  inspired  alto- 
gether by  a  sensitive  self-respect  or  an  injured 
pride  from   the  fact  that   sovereign   China  is 
about  to  be  "  protected  "  by  Japan, — the  con- 
struction put  upon  Chinese  expressions  by  many 
journals  in  America.     Rather  it  is  due  to  the 
Chinese  fear  of  Japan  and  her  conviction  that 
Japanese  designs  in  China  are  contrary  to  the 
public  declarations  of  the  Nipponese  statesmen. 
e/v    .Dr.    Ng.    Poon    Chew,    the    eminent    Chinese 
^   scholar  and  publicist,  gives  expression  to  the 
<.  enlightened   Chinese   sentiment   regarding  the 
V   new  pact  as  follows :  "  During  Japan's  war  with 
Russia,  twelve  years  ago,  Japan  declared  to  the 

"Press  dispatches  from  Washington,  November  10,  1917. 
19  Quoted  in  Literary  Digest,  p.  8,  November  24,  1917. 


THE  LANSING-ISHII  AGBEEMENT       93 

world  that  the  motives  which  impelled  her  to 
take  arms  against  Russia  were  to  drive  Russia 
from  Manchuria  and  restore  Manchuria  to  its 
rightful  owner,  China.  Twelve  years  have 
elapsed  since  the  conclusion  of  that  war.  What 
part  of  Manchuria  has  Japan  restored  to  China? 
Not  only  none,  but  to-day  Japan  occupies  a 
larger  sphere  of  Manchuria  than  Russia  ever 
occupied.  Japan  has  done  everything  to  hin- 
der, obstruct,  and  frustrate  China's  plans  to 
develop  Manchuria  under  Chinese  Government 
auspices.  Japan  is  the  Prussia  of  Asia.  She 
stands  to-day  for  the  very  principles  against 
which  the  Allied  nations  are  fighting.  If  Japan 
to-day  is  allowed  a  free  hand  to  dispose  of 
China  the  war  now  being  fought  at  such  a  ter- 
rible cost  in  Europe  must  be  fought  all  over  in 
Asia.  It  is  not  to  the  interest  of  the  world  to 
permit  Japan  to  have  a  free  hand  in  China." 

3.  EFFECT  ON  JAPANESE  ATTITUDE 
"Is  there  any  substantial  reason  for  the 
Chinese  distrust  of  Japanese  policy  in  China?  " 
the  American  reader  may  ask.  Had  the  United 
States  Government  given  China  the  same  pledge 
that  Japan  has  given  in  the  recent  American- 
Japanese  pact,  China  would  be  elated,  for  it  has 
been  the  history  of  commercial  development  in 

20  Published  in  the  Sacramento  Bee,  quoted  in  the  Literary 
Digest,  November  24,  1917,  pp.  16-17. 


94    THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  POLICY 

China  of  late  years  that  whatever  advantage 
Japan  obtained  from  the  Chinese  she  got 
through  coercion,  whereas  American  capitalists 
are  invited  to  develop  Chinese  resources.81 
Time,  the  great  revealer  of  truth,  will  in  the 
future  expose  the  hidden  ambition  of  Japan 
concerning  China,  and  her  real  purposes  in  mak- 
ing this  new  agreement  with  America.  At 
present,  there  is  only  one  way  in  which  we  can 
form  a  reasonably  accurate  opinion  as  to  the 
ulterior  motives  of  an  aggressive  empire,  that 
is  to  deduce  current  policies  from  existing  facts 
in  the  light  of  past  experience.  What  in 
Japanese  diplomacy  of  the  recent  past  has  been 
indicative  of  the  present  Japanese  Asiatic 
policy?  What  part  should  the  United  States 
take  in  the  shaping  of  events  in  the  Far  East? 
Upon  the  correct  analysis  and  proper  solution 
of  this  problem  hinges  the  future  peace  in  the 
Pacific  basin  and  the  welfare  of  one-fourth  of 
the  world's  population.  If  the  problem  be  cor- 
rectly solved,  and  the  situation  wisely  handled, 
the  Pacific  Ocean  in  the  future  will  be  a  basin 
of  cultural  and  commercial  activities ;  the  United 
States  will  hold  her  political  prestige  and  com- 
mercial advantages  in  the  East;  the  oldest 
civilization  in  the  world  will  be  preserved,  and 

*  See  Minister  Wellington  Koo's  speech  at  a  meeting  of 
U.  S.  Chamber  of  Commerce,  New  York  Times,  February 
10,  1916. 


THE  LANSING-ISHII  AGBEEMENT       96 

China  will  in  time  take  her  place  among  the 
powers  of  the  world.  If,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  Asiatic  question  is  left  to  a  hit-or-miss  policy 
with  a  lax  and  indifferent  attitude,  Asia  will 
ultimately  be  consolidated  under  Japanese 
domination.  Asia,  with  great  natural  resources 
and  limitless  man-power,  dominated  by  an 
aggressive  empire,  European  or  Asiatic,  is  a 
menace  to  the  world's  peace,  and  a  direct  threat 
to  the  welfare  of  the  United  States. 

The  habitable  area  of  the  earth  is  limited,  and 
China  is  the  last  remaining  unprotected  El 
Dorado  in  the  world.  There  are  two  elements 
that  an  ambitious  nation  must  have  in  order  to 
be  great, — great  in  the  material  sense:  wealth 
and  man-power.  China  has  both;  she  has 
abundant  natural  resources  to  be  developed,  and 
four  hundred  million  sturdy  people  to  be 
secured  for  use  in  war  or  peace.  But  China  is 
no  nation;  she  is  a  collection  of  four  hundred 
million  individuals.  Common  ties  of  political 
aspiration,  economic  interdependence,  and 
social  obligation  are  almost  utterly  lacking. 
Nationalism  in  the  modern  sense  of  the  word  is 
an  unknown  quantity  to  the  masses  of  China. 
European  nations  took  advantage  of  this,  and 
through  one  pretext  after  another  obtained 
leases,  concessions,  and  spheres  of  influence  in 
China  until  the  autonomy  of  that  ancient  nation 
became  only  a  nominal  term. 


96    THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  POLICY 

Japan,  the  infant  prodigy  of  the  East,  crowded 
for  space  for  her  ever-increasing  population,28 
and  with  an  insatiable  desire  to  become  a  first 
class  power  among  the  family  of  nations,  has  a 
vision  of  political  and  commercial  expansion  on 
the  mainland  of  Asia.  Consolidation  of  Asia  under 
Japanese  domination  is  the  soul  of  Japanese  foreign 
policy,  and  has  been  so  ever  since  Japan  became 
a  modern  nation.2*  In  the  first  blocking  out  of 
her  program  she  proposed  to  annex  Korea 
within  forty-nine  years,  but  this  has  been  ac- 
complished in  twenty-six."  Now  the  same 
process  is  being  repeated  in  China.  Already 
Japan  dominates  Manchuria,  Inner  Mongolia, 
Fukien,  Shantung  and  Liaotung.29  The  same 
policy — the  policy  of  opportunism — that  was 
used  so  effectively  in  undermining  the  Korean 
Government  is  in  full  operation  in  China  now, 
and  the  same  Japanese  minister,  Count  Gonsuke 
Hayashi,  who  was  instrumental  in  destroying 
Korea,  is  now  the  Japanese  minister  at  Peking. 
The  open  door  principle  is  practically  destroyed, 


"Annual  increase  of  population  in  Japan  proper  is  esti- 
mated at  600,000;  see  W.  E.  Weyl,  "Japan's  Menacing 
Birth-rate,"  Asia,  18 :  129-133,  February,  1918. 

M  See  Walter  E.  Weyl,  "  Japan's  Diplomacy  of  Necessity," 
Asia,  XVII :  593-595,  October,  1917. 

24  See  McKenzie,  "The  Tragedy  of  Korea";  Park,  "The 
Tragic  History  of  Korea,"  Chinese  and  Korean  editions. 

"  See  Millard,  "  The  Far  Eastern  Question,"  "  Our  Eastern 
Question";  J.  W.  Jenks,  "Japan's  Acts  in  China,"  World's 
Work,  33:312-328,  January,  1917. 


THE  LANSING-ISHII  AGEEBMENT       97 

for  in  the  territories  controlled  by  the  Japanese, 
the  door  is  open  only  to  Japanese  trade.28 

With  money  borrowed  from  the  British 
capitalists,  the  Japanese  built  the  South  Man- 
churian  Railway  and  shut  off  British  trade. 
British  financiers  have  now  come  to  realize  that 
every  time  they  lend  a  pound  to  the  Japanese, 
that  money  is  used  in  the  East  to  kill  the  British 
trade;  and  to-day  the  Japanese  cannot  borrow 
a  single  shilling  in  the  London  markets.  Hence 
they  turn  to  the  United  States.27  Money  they 
must  have  to  develop  all  the  mining  and  railroad 
concessions  wrenched  from  China.  In  1916, 
Baron  Shibusawa,  the  Japanese  Morgan  and 
the  semi-official  spokesman  of  the  government, 
came  to  the  United  States  to  arrange  a  huge 
loan  with  the  bankers  of  New  York.  His  mis- 
sion was  a  failure.  But  had  he  been  successful 
and  had  he  borrowed  enough  money  from 
American  capitalists,  it  is  very  probable  that 
the  Japanese  could  have  succeeded  in  closing 
all  the  doors  of  China  to  the  rest  of  the  world, 
as  they  have  done  in  Manchuria. 

It  has  been  stated  time  and  again  that  Japan 
entered  the  European  War  with  the  unselfish 


28 See  O.  K.  Davis,  "Whose  Open  Door?"  Everybody's, 
36:34-46,  January,  1917. 

"See  H.  K.  Tong,  "American  Money  and  Japanese 
Brains,"  Review  of  Reviews,  53 : 452-455.  April,  1916 ;  "  Ja- 
pan, China,  and  American  Money,"  Harper's  Weekly, 
62 :  298-299,  March  26,  1916. 


98    THE  DEVELOPMENT  OP  THE  POLICY 

motive  of  fulfilling  her  treaty  obligation  to  her 
ally — England.  That  may  or  may  not  be  true. 
But  the  fact  is  that  Japan  is  the  only  nation  that 
has  profited  by  this  war.  It  seems  likely  that 
Japan  will  occupy  all  the  territories  formerly 
held  by  Germany  in  the  Far  East  and  more. 
Commercially,  she  is  enjoying  an  unprecedented 
prosperity.  She  has  replaced  all  the  German 
and  Austrian,  and  a  part  of  the  Allies1  trade  in 
the  East.  Since  the  war  began,  Japan's  sales 
to  the  Philippines,  Straights  Settlements,  Brit- 
ish India,  Australia,  and  Spain  have  more  than 
doubled.  Sales  to  Russia  are  more  than  twelve 
times  what  they  were;28  Egypt  has  changed 
from  a  modest  customer  requiring  less  than  a 
half  million  dollars'  worth  of  goods  yearly  to  a 
fairly  important  one  buying  more  than  five 
times  that  amount.  The  United  States  bought 
in  1916  a  hundred  million  dollars'  worth  more 
than  in  1913.  "  Japan  is  enjoying  the  novel  ex- 
perience of  engaging  in  a  war  which  has  brought 
great  prosperity,  with  no  increase  in  taxes,  no 
issues  of  bonds,  and  with  no  loss  to  army  and 
navy."  " 

"This  was  true  up  to  the  time  of  the  overthrow  of  the 
Kerensky  government,  November,  1917.  Since  then  the 
trade  relations  between  Japan  and  Russia  have  been  uncer- 
tain because  of  the  unstable  condition  of  Russia. 

"Carl  Crow,  "Get-Rich-Quick  Japan,"  Sunset  Magazine, 
39 : 32-33,  December,  1917.  Also  see  G.  L.  Harding,  "  Ja- 
pan's Part  in  the  War,"  New  York  Times,  Current  History, 
VI :  528-531,  September,  1917. 


THE  LANSING-ISHII  AGBEEMENT       99 

The  Lansing-Ishii  agreement,  regardless  of 
what  the  American  people  may  think  of  it,  is, 
in  the  opinion  of  Japanese  and  Chinese,  a  de- 
cided victory  for  Japan  and  a  corresponding  de- 
feat for  America.80  Recognition  of  sovereignty 
within  sovereignty  is  contradiction  of  terms. 
No  matter  what  the  intention  of  the  American 
statesmen  ill  recognizing  Japan's  special  in- 
terests in  China,  the  Japanese  purpose  in  mak- 
ing this  agreement  is  to  blindfold  America  as  to 
their  ever-increasing  activities  in  China,  and  to 
make  America  ignore  China's  appeal  against  the 
Japanese  aggression. 

*°For  full  discussion  of  this  topic,  see  the  present  wri- 
ter's "China's  Distrust  of  Japan,"  Asia,  XVIII :  225-226, 
March,  1918. 


V 

PRESENT  POLICIES  AND  OPPORTUNITIES 

i.    JAPANESE  PLANS  AND  AMBITIONS 

THE  astute  statesmen  of  Japan  realize 
the  solidarity  of  public  opinion  in  the 
West.  Hence  their  advance  on  the 
Asiatic  mainland  has  been  very  cautious.  As 
long  as  they  get  whatj:hey  want  piecemeal,  it 
will  not  attract  Western  attention,  nor  will  any 
single  loss  be  great  enough  to  arouse  the  Chi- 
nese to  a  fighting  spirit.  Through  this  policy — 
the  policy  of  the  small  snake  with  the  big  toad — 
Japan  has  swollen  her  sphere  of  influence  dur- 
ing the  last  ten  years  to  the  largest  in  the  main- 
land of  Asia.  If  this  policy  is  permitted  to  pro- 
ceed unchecked,  Japan  will  ultimately  succeed 
in  absorbing  the  entire  continent  of  Asia  with 
its  vast  natural  resources  and  limitless  man- 
power. Then  no  longer  could  the  British 
colonies  discriminate  against  Japanese  immi- 
grants ; *  no  longer  could  California  pass  an 
alien  land  law;  no  longer  could  the  United 
States  Government  assert  the  principles  of 
Monroe  Doctrine  tha*  the  Western  Hemisphere 
is  closed  to  imperial  colonization.  Banzai  and 

1  See   Harry   C.    Douglas,   "  What   May   Happen    in   the 
Pacific,"  Review  of  Reviews,  55 : 394-398,  April,  1917. 

100 


^  Japanese  Sphere  and  Desired  Sphere 
^  British  SfAere 
^French  Sphere 

["i"1  French  and  British  Desired  Spheres 
Conftctei  CWn»o«  E«pw  PWWI 


Courtesy  Asia  Magazine  of 
American  Asiatic  Association, 

CHINA  IN  1919 

SHOWING  RAILWAYS  AND  SPHERES  OF  INFLUENCE 

The  Spheres  Vary  Broadly  from  the  British  Centres  of  Economic  Influence  Based  on  Years  of  Developed  Com- 
merce and  Investment  to  the  Japanese,  Where  Political  Authority  Advances  Hand  in  Hand  With  Economic 
Advantage.  A  Crucial  Test  of  the  League^of  Nations  Will  B*>  Its  Ability  or  Failure  to  End  Them  by 


PRESENT  POLICIES  AND.  OPFOBTf  I?XE»  1CB. 


Dai  Nippon  will  be  far  more  dangerous  and  for- 
midable than  Kultur  and  Weltpolitik.  With  these 
outstanding  facts  and  tendencies  in  view,  what 
should  be  the  correct  Oriental  policy  of  the 
United  States? 

Japan  will  regard  —  outwardly,  at  least  —  the 
wishes  of  the  United  States  as  long  as  the 
United  States  is  superior  in  resources  and  man- 
power. But  Japan  will  not  remain  inferior  to 
the  United  States  in  these  two  elements  essen- 
tial to  a  nation's  greatness,  if  her  present  policy 
is  carried  out  successfully.  She  patiently  fore- 
bore  the  insolence  of  China  during  the  early 
years  of  the  Meiji  Era,  only  saying  to  herself, 
"  We  will  come  back  at  China  when  we  are 
ready  and  able."  She  redeemed  this  pledge  to 
herself  in  1894.  After  the  Chino-Japanese  War, 
Russia,  Germany,  and  France  drove  her  out  ofv 
Liaotung  Peninsula.  She  acquiesced  in  what 
she  deemed  to  be  the  humiliating  terms  of  these 
three  powers,  but  with  the  anticipation  of  com- 
ing back  at  them  in  the  future.  Come  back  she 
did  in  1904  and  1914,  to  Russia  and  Germany 
respectively.  The  dates  1924  and  1934  are 
open,  and  Japan  has  a  few  more  issues  to  settle 
with  foreign  nations  —  especially  with  the  United 
States  —  and  a  few  more  self-made  pledges  to 
redeem.  Here  it  might  be  well  to  remember 
the  significant  statement  of  Baron  Kato,  Min- 
ister for  Foreign  Affairs,  in  the  Japanese  Diet 


-'•JO?:  *j^-J>]fcVEiOPHENT  OF  THE  POLICY 

/ 

on  January  21,  1915,  on  the  pending  California 
Alien  Land  Law  question :  "  The  Imperial  Gov- 
ernment has  found  the  replies  of  the  American 
Government  not  at  all  satisfactory  and  recog- 
nizes the  necessity  of  elaborating  other  plans 
for  the  solution  of  the  pending  question.  As  re- 
gards the  nature  of  these  plans,  the  time  to 
report  them  has  not,  to  our  regret,  arrived." 

The  American  diplomacy  in  the  Far  East 
has  been  a  "  diplomacy  de  luxe"  as  a  Japanese 
publicist  once  described  it.  American  states- 
men piously  believe  in  the  open  door  and  in- 
tegrity of  China,  but  the  idea  of  fighting  for 
these  ideals  has  never  entered  their  minds. 
They  have  honourable  intentions  in  regard  to 
their  foreign  policy  and  judge  the  intentions  of 
the  Japanese  statesmen  by  their  own.  The 
American  lack  of  preparation,  both  military  and 
psychological,  to  fight  for  what  she  believes  in 
concerning  Chiha  gave  Japan  freedom  of  action 
in  the  East,  and  the  self-deceiving  good  inten- 
tion of  American  diplomacy  furnished  an  ample 
opportunity  for  Japan  to  hoodwink  the  United 
States.  Count  Okuma  is  a  powerful  imperial- 
ist ;  he  believes  in  anything  but  fairness  and  non- 
aggression  toward  China.  Yet  he  is  the  presi- 
dent of  the  Japan  Peace  Society  that  manu- 
factures peace  propaganda,  not  for  home  con- 

1  Quoted   by   Millard   in   "Our   Eastern   Question,"   pp, 
223-224. 


PBESENT  POLICIES  AND  OPPORTUNITIES  103 

sumption,  but  for  export  purposes — especially 
to  the  United  States.  General  Terauchi,  the 
premier  of  Japan,  is  an  out-and-out  militarist, 
yet  he  sends  out  for  American  consumption  doc- 
trines of  peace  and  democracy  as  the  "  national 
sentiment  of  the  Japanese  people."  At  present, 
Japan  has  no  more  intention  of  making  an  ag- 
gressive war  upon  the  United  States  than  she 
has  of  making  an  aggressive  war  on  Great 
Britain.  But  she  wants  to  create  in  America  an 
impression  that  Japan  is  a  formidable  nation 
with  matchless  fighting  machines,  that  the 
United  States  must  let  her  alone  and  stay  out 
of  her  way  in  Asia.  So  far  Japan  has  succeeded 
admirably  in  all  her  diplomatic  game  of  bluff 
with  the  United  States. 

The  lax  and  indifferent  Oriental  policy  of  the 
American  Government  and  the  failure  to  under- 
stand the  nature  of  Japanese  diplomacy  have 
caused  the  decrease  of  American  trade  and 
prestige  in  the  East.  American  exports  to 
China  fell  in  ten  years  (1905-1915)  from  about 
twenty-eight  per  cent,  of  China's  total  imports 
to  less  than  eight  per  cent.3  The  Japanese  in 
China  are  working  insidiously  to  undermine 
American  influence  and  prestige.  In  exerting 
their  pressure  to  cancel  the  Chinchow-Aigun 
railway  concession,  a  concession  given  to  the 
Bethlehem  Steel  Corporation,  the  Japanese 
•Millard,  "Our  Eastern  Question"  p.  356. 


104    THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  POLICY 

minister  at  Peking  used  these  significant  words 
in  his  note  to  the  Chinese  Government,  January 
31,  1910:  "  Before  the  Chinese  Government  de- 
termines anything,  the  consent  of  my  govern- 
ment must  first  be  obtained."  While  Minister 
Reinsch  was  wielding  his  influence  to  induce 
China  to  follow  the  example  of  the  United 
States  in  breaking  off  relations  with  Germany 
in  the  spring  of  1917,  Japanese  agents  in  China 
secretly  combined  with  the  German  and  Aus- 
trian propagandists  to  block  the  move.  When 
finally  the  Chinese  liberals  won  over  the  reac- 
tionaries in  breaking  off  the  diplomatic  relation 
with  Germany,  then  both  official  Tokyo  and  the 
Japanese  press  sent  to  America  and  Europe  dis- 
patches containing  loud  praises  of  the  Chinese 
decision. 

This  insidious  attempt  of  the  Japanese  to  un- 
dermine American  influence  is  prevalent  wher- 
ever the  interests  of  the  two  nations  come  into 
contact.  Although  it  has  been  denied  by  the 
Japanese  Government  and  the  press,  and  the 
State  Department  is  reticent  on  the  Japanese 
part  of  the  intrigue  in  the  alleged  German- 
Japanese-Mexican  alliance  to  invade  the  United 
States,  presumably  because  the  officials  at 
Washington  do  not  wish  to  complicate  matters 
any  more  than  necessary  concerning  an  ally  of 

4  Note  sent  to  Wai  Wu-Pu.  See  full  text  of  the  note, 
Millard,  ibid.,  p.  17. 


PEESENT  POLICIES  AND  OPPORTUNITIES  105 

the  United  States  in  the  world  war,  there  were 
enough  evidences  in  the  intercepted  note  of  the 
German  Foreign  Minister,  Alfred  Zimmermann, 
to  the  German  Minister,  von  Eckhardt,  at  Mex- 
ico City,  and  in  the  information  which  leaked 
out  through  non-official  channels  at  Washington 
that  Japan  was  inclined  to  take  sides  with  Ger- 
many in  the  attempt  to  arouse  Mexico  against 
the  United  States,  if  the  occasion  were  op- 
portune and  the  methods  expedient.8 

2.    AMERICAN  DUTIES  AND  OPPORTUNITIES 
Now  that  the  European  War  is  over,  there  is 
likely  to  be  a  realignment  of  world  politics,  and 

8  The  Zimmermann  note  was  dated,  January  19,  1917,  and 
was  given  to  the  press  by  the  State  Department,  February 
28,  1917.  An  interesting  side-light  has  been  shed  on  the  "  pro- 
Ally"  attitude  of  Japan  during  the  war  by  Hon.  Alvan  T. 
Fuller  of  Massachusetts,  in  his  speech  in  Congress,  March 
3.  iQip: 

"  My  trip  across  the  water  was  uneventful.  I  found  among 
my  fellow  passengers  a  most  delightful  person,  who  was  no 
other  than  M.  Delanney,  the  French  ambassador  to  Japan.  I 
took  occasion  to  ask  the  ambassador,  if,  as  a  result  of  his 
observation,  the  Japanese  were  sincerely  pro-Ally.  To  this 
inquiry  the  ambassador  replied  very  definitely,  '  No,  sir/  and 
inquired,  '  Who  in  the  world  thought  they  were  sincerely 
pro- Ally?' 

"Ambassador  Delanney  stated  to  me  that  the  Japanese 
intended  to  support  Germany,  but  after  the  commission 
visited  here  and  saw  how  whole-heartedly  we  were  going  into 
the  war  they  were  afraid  to  do  so.  Ambassador  Delanney 
stated  that  he  sailed  from  Japan  to  Vancouver,  and  when  the 
party  arrived  and  learned  the  news  that  Austria  had  sur- 
rendered the  Japanese  members  of  the  party  were  visibly 
disappointed.  He  likened  the  emperor  and  the  military  caste 
of  Japan  to  that  of  Germany.  He  said  their  methods  and 
ideas  and  ideals  were  those  of  Germany"  (Congressional 
Record,  Vol.  57,  No.  86,  p.  5465,  March  15,  1919,  65th  Con- 
gress, 3rd  Session). 


106    THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  POLICY 

the  United  States  may  adopt  a  new  Oriental 
policy  befitting  its  rights  and  obligations.  The 
Anglo-Japanese  alliance  has  served  its  purpose, 
and  England  and  Japan  are  only  nominal  allies. 

2  Already  there  are  signs  in  both  countries  of 
mutual  distrust.6  British  resentment  of  the 
Japanese  encroachment  upon  their  interests  in 

t  the  East,  and  the  secret  attempts  of  the  Jap- 
anese to  stir  the  Hindus  against  the  British  rule 


are  the  straws  which  indicate  the  undercurrent 
S  that  drift  the  two  allied  nations  apart.7  In  the 
proposal  of  Japanese  intervention  in  Siberia, 
Great  Britain,  through  her  ambassador,  Earl 
Reading,  at  Washington,  sounded  the  United 
States  on  its  disposition  to  send  troops  to  Asia 
jointly  with  Japan,  before  requesting  her  East- 
ern ally  to  intervene.  From  this  diplomats  at 
Washington  and  elsewhere  drew  the  inference 
that  "  Great  Britain  suspects  Japan  of  an  inten- 
tion of  staying  in  Siberia  once  she  gets  there. 


'For  the  sentiment  of  Japanese  publicists  toward  Great 
Britain  and  her  policies,  consult  KL  K.  Kawakami,  "Japan 
in  World  Politics"  (New  York),  1917. 

TSee  Millard,  "Our  Eastern  Question,"  chap.  XIII,  "Ja- 
pan and  Great  Britain";  McKenzie,  "The  Tragedy  of 
Korea,"  chap.  XX,  "Prospects  for  Foreign  Trade."  For 
the  Japanese  secret  participation  in  Hindu  revolt  against 
the  English,  see  the  findings  in  the  Hindu  revolt  plot  trials 
in  San  Francisco,— press  dispatches,  January  19,  1918;  also 
see  the  correspondence  between  the  leaders  of  the  Hindu 
Nationalists  in  New  York,  and  Japanese  Ambassador 
Aimaro  Sato  at  Washington,  intercepted  by  the  Department 
of  Justice,  and  "Isolation  of  Japaq  in  World  Politics," 
suppressed  by  Department  of  Justice,  March,  1918. 


PBESENT  POLICIES  AND  OPPORTUNITIES  107 

Joint  intervention  would  give  handle  for  invok- 
ing joint  withdrawal  eventually." ' 

Equally  as  possible  as  the  rupture  of  the 
Anglo-Japanese  alliance  is  the  formation  of  an 
Anglo-American  alliance.  The  war  aims  of 
both  England  and  America  were  practically 
identical  and  the  political  aspirations  of  the  two 
countries  have  much  in  common.  England  and, 
the  United  States,  the  two  most  enlightened 
and  powerful  democratic  nations  in  the  world, 
combined  can  curb  the  ambition  of  Japan — the 
consolidation  of  Asia  under  Japanese  domination — 
thereby  removing  the  cause  for  another  world 
war,  and  give  China  political  independence  and 
economic  stability.  This  can  be  done  by  ac- 
complishing two  things:  (1)  By  having  all  the 
treaty  powers,  by  some  sorfaf  aT  Diploma  tic 
agreement,  give  up  the  sphere  doctrine  and  re- 
lease the  predatory  trade  privileges  extorted 
from  China.  The  limit  of  five  per  cent,  custom 
duties  on  all  imports  and  the  exemption  of  for- 
eign traders  and  manufacturers  from  internal 
revenue  taxes  have  made  it  impossible  for  the 
native  traders  and  manufacturers  to  compete 
with  their  foreign  competitors  and  have  kept  the 
Chinese  Government  in  perpetual  insolvency." 
When  these  obstacles  have  been  eliminated, 

"Press  dispatch  from  Washington  (Nebraska  State 
Journal),  March  2,  1918. 

"See  A.  P.  Winston,  "Trade  with  China  Fails  to  In- 
crease," Asia,  XVII 1654,  ff.,  October,  1917. 


108    THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  POLICY 

then  China  can  establish  her  government  on  a 
more  stable  basis  and  begin  financial  reform 
and  industrial  enterprises.  This  will  remove  the 
cause  of  international  rivalry  in  China  and  pave 
the  way  for  the  withdrawal  of  extraterritoriality. 
The  Powers  will  thereby  "  enfranchise  "  China, 
as  they  "  enfranchised  "  Japan  in  1899.  (2)  By 
developing  the  Chinese  natural  resources 
through  the  combined  capital  oi  all  Powers  as 
Secretary  Knox  suggested  in  his  plan  for  the 
neutralization  of  Manchurian  railroads  in  1909. 
By  this  plan  the  investing  Powers  will  have  the 
legitimate  profit  for  their  investment  under  the 
Chinese  ownership  of  the  enterprise.  This  will 
do  away  with  the  underhanded  trade  methods 
of  rival  nations  and  convert  the  Chinese  field 
into  a  vast  neutral  zone  of  peaceful  commerce 
and  fair  competition.  It  will  also  bring  economic 
prosperity  to  the  Chinese,  which  means  a 
higher  standard  of  living,  enlightenment  of  the 
masses,  and  increase  of  purchasing  power.  If 
the  purchasing  power  of  China's  millions  be  in- 
creased, she  will  be  one  of  the  most  attractive 
markets  in  the  world.  Treaty  Powers,  includ- 
ing Japan,  will  reap  the  benefit  in  the  end,  al- 
though they  may  feel  a  seeming  sacrifice  for  a 
time  in  surrendering  their  exclusive  rights  and 
spheres. 

The  United  States  has  a  unique  role  to  play 
in  this  realignment  of  world  politics  and  in  the 


PRESENT  POLICIES  AND  OPPORTUNITIES  109 

remaking  of  China.  The  Pacific  Ocean  is  fast 
becoming  the  basin  of  politicaTand  commercial 
activities,  and  what  affects  one  side  of  it  is 
bound  to  affect  the  other.  The  United  States 
cannot  afford,  for  the  safety  of  its  own  interests, 
to  have  China  dominated  by  an  aggressive  and 
militaristic  nation,  European  or  Asiatic.  The 
effete  notion  of  splendid  isolation  is  out  of  date, 
and  America  can  no  longer  hold  herself  aloof 
and  keep  away  from  the  entangling  alliances  of 
the  old  world.  The  world  is  being  too  closely 
unified  for  two  incombatable  political  ideals  to 
exist  together, — imperialistic  autocracy  based 
upon  militarism,  and  representative  democracy 
founded  on  political  liberty.  President  Wilson 
crystallized  this  idea  into  a  political  principle 
when  he  said  in  his  message  delivered  at  a  joint 
session  of  the  two  houses  of  the  Congress, 
April  2,  1917,  .  .  .  "The  world  must  be 
made  safe  for  democracy;  its  peace  must  be 
planted  upon  the  tested  foundations  of  political 
liberty.  .  .  .  We  shall  fight  for  the  things 
which  we  have  always  carried  nearest  our 
hearts, — for  democracy,  for  the  rights  of  those 
who  submit  to  authority  to  have  a  voice  in  their 
own  governments,  for  the  rights  and  liberties 
of  small  nations,  for  a  universal  domination 
of  right  by  such  a  concert  of  free  peoples  as 
shall  bring  peace  and  safety  to  all  nations  and 
make  the  world  itself  at  last  free." 


110    THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  POLICY 

It  is  a  clear  enunciation  of  new  Americanism. 
The  United  States  fought  for  her  own  freedom 
in  the  Declaration  of  Independence.  She  was 
willing  to  fight  for  the  freedom  of  the  peoples 
of  the  Western  Hemisphere  in  declaring  the 
Monroe  Doctrine.  In  the  European  War  she 
fought  for  the  freedom  and  democracy  of  the 
whole  world.  China,  if  unselfishly  aided  and 
wisely  guided,  can  revive  her  ancient  genius  and 
develop  her  vast  potential  resources,  and  will 
eventually  take  her  place  among  the  powers  of 
the  world  as  a  strong,  democratic  nation.  Will 
the  United  States  of  America,  true  to  the  new 
principles  of  her  political  conviction,  perform 
her  mission  toward  China  in  the  consummation 
of  this  noble  task? 


PART  II 


An  Undercurrent  Shaping  the 

Policy:   Japan's  Control 

of  Publicity 


INTRODUCTION 

IN  the  foregoing  chapters  we  have  examined 
briefly   the  development  of  the   Oriental 
policy  of  the  United  States.     We  will  now 
consider  the  subtle  undercurrent  that  directs,  in 
a  large  measure,  the  course  of  that  policy. 

When  Germany  violated  Belgian  neutrality 
and  invaded  France  in  1914,  the  whole  world 
raised  its  voice  in  indignant  protest.  But  when 
Japan  absorbed  Korea  in  breach  of  faith  and 
covenant  to  the  latter  Power,  and  in  spite  of  her 
solemn  declarations  to  the  world  at  the  beginning 
of  the  Russo-Japanese  War  that  she  was  fighting 
Russia  to  safeguard  the  political  independence 
and  territorial  integrity  of  Korea,  the  Powers  of 
the  West  apparently  connived  at  the  perpetra- 
tion of  the  crime.  The  national  crimes  that 
Japan  committed  during  the  course  of  her  im- 
perial expansion  on  the  Asiatic  mainland  are  not 
less  horrible  nor  less  excusable  than  those  com- 
mitted by  Germany  in  Belgium  and  in  northern 
France.  Yet  Japan  has  received  practically  no 
censure  for  what  she  has  done  in  Korea  and 
China;  on  the  contrary,  she  successfully  main- 
tains her  position  as  a  worthy  member  of  the 

"3 


114     JAPAN'S  CONTROL  OF  PUBLICITY 

family  of  the  democratic  nations  of  the  world. 
One  reason  for  this  situation  lies  in  her  marvel- 
lously complete  and  skillful  control  of  publicity, 
a  control  that  enables  her  to  manipulate  easily 
the  public  opinion  of  the  Western  Powers  and 
to  mould  their  diplomatic  policies  in  the  Orient. 
A  study,  therefore,  of  the  nature  and  extent  of 
Japan's  control  of  publicity  will  throw  much 
light  upon  the  diplomatic  relationships  of  the 
East  and  the  West  and  will  result  in  a  clearer 
understanding  of  the  Oriental  policy  of  the 
United  States. 

As  early  as  the  close  of  the  Russo-Japanese 
War,  before  the  destruction  of  Korean  inde- 
pendence, Thomas  F.  Millard,  the  distinguished 
American  publicist,  wrote  concerning  Japanese 
activities  in  Korea : 

"  Nothing  could  display  greater  cleverness 
than  the  manner  used  by  Japan  through  the 
propaganda  to  steadily  shift  her  ground  in  re- 
gard to  the  main  propositions  involved  in  the 
settlement,  while  at  the  same  time  remaining 
carefully  posed  in  an  attitude  of  self-sacrifice. 
Something  of  a  shock  will  be  felt  in  the  Western 
world  when  the  mask,  having  served  its  pur- 
pose, is  dropped.  Meanwhile,  pretense  is  piled 
upon  pretense,  without  being  able,  however,  to 
conceal  the  undercurrent  of  reality."  * 

The  mask  has  served  its  purpose  and  is 
'"The  New  Far  East,"  p.  102. 


INTEODUCTION  115 

dropped.  But  the  act  was  performed  so  skill- 
fully and  imperceptibly,  like  the  transition  of 
magic  pictures  on  the  screen,  that  the  Western 
world  felt  no  shock  at  all.  Japan  knows  the 
publicity  game  and  plays  it  well.  She  knows 
the  value  of  honourable  intentions  in  the  public 
opinion  of  the  West,  and  she  employs  every 
means  within  her  power  to  create  a  most  favour- 
able impression  of  herself  and  her  aspirations 
in  the  Western  world, — especially  in  the  United 
States  and  England. 

To  this  end,  she  has  many  agencies  working 
constantly.  They  form  an  elaborate  system  of 
interior  and  exterior  espionage,  publicity  prop- 
aganda, press  censorship,  control  of  the  news 
both  as  to  its  sources  and  its  distribution, 
skillful  governing  of  the  impressions  made  upon 
foreigners  who  visit  Japan. 


I 

THE  OFFICIAL  ESPIONAGE 

i.    THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  SYSTEM 

THERE  is  a  wrong  impression  in  the 
West  that  all  the  Oriental  peoples  are 
generally  cunning  and  sly.  Nothing 
could  be  further  from  the  truth.  Although  the 
Westerner  may  condemri  the  Chinaman  for  his 
fogyism  and  low  standard  of  living,  he  certainly 
may  not  condemn  him  for  dishonesty.  The 
credit  system  was  firmly  established  in  China 
long  before  it  was  known  in  Western  Europe. 
There  were  no  contractual  laws  in  China;  they 
were  not  needed,  as  the  Chinaman's  word  is  as 
good  as  his  bond.  It  is  a  well-known  fact  that 
the  Western  banks  in  the  Far  East  prefer  Chi- 
nese cashiers  to  those  of  any  other  nationality. 
Even  in  Japan,  the  majority  of  the  cashiers  in 
large  banks  were  Chinese,  because  of  their  supe- 
rior commercial  integrity  and  high  code  of  hon- 
our, until  the  Japanese  found  out  that  this  fact 
was  considered  a  reflection  on  the  honesty  of 
the  Japanese  people  before  the  Western  public. 
The  Japanese  themselves,  before  coming  into 
ix6 


THE  OFFICIAL  ESPIONAGE  117 

contact  with  the  Western  world,  were  not  so 
subtle  as  they  are  now.  The  Samurai  were  pro- 
fessional warriors.  They  despised  wealth  and 
manual  labour,  and  upheld  honour  and  bravery. 
But  the  swift  abolition  of  the  feudal  system  and 
the  "  gulping  "  of  Western  culture, — the  prod- 
uct of  more  than  five  thousand  years  of  slow 
progress, — in  a  single  generation,  has  made  the 
Japanese  civilization  of  to-day  a  peculiar  struc- 
ture, in  which  the  sense  of  proportion  is  almost 
utterly  lacking.  They  have  copied  the  material 
achievements  of  the  West  without  absorbing  the 
underlying  spiritual  truths;  they  have  adopted 
the  policy  of  expediency  rather  than  principle. 
The  military,  educational,  and  industrial  sys- 
tems of  Japan  are  modelled  after  those  of  Ger- 
many. Their  slogans,  Banzai  and  Dai  Nippon, 
are  other  forms  of  "  Deutschland,  Deutschland, 
tiber  alles,  liber  alles  in  der  Welt."  There  is  a 
remarkable  similarity  between  the  Japanese  spy 
system  and  that  of  Germany,  as  was  revealed  at 
the  opening  of  the  European  War;  only  the 
Japanese  system  is  more  elaborate,  and  carried 
out  to  finer  points.  It  is  more  than  probable 
that  the  aggressive  Empire  of  Asia  learned  the 
dishonourable  but  expedient  trick  from  the 
military  bureaucracy  of  Europe,  and  has  become 
a  greater  master  of  the  game. 

It  is  needless  to  say  that  Japan  reaped  great 
advantages  from  her  spy  system  during  her  re- 


118     JAPAN'S  CONTROL  OF  PUBLICITY 

cent  wars.  The  Chino-Japanese  War  in  1894 
was  in  many  respects  like  the  Franco-Prussian 
War.  Every  Japanese  officer  had  a  thorough 
knowledge  of  the  topography  of  China,  her  re- 
sources and  military  strength, — all  acquired 
through  the  laborious  and  patient  work  of  spies 
long  before  the  opening  of  hostilities.  The  same 
system  was  used  in  the  preparation  for  the 
Russo-Japanese  War.  "They  had  military 
maps  of  every  nook  and  corner  of  Korea  and 
Manchuria;  they  had  spies  working  as  coolies 
on  the  Russian  railroads,  and  in  Russian  ports 
and  shipyards.  .  .  .  The  collapsible  boats, 
with  which  a  pontoon  was  thrown  across  the 
Yalu,  were  made  for  that  special  purpose 
months  before,  when  the  Korean  peninsula  was 
yet  to  be  invaded."  Nothing  was  left  to 
chance  when  Japan  struck  the  first  blow,  which, 
to  the  ordinary  observer  in  the  West,  came  like 
a  thunderbolt  from  the  clear  sky. 

In  time  of  war,  when  a  nation  is  engaged  in 
a  death  struggle,  espionage  might  be  justified 
under  the  pretext  of  military  necessity.  But 
Japan  maintains  her  spy  system  in  time  of  peace 
as  well  as  in  time  of  war.  The  most  curious  fact 
about  it  is  that  so  far  no  serious  protest  has  been 
raised  by  her  scholars  and  publicists  against  it. 
The  only  explanation  of  this  strange  silence  is 

'"The  Russo- Japanese  War,"  p.  25  (Collier  and  Sons, 
New  York). 


THE  OFFICIAL  ESPIONAGE  119 

that  the  oft-quoted  phrase  of  Treitschke,  "  der 
Staat  ist  Macht,"  is  the  ruling  motto  with  the 
better  thinkers  of  Japan,  and  whatever  is  done 
for  the  benefit  of  the  state  is  justifiable.  This 
principle  was  fully  demonstrated  in  the  trial  and 
acquittal  of  Count  Miura  and  his  accomplices 
after  they  murdered  the  Korean  Queen  in  1895.' 
The  Japanese  philosophy  of  the  state  advocates 
selfishness  and  deception  as  motive  powers  that 
energize  the  world."  Only  they  appear  in  differ- 
ent manifestations  in  various  activities  of  life. 
The  forms  of  deception  in  business,  for  instance, 
are  known  as  shrewdness;  in  war,  they  are 
strategy ;  in  society,  cleverness ;  and  in  relations 
between  nations,  diplomacy.  But  all  these  are 
only  different  combinations  of  the  same  element 
— deception. 

This  philosophy  may  find  its  echoes  among 
the  followers  of  Nietzsche  and  Bernhardi;  but 
no  believer  in  liberty  and  democracy  can  en- 
dorse it.  There  are  a  few  things  in  human 
society  that  outrage  our  natural  feelings,  and 
espionage  is  one  of  them. 

2.    SPIES  IN  OTHER  LANDS 
It  is  not  a  hasty  generalization  to  say  that 

'See  "The  Far  East,"  February,  1896,  vol.  I,  p.  20;  Mc- 
Kenzie,  "  The  Tragedy  of  Korea,"  chap.  VI. 

'See  Liang  Ch'i-Chao,  "Liberty,"  pp.  148-152  (Korean 
translation  from  Chinese  text). 


120     JAPAN'S  CONTEOL  OF  PUBLICITY 

Japan  has  spies  in  practically  every  country  on 
the  globe.  This  does  not  mean,  of  course,  that 
Japan  is  preparing  for  war  on  every  nation  in 
the  world.  But  it  is  the  Japanese  way  of  finding 
out  what  the  other  people  are  doing.  Although 
subtle  rumours  are  scattered  all  over  the  United 
States  that  Japan  has  no  use  for  the  Philippine 
Islands,  and  that  she  would  not  occupy  them 
under  any  circumstances,  as  they  would  be  a 
burden  to  her; 4  yet  it  is  an  undeniable  fact  that 
the  Malay  Archipelagoes  are  honeycombed  with 
Japanese  spies.6  In  Mexico  and  South  America 
there  are  several  thousand  Japanese,  mostly 
veterans  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War.  In  one 
year,  1914,  3,675  Japanese  entered  Brazil.9  Ac- 
cording to  the  United  States  census  of  1910, 
there  were  72,157  Japanese  in  the  United  States, 
and  79,675  in  the  Hawaiian  Islands.  It  is  very 
probable  that  the  number  has  increased  consid- 
erably since.  Out  of  this  number,  123,425  were 
men — largely  ex-soldiers. 

It  is  merely  a  matter  of  opinion  how  much 
credence  we  can  attribute  to  the  newspaper  re- 
ports. But  it  is  certain  that  constant  and  re- 
peated rumours  cannot  be  ignored  as  being 
utterly  false.  They  may  be  proofless,  but  they 

4 See  "Why  Japan  does  Not  Want  the  Philippines,"  Re- 
view of  Reviews,  51:494,  April,  1915;  also,  "Philippines 
No  Bait  to  Japan,"  Literary  Digest,  52:1212,  April  29,  1916. 

6  See  S.  Henschen,  "  What  is  Behind  the  Japanese  Peril," 
Forum,  56 : 63-78,  July,  1916. 

'Figures  taken  from  the  Statesmen's  Year  Book,  1916. 


THE  OFFICIAL  ESPIONAGE  121 

are  rarely  without  foundation.  It  was  alleged 
that  some  time  ago  the  harbour  police  of  New 
York  were  astonished  to  see  a  Japanese  aviator 
drop  into  the  bay  in  his  flying  machine.  He  was 
presumably  sent  to  map  the  coast  defense  from 
an  aeroplane.  Japanese  "  fishermen  "  were  dis- 
covered near  the  entrance  of  the  Panama  Canal. 
They  were  trying  to  conduct  pearl  fishing  expe- 
ditions by  taking  bearings  in  various  sections  of 
the  bays  and  waters,  and  incidentally  mapping 
out  the  forts  and  approaches  to  the  canal. 

"On  April  28,  1916,  the  Mayor  of  Los  An- 
geles asked  the  United  States  Government  to 
probe  the  activities  of  Japanese  in  his  city.  Guns 
and  supplies  were  found  hidden  in  the  Japanese 
quarters,  motor  trucks  had  been  purchased,  avi- 
ators were  being  trained,  and  many  young  Jap- 
anese had  been  making  surveys  of  the  coast. 
„  .  .  Several  months  ago  a  Japanese  was  ar- 
rested in  Los  Angeles  for  drunkenness.  A  de- 
tailed map  of  the  United  States  was  found  on  his 
person.  It  showed  landing  places  for  aeroplanes 
in  various  parts  of  the  country.  A  short  time 
prior  to  this  another  Japanese  was  arrested  in 
San  Diego.  He  carried  a  complete  list  of  all  the 
wireless  stations  in  the  United  States." 

Samuel  G.  Blythe  gives  an  account  of  his 
knowing  a  Japanese  nobleman  in  a  Western 
hotel  as  a  bell  "  hop."  The  films  that  this  Japa- 
1  Chicago  Examiner,  February  4,  1917. 


122     JAPAN'S  CONTROL  OF  PUBLICITY 

nese  possessed  showed  "  Mr.  Togo,  the  boy  who 
wore  the  plum-coloured  suit  and  waited  on  the 
bell,  standing  on  the  bridge  of  a  Japanese  battle- 
ship, clad  in  a  silk  hat  and  a  frock  coat,  with  the 
insignia  of  a  Japanese  order  on  his  breast,  and 
between  two  Japanese  officers,  both  in  full  naval 
uniform.  There  is  a  large  American  military 
post  not  far  from  the  place  where  Togo 
officiated."  * 

All  these  reports  and  many  others  of  similar 
nature  may  be  discarded  as  fantastic  and  ficti- 
tious as  no  better  than  the  description  of  the 
Japanese  spies  in  Louis  Joseph  Vance's  recent 
novel,  "  Patria."  But  there  are  two  sides  to 
every  question ;  perhaps,  indeed,  this  is  the  case 
with  rumours  as  well  as  arguments. 

One  thing  certain  is  that  Japan  has  made  per- 
sistent efforts  to  get  a  foothold  on  the  Western 
Hemisphere  for  her  military  and  naval  pur- 
poses. In  1912,  when  it  was  known  that  Japa- 
nese were  making  secret  attempts  to  acquire 
land  inxMagdalena  Bay,  under  the  pretext  of 
establishing  a  base  for  Japanese  fishing  interests, 
Senator  Henry  Cabot  Lodge,  of  Massachusetts, 
introduced  a  resolution  in  the  Senate,  which  was 
adopted  August  2d,  declaring  that  "when  any 
harbour  or  other  place  in  the  American  conti- 
nent is  so  situated  that  the  occupation  thereof 
for  naval  or  military  purposes  might  threaten 
•  Saturday.  Evening  Post,  May  22,  1915,  p.  53. 


THE  OFFICIAL  ESPIONAGE  123 

the  communications  or  the  safety  of  the  United 
States,  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
could  not  see,  without  grave  concern,  the  pos- 
session of  such  harbour  or  other  place  by  any 
corporation  or  association  which  has  such  rela- 
tion to  another  government,  not  American,  as  to 
give  that  government  traditional  powers  of  con- 
trol for  naval  or  military  purposes."  Although 
the  name  Japanese  was  not  mentioned  in  the 
resolution,  that  it  was  aimed  at  what  Japan  was 
trying  to  do  was  obvious.  The  Japanese  took 
sufficient  hint  from  this  resolution,  and  gave  up 
the  attempt.  It  is  quite  clear  that  the  American 
Gcvernment  will  not  tolerate  the  acquisition  of 
land  in  the  Western  Hemisphere  by  the  Jap- 
anese for  naval  or  military  purposes,  much  as  it 
is  desired  by  the  Tokyo  Government. 

In  China  the  Japanese  spies  are  not  so  con- 
cealed and  unobtrusive  as  they  are  in  the  United 
States.  A  paragraph  from  the  description  of  the 
Japanese  in  Manchuria  by  an  unbiased  eye-wit- 
ness may  be  cited  to  illustrate  the  operation  of 
the  system  there. 

"  During  the  Russian  occupation  prior  to  the 
war,  the  Japanese  Government  had  sent  hun- 
dreds of  Japanese  into  the  country  with  instruc- 
tions to  adopt  the  dress  of  the  Chinese  and  do- 
mesticate themselves;  and  many  of  these  per- 
sons succeeded  in  escaping  detection  after  hos^ 
tilities  commenced,  remaining  to  act  as  spies 


124     JAPAN'S  CONTROL  OF  PUBLICITY 

and  secret  agents.  .  .  .  No  sooner  did  the 
Japanese  armies  occupy  the  country,  and  pro- 
mulgate their  military  regulations,  than  these 
informers  came  out  of  their  retirement  and 
quickly  assumed  a  position  of  importance.  They 
pointed  to  the  Japanese  authorities  Chinese  who 
were  known  or  suspected  to  sympathize  with  or 
have  business  relations  with  the  Russians.  It 
mattered  little  that  the  men  thus  accused  might 
be  of  high  standing,  and  the  fact  that  a  majority 
of  them,  especially  officials,  could  not  have 
avoided  relations  with  the  Russians.  Many 
were  executed  upon  the  witness  of  these  profes- 
sional informers,  often  without  even  a  sem- 
blance of  a  trial.  The  regulations  provided  that 
Chinese  who  knew  of  any  infraction  of  them  and 
failed  to  inform  the  authorities  were  punishable 
by  death;  while  many  were  tortured  in  the  at- 
tempt to  force  them  to  disclose  military  infor- 
mation." 

3.    ESPIONAGE  IN  JAPAN  AND  KOREA 
In  Japan   every   foreigner  is  watched,   and 
everything  he   does  and  says  is  carefully  re- 
ported and  filed  in  the  books  of  the  government 
secret  service  office.    A  paragraph  from  the  pen 
of  the  veteran  correspondent,  Samuel  G.  Blythe, 
after  his  visit  to  Japan,  well  illustrates  this : 
"  Any  man  you  meet  may  be  listening  for 
•Millard,  "The  New  Far  East,"  p.  146. 


THE  OFFICIAL  ESPIONAGE  126 

governmental  purposes  to  what  you  say  or  be- 
cause of  that  natural  curiosity ;  but  in  case  you 
say  anything  you  should  not,  whether  the  lis- 
tener is  a  secret  agent  or  not,  he  goes  and  re- 
ports your  conversation  to  somebody,  for  that 
is  the  first  duty  of  all  Japanese— to  tell  what 
they  hear.  There  are  always  some  of  these 
agents  about  the  big  hotels.  They  act  as  room- 
boys,  as  bar-boys,  as  waiters,  and  in  any  other 
capacity  that  will  put  them  in  contact  with  the 
guests.  In  the  days  of  .the  Russian  war  the  cor- 
respondents who  were  held  in  Tokyo  were  ac- 
customed to  relate  their  opinions  of  the  Japa- 
nese in  front  of  a  certain  bar,  and  each  night 
complete  reports  of  what  they  said  were  trans- 
mitted to  the  war  office.  The  bar-boys  were 
secret  agents.  .  .  .  Let  a  man  whose  business 
is  not  definitely  stated  by  him  the  moment  he 
arrives  go  to  any  city  in  Japan,  and  there  will  be 
secret-service  men  set  after  him  immediately. 
Every  petty  detail  will  be  communicated  to 
some  secret  head  and  set  down  painstakingly  in 
some  secret  record.  His  trunks  are  likely  to  be 
opened.  The  boy  in  his  room  at  his  hotel  is 
likely  to  be  a  spy.  Every  move  will  be  watched. 
A  man  whom  I  know  could  do  it  told  me  he 
would  get  me  a  complete  record  of  my  comings 
and  goings  in  Japan  for  a  hundred  yen.  I  told 
him  it  was  not  worth  it."  10 

10  Saturday  Evening  Post,  May  22,  1915,  p.  53. 


126     JAPAN'S  CONTfcOL  OF  PUBLICITY 

The  organization  of  the  Japanese  spy  system 
in  Korea  is  pretty  nearly  perfect.  It  is  a  part  of 
the  military  administration  in  the  peninsula,  and 
is  used  most  effectively  to  denationalize  the  an- 
cient kingdom.  A  Korean  is  not  permitted  to 
go  to  Europe  or  America,  and  even  within 
Korea  the  people  are  not  allowed  to  travel  in 
large  groups.  "  Every  one  must  be  registered 
and  is  given  a  number,  which  is  known  to  the 
police.  Every  time  he  leaves  his  village  or  town 
he  must'register  at  the  police  station  and  state 
fully  the  business  he*  intends  to  transact  and  his 
destination.  The  policeman  'phones  to  this 
place,  and  if  his  actions  are  in  any  way  at  vari- 
ance with  his  report,  he  is  liable  to  arrest  and 
mistreatment.  A  strict  classification  is  kept  on 
the  basis  of  a  man's  education,  influence,  position, 
etc.  As  soon  as  a  man  begins  to  show  ability  or 
qualities  of  leadership  he  is  put  in  class  '  a/  de- 
tectives are  set  on  his  trail,  and  from  thence- 
forth he  becomes  a  marked  man,  hounded  wher- 
ever he  goes.  Even  children  are  watched  or 
bribed  for  information.  If  a  man  escapes  the 
country  his  number  is  traced,  his  family  or  rela- 
tives arrested  and  perchance  tortured  until  they 
reveal  his  whereabouts.  A  man  is  likely  to  dis- 
appear any  day  and  perhaps  not  be  heard  of 
again."  Officially  authorized  spies  are  sta- 

11 J.  E.  Moore,  "Korea's  Appeal  for  Self-Determination," 
pp.  9-10. 


THE  OFFICIAL  ESPIONAGE  127 

tioned  in  every  town  and  village;  they  force 
their  presence  even  into  private  household 
parties.  Their  acts  are  backed  by  the  Japanese 
gendarmerie,  and  woe  to  the  native  who  dares 
to  resent  their  intrusion!  He  will  be  charged 
with  treason  as  opposing  the  government  au- 
thorities! The  Japanese  enlist  as  sub-spies  a 
large  number  of  the  worst  scoundrels  in  the 
country.  These  incorrigibles  are  paid  good 
salaries  and  in  many  cases  given  rewards  for 
the  merit  of  their  work;  not  infrequently  the 
well-to-do  natives  are  blackmailed  by  these 
spies,  and  the  government  winks  at  the  crime. 
It  is  not.  only  an  opportunity  for  petty  and 
venal  natures  to  vent  personal  enmities  and 
spites,  but  also  a  chance  to  gather  a  handsome 
fortune  for  a  scoundrel  who  is  not  fit  for  any- 
thing else. 

Such  abuse  of  the  method  might  naturally  be 
expected,  but  the  worst  feature  of  it  all  is  that 
it  is  often  used  as  a  machine  by  the  government 
in  relentlessly  crushing  out  the  spirit  of  nation- 
alism. If  a  Korean  is  suspected  of  keeping  alive 
the  spirit  of  his  forefathers, — not  rebellion,  for 
that  would  be  a  hopeless  thing  at  present, — the 
government  instructs  its  spies  to  bring  certain 
charges  against  him.  Upon  the  witness  of  the 
spies,  he  will  be  imprisoned,  his  property  will  be 
confiscated,  and  he  will  be  punished  in  such  a 
way  as  to  be  disabled  for  life ;  or  he  may  even  be 


128     JAPAN'S  CONTROL  OF  PUBLICITY 

executed  on  the  charge  of  treason.12  Like  the 
mediaeval  "  Ironwoman  "  that  crushed  its  victim 
without  bloodshed,  this  spy  system  of  the  Jap- 
anese administration  in  Korea  removes  from 
the  country  the  ablest  and  best  educated  Ko- 
reans without  technically  violating  the  regula- 
tions of  the  colonial  policy  of  the  Japanese  Em- 
pire. 

The  sad  feature  of  the  Korean  case  is  that, 
although  the  Korean  suffers  the  same  hard  fate 
as  did  the  Poles  and  the  Armenians  before  the 
European  War,  his  story  is  unknown  to  the  out- 
side world.  The  only  time  when  he  had  a  par- 
tial hearing  before  the  world's  court  of  public 
opinion  was  during  the  late  wholesale  arrest  and 
trial  of  the  Korean  Christian  leaders  on  the 
charge  of  conspiracy  against  the  life  of  Gov- 
ernor-General Terauchi.  This  time  the  news 
leaked  out  because  it  involved  several  prominent 
foreign  missionaries.18 

"For  Japanese  prison  tortures  in  Korea,  see  the  Con- 
tinent, June  13,  27,  1912;  Sengman  Rhee,  "The  Christian 
Persecution  in  Korea"  (Korean,  published  in  Honolulu. 
T.  H.). 

M  For  full  account,  see  the  Report  sent  to  the  Continua- 
tion Committee  by  the  missionaries  in  Korea.  Also,  consult 
Arthur  Judson  Brown,  "The  Korean  Conspiracy  Case'* 
(1912) ;  Sengman  Rhee,  "  The  Christian  Persecution  in 
Korea"  (Korean)  ;  "A  Korean  View  of  Japan's  Policy  in 
Korea,  Missionary  Review  of  the  World,  36:450-453,  June* 
1913. 


II 

THE  GOVERNMENT  CENSORSHIP 

i.    PRESS  CENSORSHIP 

IT  is  only  half  a  century  since  Japan  abol- 
ished feudalism,  but  the  basis  of  it — loyalty 
— still  remains.  This  furnishes  a  fertile 
ground  for  the  growth  and  fruition  of  the  polit- 
ical philosophies^  Machiavelli  and  Hegel — the 
suppression  of  the  individual  for  the  sake  of  the 
state,  j  The  individual  Japanese  is  not  a  free  citi- 
zen, but  a  tool  of  the  state.  He  has  no  con- 
science of  his  own  except  national  conscience; 
he  has  no  liberty  except  his  share  in  national 
liberty.  The  Japanese  scholar  or  publicist  is 
only  a  mouthpiece  of  his  government.  The  in- 
dividuals are  for  the  state,  but  the  state  is  not 
for  the  individuals,  as  it  is  in  America  and 
Western  Europe.1  This  doctrine  of  individuals 
existing  for  the  sake  of  the  state  brings  about 
that  unity  of  purpose  and  simplicity  in  ends 
which  are  the  direct  correlatives  of  national 

'See  W.  E.  Grifts,  "The  Mikado— Institution  and  Per- 
son" (1915). 

129 


130     JAPAN'S  CONTKOL  OF  PUBLICITY 

efficiency.  Japan  is  an  ambitious  climber  and  an 
efficient  worker. 

With  this  state-supremacy  doctrine  in  view, 
we  can  understand — increthble  though  it  may 
seem  to  the  Western  mind — that  in  Japan  the 
government  outlines  its  policies,  and  then  forms 
the  public  opinion  to  support  them.2  Practically 
all  the  publications  in  the  country  are  more  or 
less  under  the  control,  direct  or  indirect,  of  the 
government.  The  native  press  receives  orders 
from  the  government  as  to  the  kinds  of  news 
that  it  should  print  or  suppress.  Rigid  censor- 
ship is  in  force  all  the  time — not  only  when 
Japan  is  at  war  but  when  Japan  is  at  peace. 
"  They  suppress  not  only  governmental  matters 
but  anything  that,  in  the  light  of  their  opinion 
of  their  standing  outside,  will  tend  to  lower  that 
estimate  which  they  think  the  rest  of  the  world 
has  of  them."  The  following  is  a  typical  order 
issued  by  the  government  with  reference  to 
something  the  government  does  not  want 
printed.  In  this  case  it  happens  to  be  one  con- 
cerning the  navy,  but  its  precision  and  thor- 
oughness are  typical  of  all  orders  concerning 
even  the  least  important  matters.  Y 

"  By  an  official  order  of  the  Navy  Department 
the  following  additions  have  been  made  to  the 
clauses  of  the  press  censorship :  Matters  con- 

8  New  Republic,  November  18,  1916,  p.  66. 
*  Saturday  Evening  Post,  May  22,  1915,  p.  53. 


THE  GOVERNMENT  CENSORSHIP       131 

eerning  the  naval  movements  of  the  ally  in  war, 
which  have  some  reference  to  the  naval  strate- 
gies of  the  Empire ;  plans  of  war ;  organizations 
of  fleets  and  ships,  their  duties,  present  condi- 
tion and  movements;  employing  of  transports, 
their  crews,  their  present  condition  and  their 
movements;  whereabouts  of  fleets  and  trans- 
port ships,  and  their  departure  and  arrival;  as  to 
goods  ordered  for  service;  the  naval  prepara- 
tions and  defenses  in  naval  stations  and  along 
the  coast ;  present  condition  of  the  various  com- 
panies engaged  in  manufacturing  war  materials 
for  the  navy  by  order  of  the  naval  arsenal  and 
the  Navy  Department ;  the  positions  and  names 
of  the  bases  or  gathering  places ;  the  same  regu- 
lations as  to  aeroplanes.  Beside  the  foregoing, 
anything  that  has  not  been  made  public  by  the 
government  and  has  direct  or  indirect  reference 
to  naval  secrets." 

\  Such  a  thing  as  a  constitutional  guarantee  of 
a  free  press  is  an  unheard-of  liberty  in  Japan. 
After  the  Japanese  occupation  of  Korea,  all  the 
Korean  dailies  and  magazines  were  suppressed 
under  one  pretext  after  another,  and  were  grad- 
ually abolished.5  In  their  places  the  govern- 
ment established  one  subsidized  daily  published 


4  Order  issued  in  September,  1914,  quoted  by  Samuel  G. 
Blythe,  Saturday  Evening  Post,  May  22,  1015. 

5  See  Park,  "The  Tragic  History  of  Korea"    (Chinese 
edition,  Shanghai),  Sec.  3,  chap.  36. 


132     JAPAN'S  CONTBOL  OF  PUBLICITY 

in  Korean,  Mai  III  Shin  Po9  which  zealously 
scatters  far  and  wide  among  the  natives  the 
doctrine  of  obedience  and  loyalty.  The  Japa- 
nese even  propose  to  establish  a  Korean  daily  in 
Hawaii  to  fight  the  Korean  National  Herald  in 
Honolulu.0 

In  forming  public  opinion  both  at  home  and 
abroad  to  support  its  policies,  the  Japanese 
Government  utilizes  not  only  the  native  press, 
but  also  the  foreign  publications  in  Japan. 
Many  prominent  English  journals  published  in 
Japan  are  owned  by  Japanese.1  Most  of  the 
others  are  edited  by  those  pro-Japanese  foreign- 
ers who  have  some  interest  in  Japan,  financial 
or  otherwise.  Take,  for  example,  the  Japan 
Daily  Mail,  perhaps  the  most  powerful  English 
daily  in  the  Far  East.  Its  founder  and  former 
editor  was  Captain  Frank  Brinkley,  a  well- 
known  Irishman,  formerly  in  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment service,  and  later  foreign  adviser  to  the 
largest  Japanese  shipping  company,  the  Nippon 
Yusen  Kaisha.  Concerning  Captain  Brinkley's 
relation  with  the  Japanese,  a  prominent  English 
journalist  writes  as  follows : 

"  Captain  Brinkley's  great  knowledge  of  Jap- 
anese life  and  language  is  admitted  and  admired 
by  all.  His  independence  of  judgment  is,  how- 
ever, weakened  by  his  close  official  connection 

9  Korean  National  Herald,  editorial,  November  29,  1916. 
f  Japan  Magazine,  Herald  of  Asia,  etc. 


THE  GOVERNMENT  CENSORSHIP      133 

with  the  Japanese  Government  and  by  his  per- 
sonal interest  in  Japanese  industry.  His  journal 
is  regarded  generally  as  a  government  mouth- 
piece, and  he  has  succeeded  in  making  himself 
a  more  vigorous  advocate  of  the  Japanese  claims 
than  even  the  Japanese  themselves.  It  can 
safely  be  forecasted  that  whenever  a  dispute 
arises  between  Japanese  and  British  interests 
Captain  Brinkley  and  his  journal  will  play  the 
part,  through  thick  and  thin,  of  defenders  of 
the  Japanese." 8  /" 

The  above  might  be  said  of  nearly  all  the  for- 
eign editors  in  Japan.  When  Japan  began  the 
wholesale  arrest  of  the  Korean  Christian  leaders 
and  educators  in  1911-1912,  on  the  charge  of  a 
conspiracy,  the  Associated  Press  agent  refused 
to  send  out  the  reports  of  the  trial,  except  in  so 
far  as  favourable  to  the  Japanese.  James  Gor- 
don Bennett,  the  owner  of  the  New  York  Herald, 
ordered  J.  K.  Ohl,  the  Herald's  experienced  and 
trustworthy  correspondent  at  Peking,  to  pro- 
ceed to  Seoul  and  report  the  details  of  the 
"  Conspiracy  Trial."  Mr.  Ohl's  reports  demon- 
strated that  the  Associated  Press  was  less  than 
fair  to  the  Koreans  and  a  little  more  than  fair  to 
the  Japanese.  Immediately  great  pressure  was 
brought  to  bear  by  the  Associated  Press  on  the 
New  York  Herald,  and  the  latter  was  forced  to 
say  editorially  that  it  was  convinced  that  "  the 
*  F.  A.  McKenzie,  "  The  Tragedy  of  Kprea,"  p.  216. 


134     JAPAN'S  CONTKOL  OF  PUBLICITY 

Associated  Press  reports  were  truthful  and  ade- 
quate," which  was  a  virtual  apology  on  the  part 
of  the  New  York  Herald  for  sending  its  own  able 
correspondent  to  report  the  trial  instead  of 
printing  the  sifted  news  doled  out  by  the  pro- 
Japanese  agent  of  the  Associated  Press.  A  New 
York  weekly,  commenting  on  this,  says  edito- 
rially : 

"The  external  appearance  of  the  case 
strongly  indicates  that  the  threat  bringing  The 
Herald  thus  to  its  knees  was  some  intimation 
that  its  own  news  franchise  in  the  Associated 
Press  was  in  jeopardy  of  being  revoked.  .  .  . 
If  the  Associated  Press  management  can  make 
such  a  powerful  metropolitan  daily  as  The  Herald 
'  eat  crow  '  .  .  .  what  can  it  not  do  by  way 
of  dictation  and  repression  with  others  of  its 
constituent  papers,  which,  to  say  the  least,  can- 
not be  more  capable  of  resisting  it  than  The  New 
York  Herald  is?"9 

After  the  reports  of  the  "  Conspiracy  Trial " 
were  brought  out  to  the  West  largely  through 
missionary  channels,  the  Associated  Press  agent, 
J.  Russell  Kennedy,  who  garbled  the  reports  of 
the  case,  was  no  longer  able  to  hold  his  position 
as  an  unbiased  press  agent.  He  resigned  his 
position  from  the  Associated  Press,  and  the  Jap- 
anese Government  promptly  awarded  his  loyal 
service  to  Japan  by  making  him  the  head  of  the 

9  The  Continent,  January  9,  1913. 


THE  GOVERNMENT  CENSORSHIP      136 

Koksai  (Japanese  National  News  Agency)  at 
Tokyo. 

f  It  might  be  said  that  pro-Japanese  policy  is 
adopted  as  a  matter  of  expediency  on  the  part  of 
some  of  the  journals  in  Japan.  The  Japanese 
Government  encourages  and  gives  all  kinds  of 
aid,  direct  and  indirect,  to  those  newspapers  that 
follow  its  policy,  but  insidiously  suppresses  for- 
eign publications  that  do  not  serve  its  purpose. 
The  pressure  is  so  strong  that  no  single  journal 
can  successfully  resist  it*  The  case  of  the  late 
E.  T.  Beth  ell  and  the  Korea  Daily  News  may  be 
cited  as  an  example  of  the  usual  fate  of  an  inde- 
pendent foreign  newspaper  in  the  Japanese  Em- 
pire. 

In  the  summer  of  1904,  Mr.  Bethell,  a  young 
English  journalist,  settled  in  Seoul  as  temporary 
correspondent  of  a  London  daily  paper,  and 
started  a  modest  bilingual  journal,  the  Korea 
Daily  News,  printed  partly  in  English  and  partly 
in  Korean.  He  did  not  hesitate  to  record  the 
facts  as  he  saw  them,  regardless  of  their  pala- 
table nature  to  the  Japanese.  This  brought  him 
into  direct  conflict  with  the  Japanese  authori- 
ties. For  a  time  it  was  doubtful  whether  he 
could  withstand  the  pressure.  "  The  Japanese 
were  making  his  life  as  uncomfortable  as  they- 
possibly  could,  and  were  doing  everything  to  ob- 
struct his  work.  His  mails  were  constantly  tam- 
pered with;  his  servants  were  threatened  or  ar- 


136     JAPAN'S  COKTBOL  OF  PUBLICITY 

rested  on  various  excuses,  and  his  household 
was  subjected  to  the  closest  espionage.  He  dis- 
played surprising  tenacity,  and  held  on  month 
after  month  without  showing  any  sign  of  yield- 
ing." He  was  approached  with  threat,  caJQ: 
lef^1,  bribe^nd  everything,  in  fact,  the  Japanese 
could  think  of  to  win  him  over  to  their  side. 
But  the  English  journalist  stood  his  ground  like 
a  stone  wall. 

Failing  to  conciliate  the  editor,  the  Japanese 
sought  to  cut  the  ground  from  under  his  feet  by 
starting  an  opposition  paper  printed  in  English. 
An  able  Japanese  journalist,  Mr.  Zumoto,  be- 
came the  editor.  With  the  financial  backing  of 
the  Japanese  Government,  this  new  journal,  the 
Seoul  Press,  started  out  in  fine  shape,  and  was 
distributed  almost  for  nothing.  But  the  Korea 
Daily  News  held  more  than  its  own.  Finally  di- 
plomacy was  brought  into  play,  and  this  young 
English  journalist  was  ordered  to  leave  the 
country  and  the  Korea  Daily  Nezvs  was  sup- 
pressed by  the  order  of  the  British  Foreign 
Office. 


2.    CENSORSHIP  OF  POSTAL  AND  TELEGRAPHIC 
COMMUNICATIONS 

Prior  to  the  opening  of  the  World  War  there 
were  three  general  news  telegraph  services  op- 

10  McKenzie,  "  The  Tragedy  of  Korea,"  p.  213. 
"For  full  discussion,   see  McKenzie,  "The  Tragedy  of 
Korea,"  chap.  XIX. 


THE  GOVERNMENT  CENSORSHIP      137 

crating  to  and  from  the  FarJEast :  Reuter  (Brit- 
ish), Ostasiatische  Lloyd  and  its  connections 
(German),  and  the  Koksai  (Japanese  National 
News  Agency).  Of  these  the  Reuter  system 
was  the  most  powerful  and,  perhaps,  the  least 
biased,  although  in  times  past,  this  agency  has 
been  accused  on  many  occasions  of  fulfilling  the 
function  of  keeping  a  certain  point  of  view  to 
the  fore;  and  of  obscuring,  minimizing,  or  sup- 
pressing altogether  the  opposite  or  contrary 
points  of  view,  according  to  the  wishes  of  the 
British  Government.  The  British  Government 
grants  special  low  telegraphic  toll  to  this  serv- 
ice, and  being  a  British  concern,  it  is  altogether 
probable  that  the  news  gathered  and  distributed 
by  this  agency  is,'  consciously  or  unconsciously, 
somewhat  coloured  in  favour  of  the  British, 
both  as  a  matter  of  business  expediency  and  of 
patriotism.  But  the  Koksai  is  aided  by  the 
Japanese  Government  to  such  an  extent  that  no 
other  news-gathering  agency  can  compete  with 
it  in  Japan  and  in  her  territories.  On  February 
1,  1914,  an  agreement  to  cooperate  was  made 
between  the  Koksai  and  Reuter,  with  the  ap- 
proval of  the  foreign  offices  of  both  the  British 
and  Japanese  Governments.  It  was  agreed  that 
Reuter  service  from  Japan  should  be  entirely 
supplied  by  the  Koksai.  This  gives  the  semi- 
official news-telegraphic  service  of  Japan  a  dou- 
ble advantage:  the  Koksai  can  send  out  news 


138     JAPAN'S  COKTEOL  OF  PUBLICITY 

items  direct  to  other  countries,  or  it  can  have 
the  Reuter  perform  the  service,  in  case  of  any 
advantage  to  the  Japanese.  Being  the  sole 
news-gathering  agency  in  the  country,  the 
Koksai  can  handle  the  news  as  it  sees  fit — mini- 
mize or  magnify,  suppress  or  create.  When 
there  is  an  item  of  news  that  cannot  be  sent  out 
without  betraying  the  hand  of  the  government 
behind  it,  then  the  Koksai,  instead  of  sending  it 
directly  to  foreign  countries,  hands  the  item 
over  to  the  Reuter  service  in  the  Far  East  which 
"  sprinkles  it  through  the  press,  English  and 
vernacular,  east  of  Suez,  and  carries  it  to  Lon- 
don, where  it  will  be  picked  up  by  American 
correspondents  and  services  and  passed  along," 
as  news  coming  from  the  English  news-gather- 
ing agency." 

No  dispatch  can  go  in  or  out  of  the  Japanese 
Empire  unless  it  has  the  sanction  of  the  govern- 
ment. Any  incoming  news  that  does  not  agree 
with  the  policy  of  the  government  is  suppressed. 
A  month  before  the  opening  of  hostilities  be- 
tween Japan  and  Russia  the  Japanese  cut  off 
communication  between  Port  Arthur  and  the 
Russian  Legation  at  Seoul,  so  that  M.  Pavloff, 
then  Russian  minister  to  Korea,  was  forced  to 
use  a  special  war-ship  to  communicate  with  Port 
Arthur.  When  Count  Lamsdorf  sent  his  tele- 

12 From  an  editorial  in  China  Press  (Shanghai),  October 
13, 


THE  GOVEBNMENT  CEKSOESHIP       139 

gram  to  Baron  Rosen,  the  Russian  minister  to 
Japan,  in  February,  1904,  it  was  delayed  three 
days  before  delivery.18 

The  control  of  the  outgoing  dispatches  is  even 
more  complete  than  that  of  the  incoming. 
When  the  Korean  Queen  was  murdered  by  the 
Japanese  Government  assassins  in  1895,  Colonel 
Cockerill,  the  famous  correspondent  of  the  New 
York  Herald,  was  in  Seoul.  At  once  he  cabled 
the  news  to  his  paper,  but  his  message  was 
stopped  and  the  money  returned  to  him."  At 
the  time  of  the  destruction  of  Korean  independ- 
ence, it  was  impossible  for  the  Korean  Govern- 
ment to  lodge  a  formal  protest  with  the  powers, 
because  of  the  complete  control  of  communica- 
tion by  the  Japanese. 

The  official  supervision  of  the  telegraphic- 
news  service  gives  the  Japanese  Government  an 
ample  opportunity  to  create  as  well  as  to  sup- 
press news,  either  for  home  or  foreign  consump- 
tion. The  part  played  by  President  Roosevelt 
at  the  Portsmouth  Conference  between  Russia 
and  Japan  was  really  a  service  to  Japan,  as  the 
Eastern  Empire,  although  assuming  the  atti- 
tude of  a  victor,  was  at  the  end  of  her  financial 
strain  and  was  anxious  for  peace.  The  results 
of  the  conference  were  disappointing  to  the  peo- 
ple who  had  been  led  by  their  press  and  govern- 

*  The  Russian  Circular  Note,  issued  March  12,  1904. 
"McKenzie,  "The  Tragedy  of  Korea,"  p.  67. 


140     JAPAN'S  CONTROL  OF  PUBLICITY 

merit  to  entertain  high  hopes  and  to  make  free 
sacrifices  for  the  war.  Instead  of  letting  the 
people  know  the  truth,  the  government  created 
an  impression  among  them  through  its  publicity 
channels  that  the  meddling  of  the  United  States 
was  robbing  Japan  of  substantial  fruits  of  vic- 
tory, and  that  the  people  should  not  hesitate  to 
make  further  sacrifices  for  the  creating  and 
maintaining  of  a  bigger  army  and  navy  which 
alone  could  vindicate  Japan's  rights  in  the  future 
— especially  against  the  United  States.  "  If  pub- 
licity is  wanted  in  the  Far  East,  some  publica- 
tion in  China  frequently  is  used.  For  instance, 
soon  after  Japan  declared  war  against  Germany 
a  report  was  published  in  the  Fengtlen  Daily 
News  on  August  9,  1914,  that  an  American  fleet 
had  been  dispatched  to  the  Far  East  to  protect 
China  against  Japan.  Japan's  vernacular  organs 
in  China  spread  this  report,  and  caused  some  ex- 
citement among  the  Chinese.  The  report  was 
telegraphed  to  Tokyo,  and  for  a  while  it  served 
as  a  topic  for  bitter  editorial  criticism  of  the 
United  States.  When  denial  was  made  by  the 
United  States,  the  Japanese  press  had  to  drop 
the  matter;  and  it  then  side-stepped  responsi- 
bility by  charging  the  origin  of  the  report  to 
Germany.  The  facts  seem  to  be  that  the  report 
originated  in  Japan,  with  the  purpose  of  using  it 
for  all  it  was  wfcrth  to  stir  up  popular  feeling 
there  against  America,  then  accuse  Germany  of 


THE  GOVERNMENT  CENSORSHIP       141 

inciting  it ;  thus  making  it  serve  the  various  pur- 
poses of  further  stimulating  Japanese  resentment 
against  America,  rousing  American  resentment 
against  Germany,  and  warning  Chinese  against 
alleged  German  and  American  intrigues."  * 

The  government  interception  of  private  mail 
is  not  less  thorough  than  the  control  of  dis- 
patches. It  is  not  a  war  measure  or  military 
necessity,  but  a  part  of  the  established  system 
of  national  administration.  A  short  account 
given  by  Samuel  G.  Blythe,  concerning  the  in- 
discriminate opening  of  private  mail,  is  interest- 
ing and  to  the  point.  It  follows : 

"  An  official  in  the  Department  of  Communi- 
cation, whom  I  happen  to  know,  told  me  with 
great  pride,  when  I  was  in  Japan,  that  they  had 
just  secured  from  Russia  a  machine  which  made 
the  work  of  opening  and  reading  letters  much 
easier.  The  former  method  was  to  steam  the 
letters  open,  read  them,  copy  them  if  desired, 
and  seal  them  again.  This  Russian  machine,  as 
I  understand  it,  has  a  blade  of  great  thinness 
and  keenness.  It  slits  the  envelope  in  such  a 
manner  that  the  cut  is  barely  perceptible  along 
the  edge  of  the  envelope.  Then  the  writing  is 
taken  out,  read,  copied  and  replaced  or  des- 
troyed ;  and  the  edges  are  rubbed  and  stuck  to- 
gether by  the  machine  in  such  a  way  that  the 
fact  that  they  have  been  cut  is  not  discernible. 
"Millard,  "Our  Eastern  Question,"  pp.  213-214. 


142     JAPAN'S  CONTEOL  OF  PUBLICITY 

I  asked  this  man  why  they  went  to  such  great 
trouble : 

"  '  Everybody  who  knows  anything  about  the 
inside  workings  of  the  Japanese  Government 
knows  that  all  letters  they  want  to  read  are 
opened  and  read  anyhow.  Why  take  such  elab- 
orate precautions  to  hide  that  fact? '  I  said. 

" '  My  dear  sir/  he  replied,  '  it  is  contrary  to 
the  practice  of  our  government  to  disclose  these 
things/ 

"  Japan  always  has  opened  letters.  .  .  .  No 
one  can  object  if  a  government  opens  letters 
that  may  contain  information  of  use  to  an 
enemy;  but  why  should  letters  be  opened  indis- 
criminately? "  M 

It  goes  without  saying  that  such  a  system  is 
highly  annoying  to  foreigners  in  Japan  and 
Korea.  Even  missionaries,  the  most  subservi- 
ent and  non-complaining  of  all  Westerners  in 
the  Far  East,  have  complained  of  the  Japanese 
interception  of  their  mail." 

But  the  heaviest  blow  of  the  system  falls  on 
the  Koreans.  In  Korea,  under  the  Japanese 
military  administration,  the  system  is  not  cov- 
ered up,  but  openly  practiced.  Both  the  writer 
and  receiver  of  letters  objectionable  to  the  gov- 
ernment are  punished.  I  know  of  more  than 

18  Saturday  Evening  Post,  May  22,  1915. 
"See  W.  T.  Ellis,  "Christianity's  Fiery  Trial  in  Korea," 
The  Continent,  June  27,  1912,  pp.  896-899. 


THE  GOVERNMENT  CENSORSHIP       143 

one  case  in  which  confiscation  of  property  took 
place  on  the  charge  of  this  "  treasonable  crime." 
This  overt  punishment  for  writing  objection- 
able letters  may  be  said  to  be  another  point  of 
Japanese  cleverness  in  the  abolition  of  the 
Korean  nationality.  For  it  creates  an  atmos- 
phere of  fear,  which  suppresses  almost  uncon- 
sciously everything  that  pertains  to  Korean  in- 
dependence or  nationality,  or  anything  that  in- 
timates criticism  of  the  Japanese  administration 
in  the  peninsula.  No  Korean  in  America  or  in 
any  other  foreign  country  dare  write  anything 
in  the  least  questionable  in  his  letters  to  his 
friends  at  home,  not  because  of  himself  but  for 
the  sake  of  those  receiving  them.18 

MSee  Missionary  Review  of,  the  World,  June,  1913,  vol. 
36:  pp.  450-453. 


Ill 

PUBLICITY  PROPAGANDA 

i.    OFFICIAL  PUBLICATIONS 

THERE  is  a  remarkable  similarity  be- 
tween the  German  publicity  propa- 
ganda, as  it  was  disclosed  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  European  War,  and  the  Japanese 
publicity  propaganda;  only  the  Japanese  method 
is  far  subtler  than  the  German.  Fatherland, 
formerly  published  in  New  York,  once  charac- 
terized Dr.  Eliot,  the  president  emeritus  of  Har- 
vard,'as  "Foxy  Eliot,"  for  the  stand  he  took 
with  regard  to  the  belligerents.  A  Japanese 
organ  would  never  have  done  this,  for  the  Jap- 
anese have  enough  knowledge  of  American  psy- 
chology to  know  that  such  an  attack  on  one  of 
the  most  venerable  educators  in  the  country 
would  produce  an  effect  contrary  to  that  in- 
tended This  instance  is  cited  to  illustrate  the 
difference  between  the  Japanese  and  the  Ger- 
man methods. 

The  government  publishes  or  authorizes  pri- 
vate concerns   to  publish  year  books,   annual 

J44 


PUBLICITY  PBOPAGANDA  145 

reports,  statistical  abstracts,  in  foreign  lan- 
guages, not  to  inform,  but  to  misinform  the 
outside  world.  Many  writers  in  America  and 
Europe  have  paid  unreserved  tribute  to  Japan 
as  the  wisest  colonial  administrator  of  to-day.1 
They  base  their  information  on  Report  on  Re- 
forms and  Progress  in  Chosen,  an  annual  pub- 
lished in  English  by  the  Japanese  administration 
in  Korea.  From  the  standpoint  of  those  who 
know  the  actual  condition  of  Korea  to-day,  this 
Japanese  publication  is  highly  amusing,  for  it 
gives  the  reader  an  impression  that,  all  the  way 
from  Imperial  Rome  down  to  the  American 
Commonwealth,  there  never  was  a  nation  so 
wise,  just,  and  humanitarian  to  a  subject  people 
as  the  Japanese  are  to  the  Koreans.  Indeed, 
the  words  of  Colonel  Cockerill  have  lost  nothing 
of  their  force  since  they  were  penned  in  1895, 
after  the  Korean  Queen  was  murdered  by  the 
Japanese  assassins. 

"  I  decline  to  believe  anything  in  the  shape  of 
news  sent  out  by  the  correspondents  of  the  Jap- 
anese newspapers,"  wrote  the  famous  American 
correspondent.  "  A  more  flagitious  and  uncon- 
scionable lot  of  liars  I  have  never  known.  As 
the  Japanese  Government  exercises  a  strong 
censorship  over  its  home  press,  it  might  be  well 
for  it  to  try  its  repressional  hand  upon  the  Jap- 

1  See  "  Korea— A  Tribute  to  Japan,"  Review  of  Reviews, 
52:232-233,  August,  1915. 


146     JAPAN'S  CONTROL  OP  PUBLICITY 

anese  sheet  published  in  Seoul,  the  Kanjo- 
shimpo,  which  is  labouring  zealously,  it  would 
seem,  to  bring  about  the  massacre  of  foreign 
representatives  in  Korea." 

The  rapid  spread  of  the  pacifist  movement 
prior  to  the  opening  of  the  European  War  was 
taken  advantage  of  by  the  Japanese  and  used 
effectively  to  shield  their  military  ambitions  and 
to  discourage  the  increase  of  armaments  in 
America.  Eminent  pacifists  like  David  Starr 
Jordan  visited  Japan  and  brought  back  reports 
as  to  the  national  sentiment  of  the  Japanese 
people  to  the  effect  that  the  ultimate  aim  of 
Japan  is  peace,  not  war;  that  "war  talk  on 
either  side  is  foolish  and  criminal.  Japan  recog- 
nizes the  United  States  as  her  nearest  neigh- 
bour among  Western  nations,  her  best  customer 
and  most  steadfast  friend.  .  .  .  For  the  fu- 
ture greatness  of  Japan  depends  on  the  return  of 
the  old  peace  with  '  velvet-sandalled  feet/  which 
made  her  the  nation  she  is  to-day." '  But  if  we 
look  the  facts  squarely  in  the  face  despite  the 
statement  of  officials  and  public  men  of  Japan 
to  the  contrary,  the  American  Peace  Society  of 
Japan,  the  Japan  Peace  Society,  and  many  other 
similar  organizations  are  nothing  more  than  the 
catspaw  of  the  Japanese  national  program.  The 
actions  and  work  of  these  societies  have  no 

1  Quoted  by  McKenzie  in  "  The  Tragedy  of  Korea,"  p.  77- 
•  David  Starr  Jordan,  "  War  and  Waste,"  pp.  150-151. 


PUBLICITY  PROPAGAM)A  147 

effect  upon  the  policy  of  Japan,  nor  do  they 
check  the  rapid  growth  of  Japan's  militarism, 
although  they  have  influenced  American  public 
opinion  and  have  retarded,  to  a  certain  extent, 
naval  and  military  preparations  on  the  part  of 
the  United  States.  Count  Okuma  is  a  powerful 
imperialist;  he  is  liberal  in  internal  affairs,  but 
decidedly  Bismarckian  in  foreign  policy.  In  an 
article  published  in  Shin  Nijon  (May,  1915),  he 
wrote :  "  Diplomacy,  to  be  really  effective  and 
successful,  must  be  backed  up  by  sufficient  na- 
tional strength.  It  is  only  ten  or  fifteen  years 
since  Japanese  diplomacy  began  to  carry  weight 
with  foreign  countries,  and  it  began  from  the 
time  that  Western  Powers  commenced  to  rec- 
ognize Japan's  military  strength."  Yet  this 
Elder  Statesman  is  the  President  of  the  Japan 
Peace  Society  which  depicts  Japan  to  the  West- 
ern public  as  posing  in  an  attitude  of  naive  paci- 
fism. A  paragraph  from  an  editorial  comment 
on  the  annual  meeting  and  report  of  the  Ameri- 
can Peace  Society  of  Japan  by  the  most  inde- 
pendent British  daily  in  Japan  is  illuminating 
and  to  the  point: 

"  Clearly  there  is  some  incongruity  in  the 
American  Peace  Society  of  Japan  deploring  the 
increase  of  armaments  in  the  United  States 
while  absolutely  silent  on  the  expansion  of  the 
Japanese  army  this  year  by  two  divisions,  and 
the  impending  program  for  the  enlargement  of 


148     JAPAN'S  CONTROL  OF  PUBLICITY 

the  Japanese  navy.  .  .  „  It  is  curious,  indeed, 
that  even  the  Japan  Peace  Society,  which  num- 
bers Japanese  as  well  as  foreigners  among  its 
members,  and  has  as  its  president  Count  Okuma, 
never  seems  to  consider  it  essential  to  oppose 
the  expansion  of  armaments  in  Japan  or  to  dep- 
recate the  chauvinism  so  often  exhibited  in  Jap- 
anese newspapers  and  public  statements.  So 
far  as  we  have  observed,  the  Japan  Peace  Soci- 
ety has  never  passed  a  single  resolution  against 
the  enlargement  of  the  Japanese  army  or  the 
increase  of  the  navy,  nor  has  it  uttered  a  word 
in  depreciation  of  the  hostile  action  which  the 
government  is  often  urged  to  take  against 
China.  It  seems  to  be  chiefly  concerned  in  the 
attitude  of  other  countries  toward  Japan,  espe- 
cially of  America,  the  dangers  of  militarism  and 
armaments  in  this  country  being  wholly  ignored. 
Again,  the  Japan  Society  of  America,  also  con- 
cerned in  the  maintenance  of  good  relations  be- 
tween Japan  and  the  United  States,  some  time 
ago  published  a  '  Symposium  of  Papers  by  Po- 
litical Leaders  and  Representative  Citizens  of 
Japan  on  the  Relations  Between  Japan  and  the 
United  States/  Some  of  the  declarations  in 
that  are  of  the  most  chauvinistic  nature.  Mr. 
Takekoshi,  a  journalist  and  M.  P.,  says  that 
'  Korea  exists  now  for  Japan,  from  the  view- 
point of  imperial  policy/  and  demands  the  devel- 
opment of  Manchuria  also.  Another  prominent 


PUBLICITY  PEOPAGANDA  149 

journalist  in  an  article  entitled,  '  Centripetal 
Mikadoism,'  shows  himself  a  flamboyant  imperi- 
alist. .  .  .  A  peace  society  in  Japan  which  con- 
centrates all  its  attention  on  menaces  to  peace 
abroad  while  ignoring  those  at  its  own  doors 
may  be  adopting  a  very  prudent  policy,  but  it  is 
not  contributing  much  to  the  cause  of  interna- 
tional good  will." 

It  is  interesting  in  this  connection  to  note  how 
the  Japanese  handle  figures.  According  to  the 
figures  received  by  the  Western  statisticians, 
the  Korean  population  in  1912,  two  years  after 
the  annexation,  was  13,461,299.  By  December 
31,  1915,  this  figure  had  jumped  to  17,405,645, 
exclusive  of  Japanese  and  Chinese.6  This  ge- 
netic increase  of  3,944,346  people  in  three  years 
speaks  eloquently  for  the  beneficence  of  Japa- 
nese rule  in  Korea.  Here,  the  Japanese,  past 
masters  as  they  are  in  the  art  of  deception,  have 
overreached  themselves.  They  explain  that  the 
more  hygienic  living  and  better  economic  well- 
being  under  the  Japanese  rule  are  the  causes  of 
the  suddenly  high  birth-rate  and  the  correspond- 
ingly sudden  lowering  of  the  death-rate.  Even 
if  that  were  granted,  an  annual  increase  of  ap- 
proximately 9.8  per  cent,  is  inconceivable  with 
any  people.  In  Japan  itself,  during  the  past  five 


'  Japan  Chronicle,  December  21,  1915. 

"Figures  taken  from  the  Statesman's  Year  Book,  1913, 


150     JAPAN'S  CONTROL  OP  PUBLICITY 

years  the  annual  increase  of  population  did  not 
exceed  1.3  per  cent.  In  Germany,  between 
1905  and  1910,  where  the  race  is  most  prolific 
and  the  economic  conditions  for  the  growth  of 
population  have  been  nearly  ideal,  the  annual 
increase  was  only  1.36  per  cent.8  Such  manipu- 
lation of  figures  with  regard  to  the  Korean  pop- 
ulation brought  a  vigorous  protest  from  Dr. 
Sengman  Rhee,  the  editor  of  the  Korean  Pacific 
Magazine. 

"  Genetically,  the  Korean  people  have  been  a 
static  race  for  several  hundred  years,"  wrote 
Dr.  Rhee.  "  Since  the  Japanese  occupation  of 
the  country  they  were  put  under  severe  eco- 
nomic strain.  They  were  driven  out  of  former 
occupations  to  make  room  for  the  incoming 
Japanese.  Hundreds  of  native  firms  went  bank- 
rupt, because  they  were  unable  to  meet  the 
Japanese  competitors  backed  by  the  administra- 
tion. More  than  three  hundred  thousand  Ko- 
reans emigrated  to  China  since  Korea  lost  her 
identity  as  a  nation.  It  is  a  sociological  law  that 
in  hard  times  people  postpone  marriage  and  the 
birth-rate  drops.  And  the  Korean  people  are  no 
exception  to  this  rule.  There  is  all  the  reason 
to  believe  that  the  Korean  population  during 
the  last  five  years  would  have  decreased  rather 
than  increased.  Although  I  have  no  definite 
proof  to  make  a  positive  statement,  yet  it  is  very 
*  Statesman's  Year  Book,  1916. 


PUBLICITY  PBOPAGANDA  151 

probable  that  the  Japanese,  with  their  charac- 
teristic foresight  in  deception,  gave  out  an  un- 
der-estimate  in  1912  with  the  view  of  increasing 
it  in  a  few  years.  The  traditional  population  of 
Korea  was  twenty  million,  and  it  could  not  have 
been  any  less  than  seventeen  million  at  the  time 
of  annexation." 

"In  the  East,  in  perhaps  a  greater  degree 
than  elsewhere,"  writes  Mr.  Millard,  the  editor 
of  the  China  Press  and  the  author  of  many  im- 
portant books  on  the  Far  Eastern  problems, 
"  statistics  often  are  prepared  to  sustain  an  hy- 
pothesis. This  is  especially  true,  at  the  present 
time,  of  some  statistics  which  relate  to  the  eco- 
nomic and  fiscal  situation  of  Japan." 

2.  GOVERNMENT  AGENCIES  IN  FOREIGN  LANDS 
What  is  left  undone,  in  the  way  of  publicity, 
by  the  press  and  official  publications  is  accom- 
plished by  the  semi-official  agencies  in  the  West. 
From  the  Japanese  bureau  of  information  in 
New  York,  or  from  the  one  in  San  Francisco, 
an  American  can  get  information  on  any  matter 
concerning  Japan ;  but  it  is  the  strict  policy  of 
the  bureau  to  give  out  only  what  the  Japanese 
Government  wishes  to  have  believed  in  the 
West.9 

''Korean  Pacific  Magazine,  editorial,  October,  1916. 

"  The  Far  Eastern  Question,"  Introduction. 
9 The  official  title  of  the  New  York  Bureau  is  "East  and 
West  News  Bureau."     It  is  maintained   for  promoting  a 


152     JAPAN'S  CONTROL  OF  PUBLICITY 

The  Japan  Society  of  New  York  is  another 
medium  of  dissemination  of  everything  Japa- 
nese. It  was  organized  in  May,  1907.  At  present 
it  boasts  an  active  membership  of  over  a  thou- 
sand people  including  such  eminent  men  as  Seth 
Low,  Hamilton  Holt,  William  Elliot  Griffis,  El- 
bert  H.  Gary,  and  Jokichi  Takamine.  American 
libraries  are  flooded  with  the  bulletins  and 
pamphlets  of  the  Japan  Society,  all  distributed 
gratuitously. 

In  addition  to  these  sources  of  propaganda, 
there  are  paid  lecturers  and  writers  who  take 
every  opportunity  to  placate  the  Western 
opinion  and  present  Japan  in  the  most  favour- 
able light.  Although  scholars  like  Inazo  Nitobe 
have  travelled  in  the  United  States  as  profes- 
sorial lecturers,  in  reality  they  have  told  their 
college  audiences  in  America  what  the  Japanese 
Government  or  newspaper  could  not  publish 
without  betraying  its  motive.10  The  Japanese 
scholar  is,  in  reality,  a  co-worker  with  and  a 
mouthpiece  of  his  government.  In  1916,  when 
Japan  deliberately  attempted  to  veto  the  con- 
tract to  repair  the  Grand  Canal  in  Shantung, 

better  understanding  between  America  and  Japan.  Dr.  T. 
lyenaga,  a  professorial  lecturer  at  Columbia  University,  is 
the  Director  of  the  Bureau.  The  one  in  San  Francisco  is 
known  as  the  "Pacific  Press  Bureau,"  headed  by  K.  K. 
Kawakami. 

10 A  collection  of  lectures  by  Dr.  Nitobe,  "The  Japanese 
Nation — Its  Land,  Its  People  and  Its  Life/'  distributed 
gratuitously  by  the  Japan  Society,  New  York. 


PUBLICITY  PROPAGANDA  153 

granted  by  the  Chinese  Government  to  an 
American  corporation,  and  failed,  the  well- 
known  Director  of  the  East  and  West  News 
Bureau,  Dr.  T.  lyenaga,  lost  no  time  in  offering 
an  apologetic  excuse  for  his  government : 

"  If  it  is  true  that  Japan  made  any  protest  to 
the  railway  scheme  and  the  reconstruction  in 
China  of  the  Grand  Canal  to  be  undertaken  by 
American  capital,  I  am  inclined  to  think  that  it 
is  simply  to  put  on  record  the  priority  of  Japan's 
rights  in  an  undertaking  of  that  kind  within  the 
Province  of  Shantung.  .'  .  .  So  far  as  Japan  is 
concerned,  I  am  sure  she  welcomes  the  develop- 
ment of  China's  resources  by  whomsoever  it  is 
undertaken,  for  such  development  will  certainly 
tend  to  enhance  the  purchasing  power  of  the 
Chinese,  which  in  turn  will  react  favourably  on 
the  Japanese  trade  in  the  Chinese  market." 

The  war-ridden  attention  of  America  was 
somewhat  diverted  in  the  fall  of  1916  by  a  new 
set  of  demands  made  on  China  by  Japan,  known 
as  the  "  Chengchiatun  demands,"  which  the 
Peking  Gazette  characterized  as  "A  Foot-note  to 
the  Twenty-one  Demands."  "  It  was  believed 
that  the  trouble  was  concocted  by  the  Japanese 
military 'authorities  in  China  in  order  to  furnish 
a  cause  for  such  demands  by  the  Tokyo  Govern- 

11  Japan  Society  Bulletin,   No.   35,  p.  67,   November  30, 
1916. 
18  Peking  Gazette,  September  9,  1916. 


154     JAPAN'S  CONTROL  OF  PUBLICITY 

ment.  After  the  fall  of  the  Okuma  Ministry, 
Premier  Terauchi  and  his  associates  withdrew 
the  demands  as  a  matter  of  expediency  in  deal- 
ing with  the  Chinese.  At  present,  they  thought, 
a  lenient  policy  toward  China  would  be  more 
beneficial  to  Japan  than  military  bullying.  This 
furnished  a  golden  opportunity  to  bring  Japan 
out  once  again  into  the  limelight  of  American 
public  opinion — to  show  the  West  the  splendid 
spirit  of  sacrifice  and  the  magnanimity  of  Japan. 
Japan,  as  a  nation,  never  hesitates  to  admit  its 
mistakes,  if  there  be  any,  and  rectify  its  wrongs, 
— so  the  Japanese  publicists  in  this  country 
would  tell  us.  The  following  is  a  paragraph 
from  the  pen  of  K.  K.  Kawakami,  the  best 
known  Japanese  author  and  editor  in  America, 
on  the  withdrawal  of  the  "  Chengchiatun  de- 
mands." 

"  However  disagreeable  such  admission  may 
be  to  Japan,  we  must  frankly  confess  that  many 
of  the  recent  troubles,  resulting  from  the  con- 
tact of  Japanese  and  Chinese  upon  Chinese  soil, 
have  been  caused  by  China  ronin  (professional 
Japanese  agitators  in  China)  as  well  as  by  unau- 
thorized actions  of  army  men  over  whom  the 
civilian  premier  had  only  inadequate  power." 

Had  the  cause  and  nature  of  the  demands  not 
been  known  in  America  and  had  the  Tokyo 
Government  sustained  the  demands,  Mr.  Kawa- 
**  Review  of  Reviews,  February,  1917,  p.  i?9. 


PUBLICITY  PROPAGANDA  155 

kami  or  any  other  Japanese  writer  would  prob- 
ably never  have  said  the  above.  But  as  it  was, 
the  occasion  was  taken  advantage  of  to  reveal 
Japan  in  an  attitude  of  innocent  repentance  and 
sacrifice,  and  also  to  create  an  impression  that 
the  Japanese  spokesmen  in  America  are  frank 
and  outspoken  in  criticizing  their  own  govern- 
ment. It  is  a  curious  fact  that  no  Japanese  pub- 
licist raised  a  single  point  of  criticism  of  his  gov- 
ernment for  making  the  "  Twenty-one  De- 
mands "  upon  China  in  1915, — the  demands 
which  were  far  more  serious  than  the  "Cheng- 
chiatun  demands  "  in  impairing  the  political  in- 
dependence and  territorial  integrity  of  China. 
On  the  contrary,  writers  like  Mr.  Kawakami 
misrepresented  the  facts  of  the  "  Twenty-one 
Demands,"  and  attempted  to  convince  the 
American  public  that  Japan  was  making  the  de- 
mands with  an  "unselfish  motive  to  aid  China."1 
Besides  the  Japanese,  there  are  a  few  West- 
erners in  the  service  of  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment to  help  in  their  publicity  propaganda. 
"  Paid  agents  lectured  English  audiences  upon 
the  beauties  and  glories  of  Nippon."  Honor- 
ary Consuls  are  appointed  not  so  much  to  make 

"See  K.  K.  Kawakami,  "What  Can  Japan  Do  For 
China?"  Independent,  82:280-281,  May  17,  19(15.  A  com- 
plete record  of  Japan's  Twenty-one  Demands  made  upon 
China  in  1915,  and  the  various  steps  taken  in  connection 
with  them  are  given  in  Millard,  "Our  Eastern  Question," 
chapters  on  "Japan's  Aggressions  in  China." 

11  McKenzie,  "  The  Tragedy  of  Korea,"  p.  105. 


156     JAPAN'S  CONTEOL  OF  PUBLICITY 

trade  reports  or  look  after  Japanese  commercial 
interests,  but  mainly  to  cooperate  with  the 
larger  national  system  and  play  the  local  part 
in  the  publicity  game."  Thus  nothing  is  left 
undone;  what  is  overlooked  by  the  national 
worker  is  taken  up  by  his  local  associates. 
"  When  it  comes  to  publicity,"  said  an  Ameri- 
can journalist,  "  the  Japanese  catch  us  in  every 
direction." 

3.  MANIPULATION  OF  FOREIGN  VISITORS  IN  JAPAN 
The  remarkable  success  of  the  Japanese 
propaganda  in  controlling  the  public  opinion  of 
America  has  been  due  largely  to  the  coopera- 
tion of  public  men  on  this  side  of  the  ocean.  All 
the  praise  we  hear  of  Nippon  from  the  lecture 
platforms  and  in  periodical  literature  would 
have  come  to  naught  if  it  were  not  endorsed  by 
public  men  in  this  country  who  visit  Japan  and 
bring  back  favourable  reports.  The  Japanese 
have  shown  consummate  skill  in  manipulating 
the  distinguished  foreigners  who  visit  Japan. 

The  Japan  Society  in  America  maintains  a 
Travel  Bureau,  issues  letters  of  introduction  and 
publishes  descriptive  travel  pamphlets  which 
supplement  the  official  traveller's  guide  pub- 
lished by  the  Japanese  Government.  The  min- 
ute a  globe-trotter  lands  in  Japan  he  has  little 

"There  are  Japanese  Honorary  Consuls  in  New  Orleans, 
St.  Louis,  Denver,  Mobile.  Galveston,  Philadelphia,  and 
Boston.  They  are  all  Americans. 


PUBLICITY  PEOPAGANDA  157 

chance  to  see  or  find  out  anything  for  himself, 
especially  if  he  is  a  distinguished  personage.  He 
is  met  at  the  pier  by  a  polished  guide  conversant 
with  Western  manners  and  language;  he  is  di- 
rected to  a  hotel;  is  shown  about  with  great 
kindness  and  courtesy.  He  is  impressed  by  the 
politeness  and  hospitality  of  the  people  and  is 
charmed  by  the  beautiful  scenes  and  unique  fes- 
tivals of  the  land.  The  country  seems  to  him  a 
land  of  poets,  artists  and  lovers,  where  the  lotus 
blooms  and  life  is  a  happy' dream  of  ease  and  de- 
votion to  the  service  of  art.  His  sense  of  ad" 
miration  and  wonder  increases  when  he  is 
shown  the  accomplishments  of  modern  Japan — 
the  army,  navy,  commerce,  industry.  Here  is  a 
land  where  the  military  virtues  are  fostered 
without  losing  sight  of  the  beautiful;  where 
there  is  industry  without  sordid  materialism; 
wealth  without  the  idle  rich.  The  Japanese  are 
the  most  well  balanced  of  all  races,  the  visitors 
write  home.  "  They  have  become  practical,  but 
they  still  love  the  cherry  tree  and  write  poems 
to  it;  they  are  developing  great  business  activi- 
ties, but  they  continue  to  paint  with  almost  un- 
rivalled delicacy  and  precision;  they  support  a 
strong  army  and  navy,  but  both  are  kept  in  high 
efficiency  for  defensive  purposes." 

"  It  was  delightful,"  said  an  American  gentle- 

"See  articles  by  Hamilton  W.  Mabie,  "Japan  To-day  and 
To-morrow,"  in  the  Outlook,  vols.  103,  104,  1913. 


168     JAPAN'S  CONTEOL  OF  PUBLICITY 

man  after  his  visit  to  Japan.  "  I  never  enjoyed 
myself  so  much.  Every  time  I  wanted  to  go 
anywhere  there  was  an  automobile  at  my  dis- 
posal and  a  Japanese  official  to  show  me  about 
and  explain  things  to  me.  I  was  constantly  at- 
tended and  made  comfortable ;  and  I  was  given 
unexampled  opportunities  for  seeing  Japan,  and 
guided  to  all  the  points  of  interest,  and  had  the 
real  Japanese  spirit  explained  to  me  by  culti- 
vated Japanese  officials  and  scholars.  My  view 
of  Japan  has  entirely  changed.  I  now  realize 
how  great  is  the  work  they  are  doing,  how  patri- 
otic they  are,  how  wonderful  as  a  people !  " 

"  Their  methods  when  a  distinguished  Ameri- 
can gets  to  Japan  are  interesting  and  effica- 
cious," wrote  Samuel  G.  Blythe,  after  his  return 
from  Japan  in  1915.  "  Their  hospitality  is  un- 
bounded; their  courtesy  is  unexampled;  their 
attentions  are  flattering;  their  polite  recognition 
and  deference  are  alluring  to  the  susceptible. 
The  Japanese  capture  a  distinguished  American 
without  half  trying.  They  have  become  experts 
at  the  game." 

The  distinguished  foreigner  is  kept  constantly 
on  the  move;  is  dined,  wined,  and  entertained; 
is  invited  to  give  addresses;  is  taken  here  and 
there ;  is  made  much  of ;  in  certain  cases,  deemed 
most  important  by  the  Japanese,  he  is  presented 
to  the  Emperor  or  given  a  decoration.  It  is 
18  Saturday  Evening  Post,  May  22,  1915. 


PUBLICITY  PROPAGANDA  159 

said  that  when  Vice-President  Fairbanks  was  in 
Korea,  the  Japanese  authorities  tried  their  ut- 
most to  keep  him  busy  with  the  official  func- 
tions of  the  government  so  as  to  prevent  him 
from  having  private  conversations  with  resident 
Americans."  In  1909,  when  Lord  Kitchener 
went  through  Korea,  an  English  resident,  who 
was  an  old  friend  of  Kitchener,  tried  to  invite 
the  distinguished  visitor  to  his  home  for  dinner, 
but  the  Japanese  officials  refused  the  privilege 
on  the  ground  that  the  details  of  his  visit  and 
entertainment  had  already  been  arranged. 

When  Judge  Elbert  H.  Gary  went  to  Japan  in 
1910,  he  was  met  on  board  the  ship  by  the 
Japanese  reception  committee.  His  special  train 
was  to  arrive  at  Tokyo  at  twilight,  so  that  the 
procession  could  pass  through  a  mammoth 
electric  arch  with  the  sign,  "  Welcome,  Judge 
and  Mrs.  Gary."  The  Chairman  of  the  United 
States  Corporation  was  interviewed  by  dis- 
tinguished Japanese  statesmen  and  financiers; 
was  invited  to  give  addresses;  was  entertained 
at  luncheons,  banquets,  and  receptions  given  in 
his  honour;  and  was  shown  about  the  country 
with  characteristic  Japanese  deference  and  hos- 
pitality. An  American  journalist  who  knows 
the  Japanese  method  of  capturing  distinguished 
foreigners  spoke  of  the  Judge  at  that  time  as 
being  "  one  of  the  biggest  fishes  that  got  caught 
19  See  The  Continent,  June  27,  1912,  p.  897. 


160     JAPAN'S  CONTROL  OF  PUBLICITY 

in  the  net  of  the  Japanese  publicity  propaganda 
for  some  time."  In  describing  Japanese  hos- 
pitality after  his  return  to  America,  the  steel 
magnate  said,  "  I  have  never  before  seen  it  ex- 
celled nor  even  equalled.  An  American  gentle- 
man, if  he  is  known  and  considered  worthy  and 
representative,  will  receive  invitations  by 
Marconi  for  luncheons  or  dinners  or  other  func- 
tions from  those  who  are  in  office  or  have  been 
in  some  way  designated  to  speak  for  the  senti- 
ment of  the  people ;  he  will  be  met  on  the  ship 
before  it  is  docked  by  a  committee  or  delegation 
from  the  city  he  is  approaching;  and  from  the 
time  he  lands  upon  Japanese  territory  until  he 
departs  he  will  receive  the  kindest  and  most 
liberal  hospitality  that  can  be  offered,  and  al- 
ways with  a  grace  and  charm  and  simplicity  that 
cannot  be  surpassed.  ...  I  have  no  doubt 
that  the  leading  and  controlling  men  in  Japan 
earnestly  desire  to  maintain  cordial,  close  and 
continuous  relations  with  the  people  of  the 
United  States.  It  seems  to  me,  if  we  ever  have 
serious  trouble  with  Japan  it  will  be  as  much 
the  fault  of  the  United  States  as  it  is  the  fault 
of  Japan ;  and  perhaps  more."  The  Japan 
Society  of  America  gathered  all  the  addresses 
delivered  by  Judge  Gary  in  Japan,  bound  them 
in  an  attractive  pamphlet,  Japan  as  Viewed  by 

50  From  address  delivered  at  the  Bankers'  Club,  New  York, 
November  9,  1916  (pamphlet  mentioned). 


PUBLICITY  PBOPAGANDA  161 

Judge  Elbert  H.  Gary,  and  scattered  it  gratis  to  all 
the  leading  libraries  in  the  country  as  the  sane 
and  unbiased  view  of  a  distinguished  American 
business  man.  When  the  United  States  de- 
clared its  policy  of  embargo  on  steel  in  1917, 
Baron  Shibusawa,  the  leading  Japanese  finan- 
cier and  semi-official  spokesman  of  his  govern- 
ment, sent  the  appeal  of  the  Japanese  industrial 
concerns  direct  to  Judge  Gary  to  see  to  it  that 
Japan  might  be  exempted  from  the  embargo." 
Indeed,  the  American  steel  magnate  wielded  a 
powerful  influence  in  bringing  about  the  ar- 
rangement by  which  Japan  could  get  steel  from 
the  United  States,  as  usual,  in  return  for  fur- 
nishing shipping  in  the  Pacific  so  that  the  Amer- 
ican vessels  there  could  be  transferred  to  the 
Atlantic  for  war  purposes. 

The  average  globe-trotter  in  Japan  sees  Japan 
through  the  eyes  of  the  Japanese.  He  sees 
nothing  except  what  the  Japanese  want  him  to 
see,  and  hears  nothing  except  what  the  Japa- 
nese want  him  to  hear.  "  No  condition  can 
arise  in  Japan  whereby  a  foreigner  can  learn 
from  a  Japanese  of  anything  to  the  detriment 
of  the  country.  The  statesmen  will  not  tell  you 
anything.  The  coolies  will  not  tell  you  any- 
thing. They  are  units  of  concealment.  They 
put  the  good  face  on  everything.  ...  If 

21  Telegram  given  to  the  press  by  Judge  Gary,  New  York, 
October  8,  1917. 


162     JAPAN'S  CONTEOL  OP  PUBLICITY 

you  ask  a  Japanese  to  read  you  from  a  Japanese 
newspaper,  he  will  carefully  skip  anything  he 
may  find  in  that  paper  that,  as  it  seems  to  him, 
would  be  detrimental  to  the  fair  name  and  fame 
of  Japan  if  communicated  to  a  foreigner.  If  a 
Japanese — any  Japanese — hears  anything  he 
deems  of  importance  or  of  use  to  his  country,  he 
sees  to  it  that  that  information  gets  to  the 
proper  person.  He  seeks  to  show  you  the 
bright  spots."  *  Indeed,  the  late  Richard  Hard- 
ing Davis  characterized  the  Japanese  method  of 
showing  Japan  to  the  Westerner  as  like  telling 
a  young  woman  that  she  might  go  out  to  swim 
but  she  mustn't  go  near  the  water.21 

This  unprecedented  manipulation  of  foreign 
visitors,  the  peculiar  trait  of  the  Japanese,  has 
far-reaching  consequences  in  forming  public 
opinion  in  the  West  with  regard  to  Oriental 
politics.  Few,  if  any,  escape  the  Japanese  net 
of  hospitality  and  bring  back  true  reports.  The 
majority  of  foreigners  leave  Japan  in  a  happy 
haze  of  pleasant  impressions  and  ever  afterward 
sing  the  joys  and  beauties  and  wonders  of  the 
country.  They  form  a  bulwark  of  Japanese  de- 
fense in  the  public  sentiment  in  the  West;  per- 
sistently refuse  to  believe  anything  that  is  dis- 
paraging to  their  once  kind  and  generous  host; 
and  in  some  cases,  they  become  more  vigorous 

22  Samuel  G.  Blythe,  Saturday  Evening  Post,  May  I,  1915. 
"See    "The    Russo-Japanese    War,"    chap.    VII,    "The 
Chroniclers  of  War." 


PUBLICITY  PBOPAGANDA  163 

advocates  of  the  rights  of  Dai  Nippon  than  the 
Japanese  themselves.  Especially  is  this  notice- 
able on  the  part 'of  publicists,  such  as  George 
Kennan,  the  well-known  American  journalist, 
who  received  an  unlimited  hospitality  during  his 
stay  in  Japan,  and  Dr.  George  Trumbull  Ladd, 
who  was  made  an  honorary  member  of  the  Im- 
perial Educational  Society  of  Japan  and  was 
twice  decorated  by  the  late  Emperor  with  the 
insignias  of  the  Rising  Sun.54 

The  "  Twenty-one  Demands  "  made  on  China 
by  Japan  on  January  18,  1915,  is  one  of  the  most 
notorious  pieces  of  international  robbery  in 
modern  times.  Had  China  conceded  to  the 
terms  as  they  were  first  presented  by  Mr.  Hioki, 
the  Japanese  minister  at  Peking,  the  ancient 
Empire  would  be  a  vassal  state  to-day.  The  de- 
mands were  first  presented  by  the  Japanese 
Government  to  the  Chinese  coupled  with  a 
strong  admonition  to  China  that  both  haste  and 
secrecy  were  required  in  this  consideration. 
Continuous  pressure  was  brought  on  China  to 
force  her  to  concede  the  demands  en  bloc  without 
discussion,  and  the  Chinese  officials  were  warned 
not  to  inform  other  powers  of  the  demands  and 
negotiations,  even  confidentially.  The  Japanese 
Government  officially  denied,  as  being  utterly 
false,  all  press  reports  in  China  about  the  de- 

24  Mr.  Kennan's  articles  on  Japan  in  the  Outlook,  and  Dr. 
Ladd's  "In  Korea  With  Marquis  Ito,"  and  "Benevolent 
Assimilation/'  are  decidedly  pro-Japanese. 


164     JAPAN'S  CONTEOL  OF  PUBLICITY 

mands.  Newspapers  in  Japan  were  warned  by 
the  government  not  to  publish  or  discuss  news 
of  the  demands,  and  Japan's  diplomatic  repre- 
sentatives abroad  were  instructed  to  deny  and 
discredit  any  such  news.  The  Japanese  min- 
ister at  Peking  stated  in  response  to  inquiries 
of  other  foreign  ministers  that  no  demands  had 
been  made.  When  copies  of  the  original  de- 
mands, procured  from  the  Chinese  Government, 
were  received  by  foreign  governments,  Japan 
still  denied  the  twenty-one  demands,  and  gave 
out  a  list  of  eleven  articles,  omitting  the  most 
objectionable  matters,  as  "  friendly  "  demands 
made  by  Japan  upon  China  "  in  accordance  with 
the  principle  of  the  maintenance  of  the  terri- 
torial integrity  of  China." 

As  the  facts  of  the  case  began  to  leak  out, 
those  who  knew  something  about  the  political 
situation  in  the  East  were  nonplussed  at  the 
callous  selfishness  of  Japan.  "  Her  statesmen 
have  set  truth  and  common  decency  at  defiance 
in  a  way  unparalleled  in  the  most  torturous 
diplomacy  of  the  worst  courts  of  the  vilest 
period  of  history,"18  as  the  National  Revinv 
(Shanghai)  expressed  it.  Others  refused  to 
believe  the  reports  as  being  utterly  incredible. 
At  this  time  Dr.  Shailer  Mathews  returned  from 
Japan  and  made  a  report  that  "  much  of  the 
news  emanating  from  Peking  is  obviously 

*  Quoted  in  Review  of  Revieivs,  52 : 230,  August,  1915. 


PUBLICITY  PROPAGANDA  165 

coloured  by  anti-Japanese  feeling,  and  it  is  diffi- 
cult to  accept  any  of  the  reports  on  their  face 
value;  and  this  colouring  of  reports  in  the  ap- 
parent interest  of  making  trouble  between  the 
United  States  and  Japan  is  a  menace."  An  in- 
fluential New  York  weekly  shrewdly  compared 
the  Japanese  policy  in  China  with  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  of  the  United  States  and  said,  "  The 
Monroe  Doctrine  .  .  .  was  adopted  as  a 
means  of  self-protection,  and  has  never  been 
made  an  excuse  for  aggrandizement  or  inter- 
ference in  the  governmental  policies  of  Amer- 
ican Republics.  The  policy  of  Japan  may  be 
likened  to  that  of  Monroe  Doctrine  so  far  as  it 
seeks  to  protect  itself  through  checking  Euro- 
pean aggressions." 

China  waited  and  stood  the  pressure  as  long 
as  she  was  able,  and  finally  conceded  the  de- 
mands slightly  modified,  giving  Japan  the  para- 
mount sphere  of  influence  in  China.  "  She 
could  not  help  herself.  She  had  to  give  way. 
But  to  say  that  her  giving  way  and  Japan's 
paltry  modifications  of  her  demands  have 
brought  about  a  peaceful  solution  is  to  talk  the 
sheerest  drivel,"  said  an  English  journal  pub- 
lished itt  the  Far  East.67 

When  the  terms  of  settlement  were  fully 

*  Outlook,  110:4,  May  5,  1915. 

"Editorial  in  National  Review  (Shanghai),  quoted  in 
Review  of  Reviews,  52 : 231,  August,  1915. 


166     JAPAN'S  CONTBOL  OF  PUBLICITY 

known  to  the  West,  even  the  most  conservative 
English  writers  who  were  in  no  position  to 
criticize  the  British  ally  in  the  time  of  war,  ex- 
pressed their  views  in  unmistakable  terms. 
"  Japan  has  violated,  and  is  flow  violating,  the 
terms  of  the  Portsmouth  Treaty  and  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  Alliance,"  said  J.  O.  P.  Bland.  "  She 
is  taking  possession  of  China's  outlying  de- 
pendencies and  endeavouring  to  establish  the 
beginnings  of  overlordship  in  China  proper, 
simply  because,  for  the  moment,  there  is  noth- 
ing to  prevent  her  from  so  doing."  Yet  the 
prominent  New  York  weekly  commented  on  the 
settlement  of  disputes  between  China  and  Japan 
as  follows : 

"Americans  interested  in  the  welfare  of  China 
and  Japan  will  rejoice  that,  at  a  time  when  in- 
ternational differences  have  brought  about  half 
the  world  into  war,  these  two  Oriental  countries 
have  adjusted  their  difficulties  on  a  basis  of 
mutual  compromise." 

These  things  are  not  said  to  cast  any  reflec- 
tion on  the  New  York  weekly  or  on  any  other 
pro-Japanese  journal  in  America ;  they  are  cited 
to  illustrate  the  tremendous  influence  the 
Japanese  exercise  over  publications  in  this 
country,  through  the  agencies  that  have  been 
mentioned. 

**  Nineteenth  Century,  78: 1198-1212,  November,  1915. 
" Outlook,  no:  121-123,  May  19,  1915. 


CONCLUSION 

COMPARISON  OF  RUSSIAN  AND  JAPANESE 
DIPLOMACY 

THE  mainland  of  Asia  has  been,  during 
the  last  fifty  years,  an  international 
grab-bag.  Ea,ch  European  nation  has 
scrambled  for  its  share  in  the  sphere  of  influence 
and  for  commercial  advantages.  The  two  na- 
tions that  have  been  most  active  in  the  struggle 
in  eastern  Asia  are  Russia  and  Japan.  But 
Russia  is  no  longer  a  menace  to  the  peace  of 
Asia.  The  Soviet  Government  may  crumble 
to-morrow,  but  it  is  not  likely  that  the  people 
will  restore  their  absolute  monarchy.  Although 
militaristic  Russia  no  longer  exists,  the  civilized 
world  is  very  familiar  with  the  tortuous  in- 
trigue and  secret  diplomacy  of  the  former  Rus- 
sian Government.  Therefore,  by  comparing 
the  present-day  Japanese  diplomacy  with  that 
of  Russia  under  the  old  regime,  the  reader  will 
get  a  clearer  understanding  of  the  tactics  that 
are  being  employed  by  the  Asiatic  Empire  in 
her  intercourse  with  other  nations.  We  may 
profitably  make,  then,  a  brief  comparison  of  the 

167 


168     JAPAN'S  CONTROL  OF  PUBLICITY 

diplomacies  of  these  two  Powers  in  the  course 
of  their  expansion,  territorial  and  commercial, 
in  eastern  Asia. 

Russian  history  from  the  time  of  Peter  the 
Great  down  to  the  abdication  of  Czar  Nich- 
olas II,  March  15,  1917,  has  been  a  history  of 
territorial  aggrandizement  and  political  ex- 
ploitation. The  diplomacy  of  such  a  nation 
would  necessarily  be  stained  by  indelible  records 
of  deceit  and  treachery.  Perhaps  writers  like 
Kipling  are  justified  in  designating  Russia,  until 
the  opening  of  the  European  War,  as  a  black 
sheep  in  the  European  family  of  nations,  and  as 
utterly  unworthy  of  British  respect  and  friend- 
ship. 

Japanese  diplomacy,  on  the  other  hand,  is 
subtle  and  insidious.  Its  inconsistencies  are  so 
skillfully  covered  that  an  ordinary  observer  can- 
not notice  them  at  all.  The  Japanese  being  the 
cleverest  imitators  in  the  world,  spare  no  pains 
in  putting  on  an  appearance  of  honesty  and 
frankness  in  their  dealings  with  other  peoples. 
In  fact,  they  are  honest  when  honesty  would 
give  them  greater  advantage  than  dishonesty. 
"  In  the  Japanese  philosophy  of  life,"  said  Col- 
gate Baker,  who  was  born  and  brought  up  in 
Japan,  "  right  and  wrong  are  terms  of  mere  ex- 
pediency. It  is  right  to  be  honest  when  honesty 
gives  you  an  advantage.  It  is  not  wrong  to  be 
dishonest  when  you  would  lose  by  honesty. 


EUSSIAN  AND  JAPANESE  DIPLOMACY    169 

There  is  no  conception  of  right  for  the  sake  of 
right"1 

It  is  obvious  that  Japanese  diplomacy  is  far 
superior  to  the  crude  and  brutal  Russian 
diplomacy,  in  so  far  as  obtaining  the  goal  of 
their  respective  national  policies  is  concerned. 
Whatever  is  done  by  Russia  is  known  and 
criticized  by  outsiders ;  but  such  is  not  the  case 
in  Japanese  affairs.  "  From  what  I  know  of 
Japan,  inside  and  outside,"  wrote  Thomas  F. 
Millard,  "  I  am  convinced  that  Western  knowl- 
edge of  darkest  Russia  is  as  the  noonday  sun  to 
the  moon  compared  to  general  Western  under- 
standing of  internal  forces  which  sway  the 
policy  of  Nippon." 

During  the  past  ten  years  of  Japanese  ex- 
pansion, Japan  committed  national  crimes  not 
less  horrible  than  those  perpetrated  by  Russia 
in  the  worst  period  of  her  history.  The  mili- 
tary tyranny  in  Korea  has  been  interpreted  in 
the  Western  press  as"  a  firm  and  necessary 
measure.  "After  the  Japanese  occupation  of 
Manchuria,"  wrote  an  American  correspondent 
who  personally  investigated  the  situation,  "  be- 
gan the  state  of  affairs  which,  had  it  occurred  in 
the  Balkans  or  in  Manchuria  under  Russian  con- 
trol, would  quickly  have  resounded  through  the 

'"Real    Japanese    Character,"    Independent,    56:641-644, 
March  24,  1904. 
2  Millard,  "  The  Far  Eastern  Question,"  p.  185. 


170     JAPAN'S  COOTBOL  OF  PUBLICITY 

world."  *  The  Japanese  during  their  expedition 
against  the  Germans  in  Kiaoehow  confiscated 
practically  all  the  property  in  the  Liao-Tung 
Peninsula.  The  Shantung  railway  was  not  a 
German  property.  It  was  built  by  the  Chinese 
Government  with  money  borrowed  from  Ger- 
many. Japan  confiscated  this  railway  on  the 
pretext  that  it  belonged  to  Germany.4  Dis- 
patches of  such  nature  seldom  reach  the  West, 
and  whatever  fragmentary  news  is  smuggled 
out  by  individual  witnesses  is  entirely  dis- 
credited in  the  Western  press.  The  majority  of 
American  editors  refuse  to  believe  anything 
that  is  contrary  to  cheir  former  opinion  of 
Japan  ^  they  take  great  pleasure  in  quoting  the 
stock  phrases  of  the  Japanese  statesmen,  "Japan 
has  no  ulterior  motive,  no  desire  to  secure  more 
territory,  no  thought  of  depriving  China  or  any 
other  peoples  of  anything  which  they  now 
possess,"1  which  promises,  George  Bronson 
Rea,  the  editor  of  the  Par  Eastern  Review,  prop- 
erly calls  "  worthless  scraps  of  paper  to  be  torn 
to  shreds  and  scattered  to  the  winds." 

'  Millard,  "  The  New  Far  East,"  p.  146. 

4  Information  given  me  by  Dr.  W.  J.  Hiltner,  of  the  Har- 
vard Medical  College  in  China,  who  personally  investi- 
gated the  problem  before  his  return  to  America  on  fur- 
lough, November,  1916.  "  Tsinan-Tsingtau  Railway"  is  the 
official  name ;  see  Millard,  "  Our  Eastern  Question,"  109- 
lio,  for  full  discussion. 

"Count  Okuma's  "Message  to  the  American  People,"  7n- 
dependent,  79:291,  August  31,  1914. 

•Quoted  in  Review  of  Reviews,  52:231,  August,  1915. 


BUSSIAN  AOT)  JAPANESE  DIPLOMACY   171 

The  respective  predicaments  of  the  unfor- 
tunate peoples  living  under  the  Russian  and  the 
Japanese  domination  are  best  compared  per- 
haps by  Park  In  Sick,  a  Korean  historian  and 
editor,  who  fled  his  country  since  the  Japanese 
occupation : 7 

"  To  be  a  subject  race  is  contemptible  at  its 
best.  It  is  the  most  intolerable  of  all  slavery, 
when  the  dominating  nation  happens  to  be  one 
like  Russia  or  Japan  in  which  the  sense  of  na- 
tional conscience  plays  no  part  in  colonial  ad- 
ministration, and  which  holds  colonies  purely 
for  material  gains.  To  live  under  the  Russian 
control  is  like  meeting  a  lion  in  an  open  field. 
Other  people  will  hear  the  roar  and  will  sympa- 
thize with  you  at  least ;  you  might  find  a  chance 
to  run  away  from  the  beast.  But  to  live  in  a 
country  dominated  by  Japan  is  like  being  shut 
up  in  a  small  room  with  hundreds  of  cobras. 
You  have  no  chance  to  escape,  and  the  world 
will  not  know  of  your  death." 

It  is  but  just  to  admit  that  Japan  is  not  with- 
out some  excuse  in  her  sinister  foreign  policies. 
Tfhe  only  standard  by  which  we  can  judge  the 
right  or  wrong  of  nations  in  their  mutual  deal- 
ings is  the  criterion  of  world  culture — the  public 
opinion  of  the  civilized  peoples.  So  far  in  hu- 


TPark  is  a  profound  scholar  in  Chinese  classics.  Ex- 
Premier  Kang  Yu-Wei  wrote  the  preface  to  his  widely  read 
book,  "The  Tragic  History  of  Korea"  (Chinese). 


172     JAPAN'S  CONTEOL  OF  PUBLICITY 

man  history  public  sentiment  has  sanctioned 
secret  and  questionable  methods  of  diplomacy 
as  legitimate.  What  would  be  looked  upon  as 
unpardonable  dishonesty  between  individuals  is 
often  considered  as  a  clever  piece  of  diplomacy 
between  nations.  A  single  standard  of  morality 
is  still  an  ideal,  rather  than  a  reality.  Espe- 
cially is  this  true  with  nations  swayed  by  im- 
perial aspirations  and  deep-seated  militarism. 
Japan,  the  infant  prodigy  of  the  East,  ambitious 
of  her  future  and  jealous  of  her  rights,  has 
chosen  the  expedient  rather  than  the  righteous 
path  to  reach  her  place  in  the  sun.  Her  poets 
have  sung  the  glory  and  grandeur  of  war;  her 
philosophers  have  praised  the  valour  and  virtue 
of  militarism.  Her  merchants  have  practiced 
"  dumping  "  and  misrepresentation  of  goods  as 
a  matter  of  course ;  her  statesmen  have  adopted 
the  Bismarckian  "  iron  and  blood  "  policy  as  the 
only  road  to  national  greatness.  Japan  is  no 
longer  the  gallant  knight  she  was  deemed  to  be 
in  the  earlier  years  of  her  national  ascendency, 
setting  out  to  rescue  Asia  from  the  European 
dragon;  she  is  now  the  armed  bully  of  the  East. 
The  Asiatics  had  looked  upon  her  as  their 
teacher  and  leader;  now  their  hope  and  faith 
are  shattered  in  finding  her  a  merciless  con- 
queror, reigning,  sword  in  hand,  over  subject 
races.  The  Japanese  national  policy  may  go 
through  a  process  of  regeneration,  as  the  world 


BUSSIAN  AND  JAPANESE  DIPLOMACY   173 

society  is  better  organized  on  the  basis  of 
nationality  and  individual  freedom.  Perhaps 
the  Western  nations,  at  present,  have  no  right 
to  demand  of  Japan  the  principles  of  justice  and 
humanity,  which  they  themselves  do  not  prac- 
tice. But  they  have  a  right  to  demand  the  full 
knowledge  of  her  policies.  Open  diplomacy  is — 
and  it  ought  to  be — the  cry  of  the  age.  "  The 
highest  reach  of  injustice,"  as  the  wise  Plato 
pointed  out  over  twenty  centuries  ago,  "  is  to 
be  deemed  just  when  you  are  not."  The 
Koreans, — and,  indeed,  all  subject  races — may 
submit  to  injustice,  but  they  ought  to  have  a 
right  to  demand,  at  least,  openness  on  the  part 
of  their  conquerors. 

"  E'en  in  the  light  let  us  die,  if  die  we  must !  " 


PART  III 
Documents  in  the  Case 


TREATY  BETWEEN  THE  UNITED  STATES 
AND  JAPAN 

Signed  November  22, 
Proclaimed  March  21, 

THE  President  of  the  United  States  of 
America  and  His  Majesty  the  Emperor 
of  Japan,  being  equally  desirous  of 
maintaining  the  relations  of  good  understanding 
which  happily  exist  between  them,  by  extending 
and  increasing  the  intercourse  between  their  re- 
spective States,  and  being  convinced  that  this 
object  cannot  better  be  accomplished  than  by 
revising  the  Treaties  hitherto  existing  between 
the  two  countries,  have  resolved  to  complete 
such  a  revision,  based  upon  principles  of  equity 
and  mutual  benefit,  and,  for  that  purpose,  have 
named  as  their  Plenipotentiaries,  that  is  to  say : 
The  President  of  the  United  States  of  America, 
Walter  Q.  Gresham,  Secretary  of  State  of  the 
United  States,  and  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of 
Japan,  Jushii  Shinichiro  Kurino,  of  the  Order  of 
the  Sacred  Treasure,  and  of  the  Fourth  Class; 
who,  after  having  communicated  to  each  other 
their  full  powers,  found  to  be  in  good  and  due 
form,  have  agreed  upon  and  concluded  the  fol- 
lowing Articles : 

177 


178  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

ARTICLE  I 

The  citizens  or  subjects  of  each  of  the  two 
High  Contracting  Parties  shall  have  full  liberty 
to  enter,  travel,  or  reside  in  any  part  of  the  ter- 
ritories of  the  other  Contracting  Party,  and 
shall  enjoy  full  and  perfect  protection  for  their 
persons  and  property. 

They  shall  have  free  access  to  the  Courts  of 
Justice  in  pursuit  and  defense  of  their  rights; 
they  shall  be  at  liberty  equally  with  native  citi- 
zens or  subjects  to  choose  and  employ  lawyers, 
advocates  and  representatives  to  pursue  and  de- 
fend their  rights  before  such  Courts,  and  in  all 
other  matters  connected  with  the  administra- 
tions of  justice  they  shall  enjoy  all  the  rights 
and  privileges  enjoyed  by  native  'citizens  or  sub- 
jects. 

In  whatever  relates  to  rights  of  residence  and 
travel ;  to  the  possession  of  goods  and  effects  of 
any  kind;  to  the  succession  to  personal  estate, 
by  will  or  otherwise,  and  the  disposal  of  prop- 
erty of  any  sort  and  in  any  manner  whatsoever 
which  they  may  lawfully  acquire,  the  citizens  or 
subjects  of  each  Contracting  Party  shall  enjoy 
in  the  territories  of  the  other  the  same  privi- 
leges, liberties,  and  rights,  and  shall  be  subject 
to  no  higher  imposts  or  charges  in  these  re- 
spects than  native  citizens  or  subjects,  or  citi- 
zens or  subjects  of  the  most  favoured  nation. 
The  citizens  or  subjects  of  each  of  the  Contract- 
ing Parties  shall  enjoy  in  the  territories  of  the 
other  entire  liberty  of  conscience,  and,  subject 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  179 

to  the  laws,  ordinances,  and  regulations,  shall 
enjoy  the  right  of  private  or  public  exercise  of 
their  worship,  and  also  the  right  of  burying 
their  respective  countryman,  according  to  their 
religious  customs,  in  such  suitable  and  conveni- 
ent places  as  may  be  established  and  maintained 
for  that  purpose. 

They  shall  not  be  compelled,  under  any  pre- 
text whatsoever,  to  pay  any  charges  or  taxes 
other  or  higher  than  those  that  are,  or  may  be 
paid  by  native  citizens  or  subjects,  or  citizens  or 
subjects  of  the  most  favoured  nation. 

The  citizens  or  subjects  of  either  of  the  Con- 
tracting Parties  residing  in  the  territories  of  the 
other  shall  be  exempted  from  all  compulsory 
military  service,  whether  in  the  army,  navy,  na- 
tional guard,  or  militia;  from  all  contributions 
imposed  in  lieu  of  personal  service ;  and  from  all 
forced  loans  or  military  exactions  or  contribu- 
tions. 

ARTICLE  II 

There  shall  be  reciprocal  freedom  of  com- 
merce and  navigation  between  the  territories  of 
the  two  High  Contracting  Parties. 

The  citizens  or  subjects  of  each  of  the  High 
Contracting  Parties  may  trade  in  any  part  of  the 
territories  of  the  other  by  wholesale  or  retail  in 
all  kinds  of  produce,  manufactures,  and  mer- 
chandise of  lawful  commerce,  either  in  person  or 
by  agents,  singly  or  in  partnership  with  foreign- 
ers or  native  citizens  or  subjects ;  and  they  may 
there  own  or  hire  and  occupy  houses,  manufac- 


180  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

tories,  warehouses,  shops  and  premises  which 
may  be  necessary  for  them,  and  lease  land  for 
residential  and  commercial  purposes,  conform- 
ing themselves  to  the  laws,  police  and  customs 
regulations  of  the  country  like  native  citizens  or 
subjects. 

They  shall  have  liberty  freely  to  come  with 
their  ships  and  cargoes  to  all  places,  ports,  and 
rivers  in  the  territories  of  the  other,  which  are 
or  may  be  opened  to  foreign  commerce,  and 
shall  enjoy,  respectively,  the  same  treatment  in 
matters  of  commerce  and  navigation  as  native 
citizens  or  subjects,  or  citizens  or  subjects  of  the 
most  favoured  nation,  without  having  to  pay 
taxes,  imposts  or  duties,  of  whatever  nature  or 
under  whatever  denomination  levied  in  the 
name  or  for  the  profit  of  the  Government,  public 
functionaries,  private  individuals,  corporations, 
or  establishments  of  any  kind,  other  or  greater 
than  those  paid  by  native  citizens  or  subjects,  or 
citizens  or  subjects  of  the  most  favoured  nation. 

It  is,  however,  understood  that  the  stipula- 
tions contained  in  this  and  the  preceding  Article 
do  not  in  any  way  affect  the  laws,  ordinances 
and  regulations  with  regard  to  trade,  the  immi- 
'gration  of  labourers,  police  and  public  security 
which  are  in  force  or  which  may  hereafter  be 
enacted  in  either  of  the  two  countries. 

ARTICLE  III 

The  dwellings,  manufactories,  warehouses, 
and  shops  of  the  citizens  or  subjects  of  each  of 
the  High  Contracting  Parties  in  the  territories  of 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  181 

the  other,  and  all  premises  appertaining  thereto 
destined  for  purposes  of  residence  or  commerce, 
shall  be  respected. 

It  shall  not  be  allowable  to  proceed  to  make  a 
search  of,  or  a  domiciliary  visit  to,  such  dwell- 
ings and  premises,  or  to  examine  or  inspect 
books,  papers,  or  accounts,  except  under  the 
conditions  and  with  the  forms  prescribed  by  the 
laws,  ordinances  and  regulations  for  citizens  or 
subjects  of  the  country. 

ARTICLE  IV 

No  other  or  higher  duties  shall  be  imposed  on 
the  importation  into  the  territories  of  the 
United  States  of  any  article,  the  produce  or 
manufacture  of  the  territories  of  His  Majesty 
the  Emperor  of  Japan,  from  whatever  place  ar- 
riving; and  no  other  or  higher  duties  shall  be 
imposed  on  the  importation  into  the  territories 
of  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Japan  of  any 
article,  the  produce  or  manufacture  of  the  terri- 
tories of  the  United  States,  from  whatever  place 
arriving,  than  on  the  like  article  produced  or 
manufactured  in  any  other  foreign  country ;  nor 
shall  any  prohibition  be  maintained  or  imposed 
on  the  importation  of  any  article,  the  produce 
or  manufacture  of  the  territories  of  either  of  the 
High  Contracting  Parties,  into  the  territories  of 
the  other,  from  whatever  place  arriving,  which 
shall  not  equally  extend  to  the  importation  of 
the  like  article,  being  the  produce  or  manufac- 
ture of  any  other  country.  This  last  provision  is 
not  applicable  to  the  sanitary  and  other  prohibi- 


182  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

tions  occasioned  by  the  necessity  of  protecting 
the  safety  of  persons,  or  of  cattle,  or  of  plants 
useful  to  agriculture. 

ARTICLE  V 

No  other  or  higher  duties  or  charges  shall  be 
imposed  in  the  territories  of  either  of  the  High 
Contracting  Parties  on  the  exportation  of  any 
article  to  the  territories  of  the  other  than  such 
as  are,  or  may  be,  payable  on  the  exportation 
of  the  like  article  to  any  other  foreign  country ; 
nor  shall  any  prohibition  be  imposed  on  the  ex- 
portation of  any  article  from  the  territories  of 
either  of  the  two  High  Contracting  Parties  to 
the  territories  of  the  other  which  shall  not 
equally  extend  to  the  exportation  of  the  like  ar- 
ticle to  any  other  country. 

ARTICLE  VI 

The  citizens  or  subjects  of  each  of  the  High 
Contracting  Parties  shall  enjoy  in  the  territories 
of  the  other  exemption  from  all  transit  duties, 
and  a  perfect  equality  of  treatment  with  native 
citizens  or  subjects  in  all  that  relates  to  ware- 
housing, bounties,  facilities,  and  drawbacks. 

ARTICLE  VII 

All  articles  which  are  or  may  be  legally  im- 
ported into  the  ports  of  the  territories  of  His 
Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Japan  in  Japanese  ves- 
sels may  likewise  be  imported  into  those  ports 
in  vessels  of  the  United  States,  without  being 
liable  to  any  other  or  higher  duties  or  charges  of 


BOOUMBBTO  IK  THE  CASE  183 

whatever  denomination  than  if  such  articles 
were  imported  in  Japanese  vessels;  and,  recip- 
rocally, all  articles  which  are  or  may  be  legally 
imported  into  the  ports  of  the  territories  of  the 
United  States  in  vessels  of  the  United  States 
may  likewise  be  imported  into  those  ports  in 
Japanese  vessels,  without  being  liable  to  any 
other  or  higher  duties  or  charges  of  whatever 
denomination  than  if  such  articles  were  im- 
ported in  vessels  of  the  United  States.  Such 
reciprocal  equality  of  treatment  shall  take  effect 
without  distinction,  whether  such  articles  come 
directly  from  the  place  of  origin  or  from  any 
other  place. 

In  the  same  manner,  there  shall  be  perfect 
equality  of  treatment  in  regard  to  exportation, 
so  that  the  same  export  duties  shall  be  paid,  and 
the  same  bounties  and  drawbacks  allowed,  in 
the  territories  of  either  of  the  High  Contracting 
Parties  on  the  exportation  of  any  article  which 
is  or  may  be  legally  exported  therefrom, 
whether  such  exportation  shall  take  place  in 
Japanese  vessels  or  in  vessels  of  the  United 
States,  and  whatever  may  be  the  place  of  desti- 
nation, whether  a  port  of  either  of  the  High 
Contracting  Parties  or  of  any  third  Power. 

ARTICLE  VIII 

No  duties  of  tonnage,  harbour,  pilotage,  light- 
house, quarantine,  or  other  similar  or  corre- 
sponding duties  of  whatever  nature,  or  under 
whatever  denomination  levied  in  the  name  or 
for  the  profit  of  Government,  public  function- 


184  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

aries,  private  individuals,  corporations,  or  estab- 
lishments of  any  kind,  shall  be  imposed  in  the 
ports  of  the  territories  of  either  country  upon 
the  vessels  of  the  other  country  which  shall  not 
equally  and  under  the  same  conditions  be  im- 
posed in  the  like  cases  on  national  vessels  in 
general  or  vessels  of  the  most  favoured  nation. 
Such  equality  of  treatment  shall  apply  recipro- 
cally to  the  respective  vessels,  from  whatever 
port  or  place  they  may  arrive,  and  whatever 
may  be  their  place  of  destination. 

ARTICLE  IX 

In  all  that  regards  the  stationing,  loading,  and 
unloading  of  vessels  in  the  ports,  basins,  docks, 
roadsteads,  harbours  or  rivers  of  the  territories 
of  the  two  countries,  no  privilege  shall  be 
granted  to  national  vessels  which  shall  not  be 
equally  granted  to  vessels  of  the  other  country ; 
the  intention  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties 
being  that  in  this  respect  also  the  respective 
vessels  shall  be  treated  on  the  footing  of  perfect 
equality. 

ARTICLE  X 

The  coasting  trade  of  both  the  High  Con- 
tracting Parties  is  excepted  from  the  provisions 
of  the  present  Treaty,  and  shall  be  regulated  ac- 
cording to  the  laws,  ordinances  and  regulations 
of  the  United  States  and  Japan,  respectively.  It 
is,  however,  understood  that  citizens  of  the 
United  States  in  the  territories  of  His  Majesty 
the  Emperor  of  Japan  and  Japanese  subjects  in 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  185 

the  territories  of  the  United  States,  shall  enjoy 
in  this  respect  the  rights  which  are,  or  may  be, 
granted  under  such  laws,  ordinances  and  regu- 
lations to  the  citizens  or  subjects  of  any  other 
country. 

A  vessel  of  the  United  States  laden  in  a  for- 
eign country  with  cargo  destined  for  two  or 
more  ports  in  the  territories  of  His  Majesty  the 
Emperor  of  Japan,  and  a  Japanese  vessel  laden 
in  a  foreign  country  with  cargo  destined  for  two 
or  more  ports  in  the  territories  of  the  United 
States,  may  discharge  >a  portion  of  her  cargo  at 
one  port,  and  continue  her  voyage  to  the  other 
port  or  ports  of  destination  where  foreign  trade 
is  permitted,  for  the  purpose  of  landing  the  re- 
mainder of  her  original  cargo  there,  subject  al- 
ways to  the  laws  and  customs  regulation  of  the 
two  countries. 

The  Japanese  Government,  however,  agrees 
ito  allow  vessels  of  the  United  States  to  con- 
tinue, as  heretofore,  for  the  period  of  the  dura- 
tion of  the  present  Treaty,  to  carry  cargo  be- 
tween the  existing  open  ports  of  the  Empire,  ex- 
:epting  to  or  from  the  ports  of  Osaka,  Niigata, 
and  Ebisuminato. 

ARTICLE  XI 

Any  'ship-of-war  or  merchant  vessel  of  either 
of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  which  may  be 
compelled  by  stress  of  weather,  or  by  reason  of 
any  other  distress,  to  take  shelter  in  a  port  of 
the  other,  shall  be  at  liberty  to  refit  therein,  to 
procure  all  necessary  supplies,  and  to  put  to  sea 


186  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

again,  without  paying  any  dues  other  than  such 
as  would  be  payable  by  national  vessels.  -In 
case,  however,  the  master  of  a  merchant  vessel 
should  under'the  necessity  of  disposing  of  a  part 
of  his  cargo  in  order  to  defray  the  expenses,  he 
shall  be  bound  to  conform  to  the  regulations  and 
tariffs  of  the  place  to  which  he  may  have  come. 

If  any  ship-of-war  or  merchant  vessel  of  the 
High  Contracting  Parties  should  run  aground 
or  be  wrecked  upon  the  coasts  of  the  other,  the 
local  authorities  shall  inform  the  Consul  Gen- 
eral, Consul,  Vice-Consul,  or  Consular  Agent  of 
the  district,  of  the  occurrence,  or  if  there  be  no 
such  consular  officers,  they  shall  inform  the 
Consul  General,  Consul,  Vice-Consul,  or  Con- 
sular Agent  of  the  nearest  district. 

All  proceedings  relative  to  the  salvage  of  Jap- 
anese vessels,  wrecked  or  cast  on  shore  in  the 
territorial  waters  of  the  United  States,  shall 
take  place  in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  the 
United  States,  and,  reciprocally,  all  measures  of 
salvage  relative  to  vessels  of  the  United  States, 
wrecked  or  cast  on  shore  in  the  territorial 
waters  of  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Japan, 
shall  take  place  in  accordance  with  the  laws, 
ordinances,  and  regulations  of  Japan. 

Such  stranded  or  wrecked  ship  or  vessel,  and 
all  parts  thereof,  and  all  furniture  and  appurte- 
nances belonging  thereunto,  and  all  goods  and 
merchandise  saved  therefrom,  including  those 
which  may  have  been  cast  into  the  sea,  or  the 
proceeds  thereof,  if  sold,  as  well  as  all  papers 
found  on  board  such  stranded  or  wrecked  ship 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  187 

or  vessel,  shall  be  given  up  to  the  owners  or 
their  agents,  when  claimed  by  them.  If  such 
owners  or  agents  are  not  on  the  spot,  the  same 
shall  be  delivered  to  the  respective  Consuls  Gen- 
eral, Consuls,  Vice-Consuls,  or  Consular  Agents 
upon  being  claimed  by  them  within  the  period 
fixed  by  laws,  ordinances  and  regulations  of  the 
country,  and  such  Consular  officers,  owners,  or 
agents  shall  pay  only  the  expenses  incurred  in 
the  preservation  of  the  property,  together  with 
the  salvage  or  other  expenses  which  would  have 
been  payable  in  the  •  case  of  the  wreck  of  ai 
national  vessel. 

The  goods  and  merchandise  saved  from  the 
wreck  shall  be  exempt  from  all  the  duties  of  the 
Customs  unless  cleared  for  consumption,  in 
which  case  they  shall  pay  the  ordinary  duties. 

When  a  vessel  belonging  to  the  citizens  or 
subjects  of  one  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties 
is  stranded  or  wrecked  in  the  territories  of  the 
other,  the  respective  Consuls  General,  Consuls, 
Vice-Consuls,  and  Consular  Agents  shall  be  au- 
thorized, in  case  the  owner  or  master,  or  other 
agent  of  the  owner,  is  not  present,  to  lend  their 
official  assistance  in  order  to  afford  the  neces- 
sary assistance  to  the  citizens  or  subjects  of  the 
respective  States.  The  same  rule  shall  apply  in 
case  the  owner,  master,  or  other  agent  is  pres- 
ent, but  requires  such  assistance  to  be  given. 

ARTICLE  XII 

All  vessels  which,  according  to  United  States 
law,  are  to  be  deemed  vessels  of  the  United 


188  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

States,  and  all  vessels  which,  according  to  Jap- 
anese law,  are  to  be  deemed  Japanese  vessels, 
shall,  for  the  purpose  of  this  Treaty,  be  deemed 
vessels  of  the  United  States  and  Japanese  ves- 
sels, respectively. 

ARTICLE  XIII 

The  Consuls  General,  Consuls,  Vice-Consuls, 
and  Consular  Agents  of  each  of  the  High  Con- 
tracting Parties,  residing  in  the  territories  of  the 
other,  shall  receive  from  the  local  authorities 
such  assistance  as  can  by  law  be  given  to  them 
for  the  recovery  of  deserters  from  the  vessels  of 
their  respective  countries. 

It  is  understood  that  this  stipulation  shall  not 
apply  to  the  citizens  or  subjects  of  the  country 
where  the  desertion  takes  place. 

ARTICLE  XIV 

The  High  Contracting  Parties  agree  that,  in 
all  that  concerns  commerce  and  navigation,  any 
privilege,  favour  or  immunity  which  either  High 
Contracting  Party  has  actually  granted,  or  may 
hereafter  grant,  to  the  Government,  srnps,  citi- 
zens, or  subjects  of  any  other  State,  shall  be 
extended  to  the  Government,  ships,  citizens,  or 
subjects  of  the  other  High  Contracting  Party, 
gratuitously,  if  the  concession  in  favour  of  that 
other  State  shall  have  been  gratuitous,  and  on 
the  same  or  equivalent  conditions  if  the  conces- 
sion shall  have  been  conditional;  it  being  their 
intention  that  the  trade  and  navigation  of  each 
country  shall  be  placed,  in  all  respects,  by  the 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  189 

other,  upon  the  footing  of  the  most  favoured 
nation. 

ARTICLE  XV 

Each  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  may 
appoint  Consuls  General,  Consuls,  Vice-Consuls, 
Pro-Consuls,  and  Consular  Agents,  in  all  the 
ports,  cities,  and  places  of  the  other,  except  in 
those  where  it  may  not  be  convenient  to  recog- 
nize such  officers. 

This  exception,  however,  shall  not  be  made 
in  regard  to  one  of  the.High  Contracting  Parties 
without  being  made  likewise  in  regard  to  every 
other  Power. 

The  Consuls  General,  Consuls,  Vice-Consuls, 
Pro-Consuls,  and  Consular  Agents,  may  exer- 
cise all  functions,  and  shall  enjoy  all  privileges, 
exemptions,  and  immunities  which  are,  or  may 
hereafter  be  granted  to  Consular  officers  of  the 
most  favoured  nation. 

ARTICLE  XVI 

The  citizens  or  subjects  of  each  of  the  High 
Contracting  Parties  shall  enjoy  in  the  territories 
of  the  other  the  same  protection  as  native  citi- 
zens or  subjects  in  regard  to  patents,  trade 
marks,  and  designs,  upon  fulfillment  of  the  for- 
malities prescribed  by  law. 

ARTICLE  XVII 

The  High  Contracting  Parties  agree  to  the 
following  arrangement: 


ioo         DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

The  several  Foreign  Settlements  in  Japan 
shall,  from  the  date  this  Treaty  conies  into 
force,  be  incorporated  with  the  respective  Jap- 
anese Communes,  and  shall  thenceforth  form 
part  of  the  general  municipal  system  of  Japan. 
The  competent  Japanese  Authorities  shall  there- 
upon assume  all  municipal  obligations  and 
duties  in  respect  thereof,  and  the  common  funds 
and  property,  if  any,  belonging  to  such  Settle- 
ment shall  at  the  same  time  be  transferred  to 
the  said  Japanese  Authorities. 

When  such  incorporation  takes  place  existing 
leases  in  perpetuity  upon  which  property  is  now 
held  in  the  said  Settlements  shall  be  confirmed, 
and  no  conditions  whatsoever  other  than  those 
contained  in  such  existing  leases  shall  be  im- 
posed in  respect  of  such  property.  It  is,  how- 
ever, understood  that  the  Consular  Authorities 
mentioned  in  the  same  are  in  all  cases  to  be  re- 
placed by  the  Japanese  Authorities.  All  lands 
which  may  previously  have  been  granted  by  the 
Japanese  Government  free  of  rent  for  the  public 
purposes  of  the  said  Settlement  shall,  subject  to 
the  right  of  Eminent  domain,  be  permanently 
reserved  free  of  all  taxes  and  charges  for  the 
public  purposes  for  which  they  were  originally 
set  apart. 

ARTICLE  XVIII 

This  Treaty  shall,  from  the  date  it  comes  into 
force,  be  substituted  in  place  of  the  Treaty  of 
Peace  and  Amity  concluded  on  the  3d  day  of  the 
3d  month  of  the  7th  year  of  Kayei,  correspond- 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  191 

ing  to  the  31st  day  of  March,  1854;  the  Treaty 
of  Amity  and  Commerce  concluded  on  the  19th 
day  of  the  6th  month  of  the  5th  year  of  Ansei, 
corresponding  to  the  29th  day  of  July,  1858; 
the  Tariff  Convention  concluded  on  the  13th 
day  of  the  5th  month  of  the  2d  year  of  Keio, 
corresponding  to  the  25th  day  of  June,  1866; 
the  Convention  concluded  on  the  25th  day  of 
the  7th  month  of  the  llth  year  of  Meiji,  corre- 
sponding to  the  25th  day  of  July,  1878,  and  all 
Arrangements  and  Agreements  subsidiary 
thereto  concluded  or  existing  between  the  High 
Contracting  Parties;  and  from  the  same  date 
such  Treaties,  Conventions,  Arrangements  and 
Agreements  shall  cease  to  be  being,  and,  in 
consequence,  the  jurisdiction  then  exercised  by 
Courts  of  the  United  States  in  Japan  and  all  the 
exceptional  privileges,  exemptions  and  immuni- 
ties then  enjoyed  by  citizens  of  the  United 
States  as  a  part  of,  or  appurtenant  to  such  juris- 
diction, shall  absolutely  and  without  notice  cease 
and  determine,  and  thereafter  all  such  jurisdic- 
tion shall  be  assumed  and  exercised  by  Japanese 
Courts. 

ARTICLE  XIX 

This  Treaty  shall  go  into  operation  on  the 
17th  day  of  July,  1899,  and  shall  remain  in  force 
for  the  period  of  twelve  years  from  that  date. 

Either  High  Contracting  Party  shall  have  the 
right,  at  any  time  thereafter,  to  give* notice  to 
the  other 'of  its  intention  to  terminate  the  same, 
and  at  the  expiration  of  twelve  months  after 


192  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

such  notice  is  given  this  Treaty  shall  wholly 
cease  and  determine. 

ARTICLE  XX 

This  Treaty  shall  be  ratified,  and  the  ratifica- 
tion thereof  shall  be  exchanged,  either  at  Wash- 
ington or  Tokyo,  as  soon  as  possible  and  not 
later  than  six  months  after  its  signature. 

In  witness  whereof  the  respective  Plenipoten- 
tiaries have  signed  the  present  Treaty  in  dupli- 
cate and  have  thereunto  affixed  their  seals. 

Done  at  the  City  of  Washington  the  22d  day 
of  November,  in  the  eighteen  hundred  ,and 
ninety-fourth  year  of  the  Christian  era,  corre- 
sponding to  the  22d  day  of  the  llth  month  of 
the  27th  year  of  Meiji. 

WALTER  Q.  GRESHAM      [SEAL]. 
SHINICHIRO  KURINO       [SEAL]. 


B 

THE  EMIGRATION  TREATY  BETWEEN 
CHINA  AND  THE  UNITED  STATES,  1894 

Signed  March  17,  1894; 
Proclaimed  December  8,  1894 

Whereas,  on  the  17th  day  of  November,  A.  D. 
1880,  and  of  Kwanghsu,  the  sixth  year,  tenth 
moon,  fifteenth  day,  a  treaty  was  concluded  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  China  for  the  pur- 
pose of  regulating,  limiting,  or  suspending  the 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  193 

coming  of  Chinese  labourers  to,  and  their  resi- 
dence in,  the  United  States; 

And,  whereas,  the  Government  of  China,  in 
view  of  the  antagonism  and  much  deprecated 
and  serious  disorders  to  which  the  presence  of 
Chinese  labourers  has  given  rise  in  certain 
parts  of  the  United  States,  desires  to  prohibit 
the  emigration  of  such  labourers  from  China  to 
the  United  States; 

And,  whereas,  the  two  Governments  desire  to 
cooperate  in  prohibiting  such  emigration,  and  to 
strengthen  in  other  ways  the  bonds  of  friend- 
ship between  the  two  countries; 

And,  whereas,  the  two  Governments  are  de- 
sirous of  adopting  reciprocal  measures  for  the 
better  protection  of  the  citizens  or  subjects  of 
each  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  other; 

Now,  therefore,  the  President  of  the  United 
States  has  appointed  Walter  Q.  Gresham,  Sec- 
retary of  State  of  the  United  States,  as  his  Pleni- 
potentiary, and  His  Imperial  Majesty,  the  Em- 
peror of  China  has  appointed  YangJ£lj,  Officer 
of  the  second  rank,  Sub-Director  of  the  Court 
of  Sacrificial  Worship,  and  Envoy  Extraordi- 
nary and  Minister  Plenipotentiary  to  the  United 
States  of  America,  as  his  Plenipotentiary;  and 
the  said  Plenipotentiaries  having  exhibited  their 
respective  Full  Powers  found  to  be  in  due  and 
good  form,  have  agreed  upon  the  following  ar- 
ticles : 

ARTICLE  I 
The  High  Contracting  Parties  agree  that  for 


194  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

a  period  of  ten  years,  beginning  with  the  date  of 
the  exchange  of  the  ratifications  of  this  Conven- 
tion, the  coming,  except  the  conditions  herein- 
after specified,  of  Chinese  labourers  to  the 
United  States  shall  be  absolutely  prohibited. 

ARTICLE  II 

The  preceding  Article  shall  not  apply  to  the 
return  to  the  United  States  of  any  registered 
Chinese  labourer  who  has  a  lawful  wife,  child, 
or  parent  in  the  United  States,  or  property 
therein  of  the  value  of  one  thousand  dollars,  or 
debts  of  like  amount  due  him  and  pending  set- 
tlement. Nevertheless  every  such  Chinese  la- 
bourer shall,  before  leaving  the  United  States, 
deposit,  as  a  condition  of  his  return,  with  the 
collector  of  customs  of  the  district  from  which 
he  departs,  a  full  description  in  writing  of  his 
family,  or  property,  or  debts,  as  aforesaid,  and 
shall  be  furnished  by  said  collector  with  such 
certificate  of  his  right  to  return  under  this 
Treaty  as  the  laws  of  the  United  States  may 
now  or  hereafter  prescribe  and  not  inconsistent 
with  the  provisions  of  this  Treaty;  and  should 
the  written  description  aforesaid  be  proved  to  be 
false,  the  right  of  return  thereunder,  or  of  con- 
tinued residence  after  return,  shall  in  each  case 
be  forfeited.  And  such  right  of  return  to  the 
United  States  shall  be  exercised  within  one  year 
from  the  date  of  leaving  the  United  States ;  but 
such  right  of  return  to  the  United  States  may  be 
extended  for  an  additional  period,  not  to  exceed 
one  year,  in  cases  where  by  reason  of  sickness  or 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

other  cause  of  disability  beyond  his  control, 
such  Chinese  labourer  shall  be  rendered  unable 
sooner  to  return — which  facts  shall  be  fully  re- 
ported to  the  Chinese  Consul  at  the  port  of  de- 
parture, and  by  him  certified,  to  the  satisfaction 
of  the  collector  of  the  port  at  which  such  Chi- 
nese subject  shall  land  in  the  United  States. 
And  no  such  Chinese  labourer  shall  be  per- 
mitted to  enter  the  United  States  by  land  or  sea 
without  producing  to  the  proper  officer  of  the 
customs  the  return  certificate  herein  required. 


ARTICLE  III 

The  provisions  of  this  Convention  shall  not 
affect  the  right  at  present  enjoyed  of  Chinese 
subjects,  being  officials,  teachers,  students,  mer- 
chants or  travellers,  for  curiosity  or  pleasure,  but 
not  labourers,  of  coming  to  the  United  States 
and  residing  therein.  To  entitle  such  Chinese 
subjects  as  are  above  described  to  admission 
into  the  United  States,  they  may  produce  a  cer- 
tificate from  their  Government  or  the  Govern- 
ment where  they  last  resided  vised  by  the  diplo- 
matic or  consular  representatives  of  the  United 
States  in  the  country  or  port  where  they  depart. 

It  is  also  agreed  that  Chinese  labourers  shall 
continue  to  enjoy  the  privilege  of  transit  across 
the  territory  of  the  United  States  in  the  course 
of  their  journey  to  or  from  other  countries,  sub- 
ject to  such  regulations  by  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  as  may  be  necessary  to  pre- 
vent said  privilege  of  transit  from  being  abused. 


196  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

ARTICLE  IV 

In  pursuance  of  Article  III  of  the  Immigra- 
tion Treaty  between  the  United  States  and 
China,  signed  at  Peking  on  the  17 th  day  of  No- 
vember, 1880  (the  15th  day  of  the  tenth  month 
of  Kwanghsu,  sixth  year),  it  is  hereby  under- 
stood and  agreed  that  Chinese  labourers  or  Chi- 
nese of  any  other  class,  either  permanently  or 
temporarily  residing  in  the  United  States,  shall 
have  for  the  protection  of  their  persons  and 
property  all  rights  that  are  given  by  the  laws 
of  the  United  States  to  citizens  of  the  most  fa- 
voured nation,  excepting  the  right  to  become 
naturalized  citizens.  And  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  reaffirms  its  obligation,  as 
stated  in  said  Article  III,  to  exert  all  its  power 
to  secure  protection  to  the  persons  and  property 
of  all  Chinese  subjects  in  the  United  States. 


ARTICLE  V 

The  Government  of  the  United  States,  hav- 
ing by  an  Act  of  the  Congress,  approved  May  5, 
1892,  as  amended  by  an  Act  approved  Novem- 
ber 3,  1893,  required  all  Chinese  labourers  law- 
fully within  the  limits  of  the  United  States  be- 
fore the  passage  of  the  first-named  Act  to  be 
registered  as  in  said  Acts  provided,  with  a  view 
of  affording  them  better  protection,  the  Chinese 
Government  will  not  object  to  the  enforcement 
of  such  acts,  and  reciprocally  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  recognizes  the  right  of  the 
Government  of  China  to  enact  and  enforce  simi- 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  197 

lar  laws  or  regulations  for  the  registration,  free 
of  charge,  of  all  labourers,  skilled  or  unskilled 
(not  merchants  as  defined  by  said  Acts  of  Con- 
gress), citizens  of  the  United  States  in  China, 
whether  residing  within  or  without  the  treaty 
ports. 

And  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
agrees  that  within  twelve  months  from  the  date 
of  the  exchange  of  the  ratifications  of  this  Con- 
vention, and  annually,  thereafter,  it  will  furnish 
to  the  Government  of  China  registers  or  reports 
showing  the  full  name,  age,  occupation  and 
number  or  place  of  residence  of  all  other  citizens 
of  the  United  States,  including  missionaries,  re- 
siding both  within  and  without  the  treaty  ports 
of  China,  not  including,  however,  diplomatic 
and  other  officers  of  the  United  States  residing 
or  travelling  in  China  upon  official  business,  to- 
gether with  their  body  and  household  servants. 

ARTICLE  VI 

This  Convention  shall  remain  in  force  for  a 
period  of  ten  years  beginning  with  the  date  of 
the  exchange  of  ratifications,  and,  if  six  months 
before  the  expiration  of  the  said  period  of  ten 
years,  neither  Government  shall  have  given  no- 
tice of  its  final  termination  to  the  other,  it  shall 
remain  in  full  force  for  another  like  period  of 
ten  years. 

In  faith  whereof,  we,  the  respective  plenipo- 
tentiaries, have  signed  this  Convention  and  have 
hereunto  affixed  our  seals. 


198  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

Done,  in  duplicate,  at  Washington,  the  17th 
day  of  March,  A.  D.  1894 

WALTER  Q.  GRESHAM      [SEAL], 
(CHINESE  SIGNATURE)    [SEAL]. 


PROTOCOL  BETWEEN  CHINA  AND  THE 
TREATY  POWERS,  SEPTEMBER  7,  1901 

The  plenipotentiaries  of  Germany,  His  Excel- 
lency M.  A.  Munn  von  Schwarzenstein ;  of  Aus- 
tria-Hungary, His  Excellency  M.  M.  Czikann 
von  Wahlborn ;  of  Belgium,  His  Excellency  M. 
Joostens ;  of  Spain,  M.  B.  J.  de  Cologan ;  of  the 
United  States,  His  Excellency  M.  W.  W.  Rock- 
hill;  of  France,  His  Excellency  M.  Paul  Beau; 
of  Great  Britain,  His  Excellency  Sir  Ernest 
Satow;  of  Italy,  Marquis  Salvago  Raggi;  of 
Japan,  His  Excellency  M.  Jutaro  Komura;  of 
the  Netherlands,  His  Excellency  M.  F.  M.  Kno- 
bel;  of  Russia,  His  Excellency  M.  M.  deGiers; 
and  of  China,  His  Highness  Yi-K'uang  Prince 
Ching  of  the  first  rank,  President  of  the  Minis- 
try of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  His  Excellency  Li 
Hung-chang,  Earl  of  Su-i  of  the  first  rank, 
Tutor  of  the  Heir  Apparent,  Grand  Secretary  of 
the  Wen-hua  Throne  Hall,  Minister  of  Com- 
merce, Superintendent  of  the  Northern  trade, 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  199 

Governor-General  of  Chihli,  have  met  for  the 
purpose  of  declaring  that  China  has  complied 
to  the  satisfaction  of  the  Powers  with  the  con- 
ditions laid  down  in  the  note  of  the  22d  of  De- 
cember, 1900,  and  which  were  accepted  in  their 
entirety  by  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  China 
in  a  decree  dated  the  27th  of  December. 

ARTICLE  Ia 

By  an  Imperial  Edict  of  the  9th  of  June  last, 
Tsai  Feng,  Prince  of  Ch'un,  was  appointed  Am- 
bassador of  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  China, 
and  directed  in  that  capacity  to  convey  to  His 
Majesty  the  German  Emperor  the  expression  of 
the  regrets  of  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of 
China  and  of  the  Chinese  Government  for  the 
assassination  of  His  Excellency  the  late  Baron 
von  Ketteler,  German  Minister. 

Prince  Ch'un  left  Peking  the  12th  of  July  last 
to  carry  out  the  orders  which  had  been  given 
him. 

ARTICLE  Ib 

The  Chinese  Government  has  stated  that  it 
will  erect  on  the  spot  of  the  assassination  of  His 
Excellency  the  late  Baron  von  Ketteler  a  com- 
memorative monument,  worthy  of  the  rank  of 
the  deceased,  and  bearing  an  inscription  in  the 
Latin,  German,  and  Chinese  languages,  which 
shall  express  the  regrets  of  His  Majesty  the 
Emperor  of  China  for  the  murder  committed. 

Their  Excellencies  the  Chinese  Plenipoten- 
tiaries have  informed  His  Excellency  the  Ger- 


200  DOCUMENTS  IK  THE  CASE 

man  Plenipotentiary,  in  a  letter  dated  the  22d 
of  July  last,  that  an  arch  of  the  whole  width  of 
the  street  would  be  erected  on  the  said  spot,  and 
that  work  on  it  was  begun  the  25th  of  June  last. 

ARTICLE  IIa 

Imperial  Edicts  of  the  13th  and  21st  of  Febru- 
ary, 1901,  inflicted  the  following  punishments  on 
the  principal  authors  of  the  outrages  and  crimes 
committed  against  the  foreign  Governments 
and  their  nationals: 

Tsai-I  Prince  Tuan  and  Tsai  Lan  Duke  Fu- 
kuo  were  sentenced  to  be  brought  before  the 
autumnal  court  of  assize  for  execution,  and  it 
was  agreed  that  if  the  Emperor  saw  fit  to  grant 
them  their  lives,  they  should  be  exiled  to  Turkes- 
tan and  there  imprisoned  for  life,  without  the 
possibility  of  commutation  of  these  punish- 
ments. 

Tsai  Hsun  Prince  Chuang,  Ying  Nien,  Presi- 
dent of  the  Court  of  censors,  and  Chao  Shu- 
Chiao,  President  of  the  Board  of  punishments, 
were  condemned  to  commit  suicide. 

Yu  Hsien,  Governor  of  Shanhsi,  Chi  Hsiu, 
President  of  the  Board  of  rites,  and  Hsu  Cheng- 
yu,  formerly  senior  vice-President  of  the  Board 
of  punishments,  were  condemned  to  death. 

Posthumous  degradation  was  inflicted  on 
Kang  Yi,  assistant  Grand  Secretary,  President 
of  the  Board  of  works,  Hsu  Tung,  Grand  Secre- 
tary, and  Li  Ping-heng,  formerly  Governor- 
General  of  Szu-ch'uan. 

An  Imperial  Edict  of  February  13th,  1901,  re- 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  201 

habilitated  the  memories  of  Hsu  Yung-yi,  Presi- 
dent of  the  Board  of  War,  Li  Shan,  President  of 
the  Board  of  works,  Hsu  Ching-cheng,  senior 
vice-President  of  the  Board  of  works,  Lien 
Yuan,  vice-Chancellor  of  the  Grand  Council, 
and  Yuan  Chang,  vice-President  of  the  court  of 
sacrifices,  who  had  been  put  to  death  for  having 
protested  against  the  outrageous  breaches  of  in- 
ternational law  of  last  year. 

Prince  Chuang  committed  suicide  the  21st  of 
February,  1901,  Ying  Nien  and  Chao  Shu-chiao 
the  24th,  Yu  Hsien  was  executed  the  22d,  Chi 
Hsiu  and  Hsu  Cheng-yu  on  the  26th.  Tung  Fu- 
hsiang,  General  in  Kan-su,  has  been  deprived  of 
his  office  by  Imperial  Edict  of  the  13th  of  Febru- 
ary, 1901,  pending  the  determination  of  the 
final  punishment  to  be  inflicted  on  him. 

Imperial  Edicts  dated  the  29th  of  April  and 
19th  of  August,  1901,  have  inflicted  various  pun- 
ishments on  the  provincial  officials  convicted  of 
the  crime  and  outrages  of  last  summer. 

ARTICLE  Hb 

An  Imperial  Edict  promulgated  the  19th  of 
August,  1901,  ordered  the  suspension  of  official 
examination  for  five  years  in  all  cities  where  for- 
eigners were  massacred  or  submitted  to  cruel 
treatment. 

ARTICLE  III 

So  as  to  make  honourable  reparation  for  the 
assassination  of  Mr.  Sugiyama,  chancellor  of  the 
Japanese  Legation,  His  Majesty  the  Emperor 


202  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

of  China  by  an  Imperial  Edict  of  the  18th  of 
June,  1901,  appointed  Na  Tung,  vice-President 
of  the  Board  of  revenue,  to  be  his  Envoy  Ex- 
traordinary, and  specially  directed  him  to  con- 
vey to  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Japan  the 
expression  of  the  regrets  of  His  Majesty  the 
Emperor  of  China  and  of  his  Government  at 
the  assassination  of  the  late  Mr.  Sugiyama. 

ARTICLE  IV 

The  Chinese  Government  has  agreed  to  erect 
an  expiatory  monument  in  each  of  the  foreign 
or  international  cemeteries  which  were  dese- 
crated and  in  which  the  tombs  were  destroyed. 

It  has  been  agreed  with  the  Representatives 
of  the  Powers  that  the  legations  interested  shall 
settle  the  details  for  the  erection  of  these  monu- 
ments, China  bearing  all  the  expenses  thereof, 
estimated  at  ten  thousand  taels  for  the  ceme- 
teries at  Peking  and  within  its  neighbourhood, 
and  at  five  thousand  taels  for  the  cemeteries  in 
the  provinces.  The  amounts  have  been  paid 
and  the  list  of  these  cemeteries  is  enclosed  here- 
with. 

ARTICLE  V 

China  has  agreed  to  prohibit  the  importation 
into  its  territory  of  arms  and  ammunition,  as 
well  as  of  materials  exclusively  used  for  the 
manufacture  of  arms  and  ammunition. 

An  Imperial  Edict  has  been  issued  on  the  25th 
of  August,  1901,  forbidding  said  importation  for 
a  term  of  two  years.  New  Edict  may  be  issued 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  203 

subsequently  extending  this  by  other  successive 
terms  of  two  years  in  case  of  necessity  recog- 
nized by  the  Powers. 

ARTICLE  VI 

By  an  Imperial  Edict  dated  the  29th  of  May, 
1901,  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  China  agreed 
to  pay  the  Powers  an  indemnity  of  four  hundred 
and  fifty  millions  of  Haikwan  taels.  This  sum 
represents  the  total  amount  of  the  indemnities 
for  States,  companies  or  societies,  private  indi- 
viduals, and  Chinese  referred  to  in  Article  VI  of 
the  note  of  December  22d,  1900. 

(a)  These  four  hundred  and  fifty  millions 
constitute  a  gold  debt  calculated  at  the  rate  of 
the  Haikwan  tael  to  the  gold  currency  of  each 
country,  as  indicated  below : 

Haikwan  tael — marks  3-O55 

— Austria-Hungary  crown. .  3.595 

— gold  dollar 0.742 

— francs 3-75° 

— pound   sterling 35.  od. 

— yen   1.407 

— Netherlands  florin 1.796 

— gold  rouble 1.412 

This  sum  in  gold  shall  bear  interest  at  4  per 
cent,  per  annum,  and  the  capital  shall  be  reim- 
bursed 'by  China  in  thirty-nine  years  in  the  man- 
ner indicated  in  the  annexed  plan  of  amortiza- 
tion. 

Capital  and  interest  shall  be  payable  in  gold 
or  at  the  rates  of  exchange  corresponding  to  the 
dates  at  which  the  different  payments  fall  due. 


204  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

The  amortization  shall  commence  the  1st  of 
January,  1902,  and  shall  finish  at  the  end  of  the 
year  1940.  The  amortizations  are  payable  an- 
nually, the  first  payment  being  fixed  on  the  1st 
of  January,  1903. 

Interest  shall  run  from  the  1st  of  July,  1901, 
but  the  Chinese  Government  shall  have  the 
right  to  pay  off  within  a  term  of  three  years, 
beginning  January,  1902,  the  arrears  of  the 
first  six  months,  ending  the  31st  of  December, 
1901,  on  condition,  however,  that  it  pays  com- 
pound interest  at  the  rate  of  4  per  cent,  per 
annum  on  the  sums  the  payments  of  which  shall 
have  thus  been  deferred.  Interest  shall  be  pay- 
able semi-annually,  the  first  payment  being  fixed 
on  the  1st  of  July,  1902. 

(b)  The  service  of  the  debt  shall  take  place  in 
Shanghai,  in  the  following  manner: 

Each  Power  shall  be  represented  by  a  dele- 
gate on  a  commission  of  bankers  authorized  to 
receive  the  amount  of  interest  and  amortization 
which  shall  be  paid  to  it  by  the  Chinese  authori- 
ties designated  for  that  purpose,  to  divide  it 
among  the  interested  parties,  and  to  give  a  re- 
ceipt for  the  same. 

(c)  The  Chinese  Government  shall  deliver  to 
the  Doyen  of  the  Diplomatic  Corps  at  Peking  a 
bond   for   the   lump    sum,   which   shall   subse- 
quently be  converted  into  fractional  bonds  bear- 
ing the  signatures  of  the  delegates  of  the  Chi- 
nese Government  designated  for  that  purpose. 
This  operation  and  all  those  relating  to  issuing 
of  the  bonds  shall  be  performed  by  the  above- 


DOCUMENTS  IK  THE  CASE  206 

mentioned  Commission,  in  accordance  with  the 
instructions  which  the  Powers  shall  send  their 
delegates. 

(d)  The  proceeds  of  the  revenue  assigned  to 
the  payment  of  the  bonds  shall  be  paid  to  the 
commission. 

(e)  The  revenues  assigned  as  security  for  the 
bonds  are  the  following: 

1.  The  balance  of  the  revenues  of  the  Impe- 
rial maritime  Customs  after  payment  of  the  in- 
terest and  amortization  of  preceding  loans  se- 
cured on  these  revenues,  plus  the  proceeds  of 
the  raising  to  five  per  cent,  effective  of  the  pres- 
ent tariff  on  maritime  imports,  including  articles 
until  now  on  the  free  list,  but  exempting  foreign 
rice,  cereals,  and  flour,  gold  and  silver  bullion 
and  coin. 

2.  The  revenue  of  the  native  customs,  admin- 
istered in  the  open  ports  by  the  Imperial  mari- 
time Customs. 

3.  The  total  revenue  of  the  salt  gabelle,  exclu- 
sive of  the  fraction  previously  set  aside  for  other 
foreign  loans. 

The  raising  of  the  present  tariff  on  imports  to 
five  per  cent,  effective  is  agreed  to  on  the  con- 
ditions mentioned  below. 

It  shall  be  put  in  force  two  months  after  the 
signing  of  the  present  protocol,  and  no  excep- 
tions shall  be  made  except  for  merchandise 
shipped  not  more  than  ten  days  after  the  said 
signing. 

(1)  All  duties  levied  on  imports  "ad  va- 
lorem "  shall  be  converted  as  far  as  possible  and 


206  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

as  soon  as  may  be  into  specific  duties.  This  con- 
version shall  be  made  in  the  following  manner: 
The  average  value  of  merchandise  at  the  time 
of  their  landing  during  the  three  years  1897, 
1898,  and  1899,  that  is  to  say,  the  market  price 
less  the  amount  of  import  duties  and  incidental 
expenses,  shall  be  taken  as  the  basis  for  the  val- 
uation of  merchandise.  Pending  the  result  of 
the  work  of  conversion,  duties  shall  be  levied 
"  ad  valorem." 

(2)  The  beds  of  the  rivers  Peiho  and 
Whangpu  shall  be  improved  with  the  financial 
participation  of  China. 

ARTICLE  VII 

The  Chinese  Government  has  agreed  that  the 
quarter  occupied  by  the  legations  shall  be  con- 
sidered as  one  specially  reserved  for  their  use 
and  placed  under  their  exclusive  control,  in 
which  Chinese  shall  not  have  the  right  to  reside, 
and  which  may  be  made  defensible. 

The  limits  of  this  quarter  have  been  fixed  as 
follows  on  the  annexed  plan : 

On  the  west,  the  line  1,  2,  3,  4,  5. 

On  the  north,  the  line  5,  6,  7,  8,  9,  10. 

On  the  east,  Ketteler  Street  (10,  11,  12). 

Drawn  along  the  exterior  base  of  the  Tartar 
wall  and  following  the  line  of  the  bastions,  on 
the  south  the  line  12.1. 

In  the  protocol  annexed  to  the  letter  of  the 
16th  of  January,  1901,  China  recognized  the 
right  of  each  Power  to  maintain  a  permanent 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  207 

guard  in  the  said  quarter  for  the  defense  of  its 
legation. 

ARTICLE  VIII 

The  Chinese  Government  has  consented  to 
raze  the  forts  of  Taku  and  those  which  might 
impede  free  communication  between  Peking 
and  the  sea ;  steps  have  been  taken  for  carrying 
this  out. 

ARTICLE  IX 

The  Chinese  Government  has  conceded  the 
right  to  the  Powers  in^the  protocol  annexed  to 
the  letter  of  the  16th  of  January,  1901,  to  occupy 
certain  points,  to  be  determined  by  an  agree- 
ment between  them,  for  the  maintenance  of 
open  communication  between  the  capital  and 
the  sea.  The  points  occupied  by  the  Powers 
are: 

Huang-tsun,  Lang-fang,  Yang-tsun,  Tientsin, 
Chun-Hang  Ch'eng,  Tang-ku,  Lutai,  Tang-shan, 
Lan-chow,  Chang-li,  Ch'in-wang  tao,  Shan-hai 
kuan. 

ARTICLE  X 

The  Chinese  Government  has  agreed  to  post 
and  to  have  published  during  two  years  in  all 
district  cities  the  following  Imperial  edicts: 

(a)  Edicts  of  the  1st  of  February,  prohibiting 
forever,  under  pain  of  death,  membership  in  any 
anti-foreign  society. 

(b)  Edicts  of  the  13th  and  21st  of  February, 
29th  of  April,  and  19th  of  August,  enumerating 
the  punishments  inflicted  on  the  guilty, 


208  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

(c)  Edicts  of  the  19th  of  August,  1901,  pro- 
hibiting examinations  in  all  cities  where  foreign- 
ers were  massacred  or  subjected  to  cruel  treat- 
ment. 

(d)  Edict  of  the  1st  of  February,  1901,  declar- 
ing all  governors-general,  governors,  and  pro- 
vincial or  local  officials  responsible  for  order  in 
their  respective  districts,  and  that  in  case  of  new 
anti-foreign  troubles  or  other  infractions  of  the 
treaties   which   shall   not   be   immediately   re- 
pressed, these  officials  shall  immediately  be  dis- 
missed, without  possibility  of  being  given  new 
functions  or  new  honours. 

The  posting  of  these  edicts  is  being  carried  on 
throughout  the  Empire. 

ARTICLE  XI 

The  Chinese  Government  has  agreed  to  nego- 
tiate the  amendments  deemed  necessary  by  the 
foreign  Governments  to  the  treaties  of  com- 
merce and  navigation  and  the  other  subjects 
concerning  commercial  relations,  with  the  ob- 
ject of  facilitating  them. 

At  present,  and  as  a  result  of  the  stipulation 
contained  in  Article  VI  concerning  the  indem- 
nity, the  Chinese  Government  agrees  to  assist 
in  the  improvement  of  the  courses  of  the  rivers 
Peiho  and  Whangpu,  as  stated  below. 

(a)  The  works  for  the  improvement  of  the 
navigability  of  the  Peiho,  begun  in  1898,  with 
the  cooperation  of  the  Chinese  Government, 
have  been  resumed  under  the  direction  of  an 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  209 

international  Commission.  As  soon  as  the  ad- 
ministration of  Tientsin  shall  have  been  handed 
back  to  the  Chinese  Government,  it  will  be  in  a 
position  to  be  represented  on  this  Commission, 
and  will  pay  each  year  a  sum  of  sixty  thousand 
Haikwan  taels  for  maintaining  the  works. 

(b)  A  conservancy  Board,  charged  with  the 
management  and  control  of  the  works  for 
straightening  the  Whangpu  and  the  improve- 
ment of  the  course  of  that  river,  is  hereby 
created. 

This  Board  shall  consist  of  members  repre- 
senting the  interests  of  the  Chinese  Government 
and  those  of  foreigners  in  the  shipping  trade  of 
Shanghai.  The  expenses  incurred  for  the  works 
and  the  general  management  of  the  undertaking 
are  estimated  at  the  annual  sum  of  four  hun- 
dred and  sixty  thousand  Haikwan  taels  for  the 
first  twenty  years.  This  sum  shall  be  supplied 
in  equal  portions  by  the  Chinese  Government 
and  the  foreign  interests  concerned.  Detailed 
stipulations  concerning  the  composition,  duties, 
and  revenues  of  the  conservancy  Board  are  em- 
bodied in  annex  hereto. 


ARTICLE  XII 

An  Imperial  Edict  of  the  24th  of  July,  1901, 
reformed  the  Office  of  foreign  affairs  (Tsungli 
Yamen),  on  the  lines  indicated  by  the  Powers, 
that  is  to  say,  transformed  it  into  a  Ministry  of 
foreign  affairs  (Wai-wu  Pu),  which  takes  pre- 
cedence over  the  six  other  Ministries  of  the 


210  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

State.  The  same  edict  appointed  the  principal 
members  of  this  Ministry. 

An  agreement  has  also  been  reached  concern- 
ing the  modification  of  Court  ceremonial  as  re- 
gards the  reception  of  foreign  Representatives 
and  has  been  the  subject  of  several  notes  from 
the  Chinese  Plenipotentiaries,  the  substance  of 
which  is  embodied  in  a  memorandum  herewith 
annexed. 

Finally,  it  is  expressly  understood  that  as  re- 
gards the  declarations  specified  above  and  the 
annexed  documents  originating  with  the  for- 
eign Plenipotentiaries,  the  French  text  only  is 
authoritative. 

The  Chinese  Government  having  thus  com- 
plied to  the  satisfaction  of  the  Powers  with  the 
conditions  laid  down  in  the  above-mentioned 
note  of  December  22d,  1900,  the  Powers  have 
agreed  to  accede  to  the  wishes  of  China  to  ter- 
minate the  situation  created  by  the  disorders  of 
the  summer  of  1900.  In  consequence  thereof 
the  foreign  Plenipotentiaries  are  authorized  to 
declare  in  the  name  of  their  Governments  that, 
with  the  exception  of  the  legation  guards  men- 
tioned in  Article  VII,  the  international  troops 
will  completely  evacuate  the  city  of  Peking  on 
the  17th  of  September,  1901,  and,  with  the  ex- 
ception of  the  localities  mentioned  in  Article  IX, 
will  withdraw  from  the  province  of  Chihli  on  the 
22d  of  September. 

The  present  final  Protocol  has  been  drawn  up 
in  twelve  identic  copies  and  signed  by  all  the 
Plenipotentiaries  of  the  Contracting  Countries. 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 


211 


One  copy  shall  be  given  to  each  of  the  foreign 
Plenipotentiaries,  and  one  copy  shall  be  given  to 
the  Chinese  Plenipotentiaries. 


Peking,  7th  September,  1901. 


A.  V.  MUMM. 

M.  CZIKANN. 
JOOSTENS. 

B.  J.  DE  COLOGAN. 
W.  W.  ROCKHIUU 

BEAU. 


ERNEST  SATOW. 
SALVAGO  RAGGI. 
JUTARO  KOMURA. 
F.  M.  KNOBEL. 
M.  DE  GIERS. 


Signatures 

and 
seals  of 
Chinese 

Plenipoten- 
tiaries. 


THE  HAY  DOCTRINE:  THE  HAY-VON 
BULOW  CORRESPONDENCE 

Mr.  Hay,  American  Secretary  of  State,  to  Mr. 
White,  American  Ambassador  to  Germany : 


SIR: 


Department  of  State, 
Washington,  September  6, 


At  the  time  when  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  was  informed  by  that  of  Germany 
that  it  had  leased  from  His  Majesty  the  Em- 
peror of  China  the  port  of  Kiaochow  and  the 
adjacent  territory  in  the  province  of  Shantung, 
assurances  were  given  to  the  Ambassador  of  the 
United  States  at  Berlin  by  the  Imperial  German 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  that  the  rights  and 
privileges  insured  by  treaties  with  China  to  citi- 
zens of  the  United  States  would  not  thereby 


212  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

suffer  or  be  in  any  wise  impaired  within  the  area 
over  which  Germany  had  thus  obtained  control. 

More  recently,  however,  the  British  Govern- 
ment recognized  by  a  formal  agreement  with 
Germany  the  exclusive  right  of  the  latter  coun- 
try to  enjoy  in  said  leased  area  and  the  contigu- 
ous "  sphere  of  influence  or  interest "  certain 
privileges,  more  especially  those  relating  to  rail- 
roads and  mining  enterprises;  but,  as  the  exact 
nature  and  extent  of  the  rights  thus  recognized 
have  not  been  clearly  defined,  it  is  possible  that 
serious  conflicts  of  interests  may  at  any  time 
arise,  not  only  between  British  and  German  sub- 
jects within  said  area,  but  that  the  interests  of 
our  citizens  may  also  be  jeopardized  thereby. 

Earnestly  desirous  to  remove  any  cause  of 
irritation  and  to  insure  at  the  same  time  to  the 
commerce  of  all  nations  in  China  the  undoubted 
benefits  which  should  accrue  from  a  formal  rec- 
ognition by  the  various  Powers  claiming 
"  spheres  of  interest  "  that  they  shall  enjoy  per- 
fect equality  of  treatment  for  their  commerce 
and  navigation  within  such  "  spheres,"  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  would  be  pleased 
to  see  His  German  Majesty's  Government  give 
formal  assurances,  and  lend  its  cooperation  in 
securing  like  assurances  from  the  other  inter- 
ested Powers,  that  each  within  its  respective 
sphere  of  whatever  influence — 

First.  Will  in  no  way  interfere  with  any 
treaty  port  or  any  vested  interest  within  any  so- 
called  "  sphere  of  interest "  or  leased  territory 
it  may  have  in  China. 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  213 

Second.  That  the  Chinese  treaty  tariff  of  the 
time  being  shall  apply  to  all  merchandise  landed 
or  shipped  to  all  such  ports  as  are  within  said 
"  sphere  of  interest  "  (they  be  "  free  ports  "), 
no  matter  to  what  nationality  it  may  belong, 
and  that  duties  so  leviable  shall  be  collected  by 
the  Chinese  Government. 

Third.  That  it  will  levy  no  higher  dues  on 
vessels  of  another  nationality  frequenting  any 
port  in  such  "  sphere  "  than  shall  be  levied  on 
vessels  of  its  own  nationality,  and  no  higher  rail- 
road charges  over  lines*  built,  controlled,  or  op- 
erated within  its  "  sphere  "  on  merchandise  be- 
longing to  citizens  or  subjects  of  other  nationali- 
ties transported  through  such  "  sphere  "  than 
shall  be  levied  on  similar  merchandise  belonging 
to  its  own  nationals  transported  over  equal  dis- 
tances. 

The  liberal  policy  pursued  by  His  Imperial 
German  Majesty  in  declaring  Kiaochow  a  free 
port  and  in  aiding  the  Chinese  Government  in 
the  establishment  there  of  a  custom-house  are 
so  clearly  in  line  with  the  proposition  which  this 
Government  is  anxious  to  see  recognized  that 
it  entertains  the  strongest  hope  that  Germany 
will  give  its  acceptance  and  hearty  support. 

The  recent  Ukase  of  His  Majesty  the  Em- 
peror of  Russia  declaring  the  port  of  Ta-lien- 
wan  open  during  the  whole  of  the  lease  under 
which  it  is  held  from  China  to  the  merchant 
ships  of  all  nations,  coupled  with  the  categorical 
assurances  made  to  this  Government  by  His  Im- 
perial Majesty's  representative  at  this  capital  at 


214  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

1 

the  time,  and  since  repeated  to  me  by  the  pres- 
ent Russian  Ambassador,  seem  to  insure  sup- 
port of  the  Emperor  to  the  proposal  measure. 
Our  Ambassador  at  the  Court  of  St.  Petersburg 
has  in  consequence  been  instructed  to  submit  it 
to  the  Russian  Government  and  to  request  their 
early  consideration  of  it.  A  copy  of  my  instruc- 
tion on  the  subject  to  Mr.  Tower  is  herewith 
enclosed  for  your  confidential  information. 

The  commercial  interests  of  Great  Britain 
and  Japan  will  be  so  clearly  served  by  the  de- 
sired declaration  of  intentions,  and  the  views  of 
the  Governments  of  these  countries  as  to  the 
desirability  of  the  adoption  of  measures  insuring 
the  benefits  of  equality  of  treatment  of  all  for- 
eign trade  throughout  China  are  so  similar  to 
those  entertained  by  the  United  States,  that 
their  acceptance  of  the  proposition  herein  out- 
lined and  their  cooperation  in  advocating  their 
adoption  by  the  other  Powers  can  be  confidently 
expected.  I  enclose  herewith  copy  of  the  in- 
struction which  I  have  sent  to  Mr.  Choate  on 
the  subject. 

In  view  of  the  present  favourable  conditions, 
you  are  instructed  to  submit  the  above  con- 
siderations to  His  Imperial  German  Majesty's 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  and  to  request  his 
early  consideration  of  the  subject 

Copy  of  this  instruction  is  sent  to  our  Ambas- 
sadors at  London  and  at  St.  Petersburg  for  their 
information. 

I  have,  etc. 

JOHN  HAY. 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  215 

Count  von  Btilow,  His  Imperial  German  Maj- 
esty's Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  Mr. 
White: 

(Translation.) 

Foreign  Office, 
Berlin,  February  19,  jpoo. 
MR.  AMBASSADOR: 

Your  Excellency  informed  me,  in  a  memoran- 
dum presented  on  the  24th  of  last  month,  that 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  of 
America  had  received  satisfactory  replies  from 
all  the  Powers  to  which  an  inquiry  had  been  ad- 
dressed similar  to  that  contained  in  Your  Excel- 
lency's note  of  September  26th  last,  in  regard  to 
the  policy  of  the  open  door  in  China.  While 
referring  to  this,  Your  Excellency  thereupon 
expressed  the  wish  that  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment would  now  also  give  its  answer  in  writing. 

Gladly  complying  with  this  wish,  I  have  the 
honour  to  inform  Your  Excellency,  repeating 
the  statements  already  made  verbally,  as  fol- 
lows: As  recognized  by  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  according  to  Your 
Excellency's  note  referred  to  above,  the  Impe- 
rial Government  has,  from  the  beginning,  not 
only  asserted,  but  also  practically  carried  out  to 
the  fullest  extent  in  its  Chinese  possessions  ab- 
solute equality  of  treatment  of  all  nations  with 
regard  to  trade,  navigation,  and  commerce.  The 
Imperial  Government  entertains  no  thought  of 
departing  in  the  future  from  this  principle, 
which  at  once  excludes  any  prejudicial  or  disad- 
vantageous commercial  treatment  of  the  citi- 


216  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

zens  of  the  United  States  of  America,  so  long  as 
it  is  not  forced  to  do  so,  on  account  of  consid- 
erations of  reciprocity,  by  a  divergence  from  it 
by  other  governments.  If,  therefore,  the  other 
Powers  interested  in  the  industrial  development 
of  the  Chinese  Empire  are  willing  to  recognize 
the  same  principle,  this  can  only  be  desired  by 
the  Imperial  Government,  which  in  this  case 
upon  being  requested  will  gladly  be  ready  to 
participate  with  the  United  States  of  America 
and  the  other  Powers  in  an  agreement  made 
upon  these  lines,  by  which  the  same  rights  are 
reciprocally  secured. 
I  avail  myself,  etc. 

BttLOW. 


E 

THE  ANGLO- JAPANESE  ALLIANCES 
(ist)  Agreement,  Concluded  January  30,  1902 

Article  I. — The  High  Contracting  Parties, 
having  mutually  recognized  the  independence 
of  China  and  Korea,  declare  themselves  to  be 
entirely  uninfluenced  by  any  aggressive  tenden- 
cies in  either  country.  Having  in  view,  how- 
ever, their  special  interests,  of  which  those  of 
Great  Britain  relate  principally  to  China,  while 
Japan,  in  addition  to  the  interests  which  she 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  217 

possesses  in  China,  is  interested  in  a  peculiar 
degree  politically,  as  well  as  commercially  and 
industrially,  in  Korea,  the  High  Contracting 
Parties  recognize  that  it  will  be  admissible  for 
either  of  them  to  take  such  measures  as  may  be 
indispensable  in  order  to  safeguard  those  inter- 
ests if  threatened  either  by  the  aggressive  action 
of  any  other  Power,  or  by  disturbances  arising 
in  China  or  Korea,  and  necessitating  the  inter- 
vention of  either  of  the  High  Contracting 
Parties  for  the  protection  of  the  lives  and  prop- 
erty of  its  subjects. 

Article  II. — If  either  Great  Britain  or  Japan, 
in  the  defense  of  their  respective  interests  as 
above  described,  should  become  involved  in  war 
with  another  Power,  the  other  High  Contract- 
ing Party  will  maintain  a  strict  neutrality,  and 
use  its  efforts  to  prevent  others  from  joining  in 
hostilities  against  its  ally. 

Article  III. — If,  in  the  above  event,  any  other 
Power  or  Powers  should  join  in  hostilities 
against  that  Ally,  the  other  High  Contracting 
Party  will  come  to  its  assistance,  and  will  con- 
duct the  war  in  common,  and  will  make  peace  in 
mutual  agreement  with  it. 

Article  IV.— The  High  Contracting  Parties 
agree  that  neither  of  them  will,  without  consult- 
ing the  other,  enter  into  separate  arrangements 
with  another  Power  to  the  prejudice  of  the  in- 
terests above  described. 

Article  V. — Whenever,  in  the  opinion  of  either 
Great  Britain  or  Japan,  the  above-mentioned  in- 
terests are  in  jeopardy  the  two  Governments 


218  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

will   communicate  with   each  other   fully   and 
frankly. 

Article  VI.  —  The  present  Agreement  shall 
come  into  effect  immediately  after  the  date  of  its 
signature,  and  remain  in  force  for  five  years 
from  that  date.  In  case  neither  of  the  High 
Contracting  Parties  should  have  notified  twelve 
months  before  the  expiration  of  the  said  five 
years  the  intention  of  terminating  it,  it  shall  re- 
main binding  until  the  expiration  of  one  year 
from  the  day  on  which  either  of  the  High  Con- 
tracting Parties  shall  have  denounced  it.  But 
if,  when  the  date  fixed  for  its  expiration  arrives, 
either  ally  is  actually  engaged  in  war,  the  Alli- 
ance shall,  ipso  facto,  continue  until  peace  is  con- 
cluded. 


Signed  at  London  August  12,  1905 
The  Marquess  of  Lansdowne  to  Sir  C.  Har-< 
dinge  : 

Foreign  Office,  September  6,  1905. 
SIR: 

I  inclose,  for  your  Excellency's  information, 
a  copy  of  a  new  Agreement  concluded  between 
His  Majesty's  Government  and  that  of  Japan  in 
substitution  for  that  of  the  30th  of  January, 
1902.  You  will  take  an  early  opportunity  of 
communicating  the  new  Agreement  to  the  Rus- 
sian Government. 

It  was  signed  on  the  12th  August,  and  you 
will  explain  that  it  would  have  been  immedi- 
ately made  public  but  for  the  fact  that  negotia- 
tions had  at  that  time  already  commenced  be- 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  219 

tween  Russia  and  Japan,  and  that  the  publication 
of  such  a  document  whilst  those  negotiations 
were  still  in  progress  would  obviously  have  been 
improper  and  inopportune. 

The  Russian  Government  will,  I  trust,  recog- 
nize that  the  new  Agreement  is  an  international 
instrument  to  which  no  exception  can  be  taken 
by  any  of  the  Powers  interested  in  the  affairs  of 
the  Far  East.  You  should  call  special  attention 
to  the  objects  mentioned  in  the  preamble  as 
those  by  which  the  policy  of  the  Contracting 
Parties  is  inspired.  His  Majesty's  Government 
believed  that  they  may  count  upon  the  good  will 
and  support  of  all  the  Powers  in  endeavouring 
to  maintain  peace  in  Eastern  Asia  and  in  seek- 
ing to  uphold  the  integrity  and  independence  of 
the  Chinese  Empire  and  the  principle  of  equal 
opportunities  for  the  commerce  and  industry  of 
all  nations  in  that  country. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  special  interests  of  the 
Contracting  Parties  are  of  a  kind  upon  which 
they  are  fully  entitled  to  insist,  and  the  an- 
nouncement that  those  interests  must  be  safe- 
guarded is  one  which  can  create  no  surprise,  and 
need  give  rise  to  no  misgivings. 

I  call  your  special  attention  to  the  wording  of 
Article  II,  which  lays  down  distinctly  that  it  is 
only  in'  the  case  of  an  unprovoked  attack  made 
on  one  of  the  Contracting  Parties  by  another 
Power  or  Powers,  and  when  that  Party  is  de- 
fending its  territorial  rights  and  special  interests 
from  aggressive  action,  that  the  other  Party  is 
bound  to  come  to  its  assistance. 


220  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

Article  III,  dealing  with  the  question  of 
Korea,  is  deserving  of  special  attention.  It  rec- 
ognizes in  the  clearest  terms  the  paramount  po- 
sition which  Japan  at  this  moment  occupies  and 
must  henceforth  occupy  in  Korea,  and  her  right 
to  take  any  measures  which  she  may  find  neces- 
sary for  the  protection  of  her  political,  military, 
and  economic  interests  in  that  country.  It  is, 
however,  expressly  provided  that  such  measures 
must  not  be  contrary  to  the  principle  of  equal 
opportunities  for  the  commerce  and  industry  of 
other  nations.  The  new  treaty  no  doubt  differs 
at  this  point  conspicuously  from  that  of  1902. 
It  has,  however,  become  evident  that  Korea, 
owing  to  its  close  proximity  to  the  Japanese 
Empire  and  inability  to  stand  alone,  must  fall 
under  the  control  and  tutelage  of  Japan. 

His  Majesty's  Government  observe  with  sat- 
isfaction that  this  point  was  readily  conceded  by 
Russia  in  the  Treaty  of  Peace  recently  con- 
cluded with  Japan,  and  they  have  every  reason 
to  believe  that  similar  views  are  held  by  other 
Powers  with  regard  to  the  relations  which 
should  subsist  between  Japan  and  Korea. 

His  Majesty's  Government  venture  to  antici- 
pate that  the  alliance  thus  concluded,  desig- 
nated as  it  is  with  objects  which  are  purely 
peaceful  and  for  the  protection  of  rights  and  in- 
terests the  validity  of  which  cannot  be  con- 
tested, will  be  regarded  with  approval  by  the 
Government  to  which  you  are  accredited.  They 
are  justified  in  believing  that  its  conclusion  may 
not  have  been  without  effect  in  facilitating  the 


DOCUMENTS  IK  THE  CASE  221 

Settlement  by  which  the  war  has  been  so  hap- 
pily brought  to  an  end,  and  they  earnestly  trust 
that  it  may,  for  many  years  to  come,  be  instru- 
mental in  securing  the  peace  of  the  world  in 
those  regions  which  come  within  its  scope. 
I  am,  etc. 

( Signed)  LANDSDOWNE. 


r(Inclosure.) 

AGREEMENT  BETWEEN  THE  UNITED 
KINGDOM  AND  JAPAN 

Signed  at  London,  August  12,  1905 

(Preamble) 

The  Governments  of  Great  Britain  and  Japan, 
being  desirous  of  replacing  the  Agreement  con- 
cluded between  them  on  the  30th  January, 
1902,  by  fresh  stipulations,  have  agreed  upon  the 
following  Articles  which  have  for  their  objects : 

(a)  The  consolidation  and   maintenance   of 
the  general  peace  in  the  regions  of  Eastern  Asia 
and  of  India ; 

(b)  The  preservation  of  the  common  interest 
of  all  Powers  in  China  by  insuring  the  independ- 
ence and  integrity  of  the  Chinese  Empire  and 
the  principle  of  equal  opportunities  for  the  com- 
merce and  industry  of  all  nations  in  China; 

(c)  The  maintenance  of  the  territorial  rights 
of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  in  the  regions 


222  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

of  Eastern  Asia  and  of  India,  and  the  defense  of 
their  special  interests  in  the  said  regions : 

Article  L — It  is  agreed  that  whenever,  in  the 
opinion  of  either  Great  Britain  or  Japan,  any  of 
the  rights  and  interests  referred  to  in  the  pre- 
amble of  this  Agreement  are  in  jeopardy,  the 
two  Governments  will  communicate  with  one 
another  fully  and  frankly,  and  will  consider  in 
common  the  measures  which  should  be  taken  to 
safeguard  those  menaced  rights  or  interests. 

Article  II. — If  by  reason  of  unprovoked  attack 
or  aggressive  action,  wherever  arising,  on  the 
part  of  any  other  Power  or  Powers  either  Con- 
tracting Party  should  be  involved  in  war  in  de- 
fense of  its  territorial  rights  or  special  interests 
mentioned  in  the  preamble  of  this  Agreement, 
the  other  Contracting  Party  will  at  once  come 
to  the  assistance  of  its  ally,  and  will  conduct  the 
war  in  common,  and  make  peace  in  mutual 
agreement  with  it. 

Article  III. — Japan  possessing  paramount  po- 
litical, military  and  economic  interests  in  Korea, 
Great  Britain  recognizes  the  right  of  Japan  to 
take  such  measures  of  guidance,  control,  and 
protection  in  Korea  as  she  may  deem  proper 
and  necessary  to  safeguard  and  advance  those 
interests,  provided  always  that  such  measures 
are  not  contrary  to  the  principle  of  equal  oppor- 
tunities for  the  commerce  and  industry  of  all 
nations. 

Article  IF. — Great  Britain  having  a  special  in- 
terest in  all  that  concerns  the  security  of  the 
Indian  frontier,  Japan  recognizes  her  right  to 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  223 

take  such  measures  in  the  proximity  of  that 
frontier  as  she  may  find  necessary  for  safeguard- 
ing her  Indian  possessions. 

Article  V.— The  High  Contracting  Parties 
agree  that  neither  of  them  will,  without  consult- 
ing the  other,  enter  into  separate  arrangements 
with  another  Power  to  the  prejudice  of  the  ob- 
jects described  in  the  preamble  of  this  Agree- 
ment 

Article  VI. — As  regards  the  present  war  be- 
tween Japan  and  Russia,  Great  Britain  will  con- 
tinue to  maintain  strict  neutrality  unless  some 
other  Power  or  Powers* should  join  in  hostilities 
against  Japan,  in  which  case  Great  Britain  will 
come  to  the  assistance  of  Japan,  and  will  con- 
duct the  war  in  common,  and  make  peace  in 
mutual  agreement  with  Japan. 

Article  VIL — The  conditions  under  which 
armed  assistance  shall  be  afforded  by  either 
Power  to  the  other  in  the  circumstances  men- 
tioned in  the  present  Agreement,  and  the  means 
by  which  such  assistance  is  to  be  made  available, 
will  be  arranged  by  the  Naval  and  Military 
authorities  of  the  Contracting  Parties,  who  will 
from  time  to  time  consult  one  another  fully  and 
freely  upon  all  questions  of  mutual  interest. 

Article  VIII. — The  present  Agreement  shall, 
subject  to  the  provisions  of  Article  VI,  come  into 
effect  immediately  after  the  date  of  its  signature, 
and  remain  in  force  for  ten  years  from  that  date. 

In  case  neither-  of  the  High  Contracting 
Parties  should  have  notified  twelve  months  be- 
fore the  expiration  of  the  said  ten  years  the  in- 


224  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

tention  of  terminating  it,  it  shall  remain  bind- 
ing until  the  expiration  of  one  year  from  the 
day  on  which  either  of  the  High  Contracting 
Parties  shall  have  denounced  it.  But  if,  when 
the  date  fixed  for  its  expiration  arrives,  either 
ally  is  actually  engaged  in  war,  the  alliance 
shall,  ipso  facto,  continue  until  peace  is  concluded. 

In  faith  whereof  the  Undersigned,  duly 
authorized  by  their  respective  Governments, 
have  signed  this  Agreement  and  have  affixed 
thereto  their  Seals. 

Done  in  duplicate  at  London,  the  12th  day 
of  August,  1905. 

(L.  S.)  LANDSDOWNE, 

His  Britannic  Majesty's  Principal  Secretary  of  State 
for  Foreign  Affairs. 

(L.  S.)  TADASU  HAYASHI, 

Envoy  Extraordinary  and  Minister  Plenipotentiary  of 
His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Japan  at  the  Court 
of  St.  James. 


Alliance  Treaty  Signed  July  Jj, 

(Preamble) 

The  Government  of  Japan  and  the  Govern- 
ment of  Great  Britain  having  in  view  the  im- 
portant changes  which  have  taken  place  in  the 
situation  since  the  conclusion  of  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  Agreement  of  August  12,  1905,  and 
believing  that  the  revision  of  that  Agreement 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  225 

responding  to  such  changes  would  contribute  to 
general  stability  and  repose,  have  agreed  upon 
the  following  stipulations  to  replace  the  Agree- 
ment above  mentioned,  such  stipulations  hav- 
ing the  same  object  as  the  said  Agreement, 
namely : — 

A. — The  consolidation  and  maintenance  of 
the  general  peace  in  the  regions  of  Eastern  Asia 
and  India. 

B. — The  preservation  of  the  common  in- 
terests of  all  the  Powers  in  China  by  insuring 
the  independence  and  integrity  of  the  Chinese 
Empire  and  the  principle  of  equal  opportunities 
for  the  commerce  and  industry  of  all  nations  in 
China. 

C. — The  maintenance  of  the  territorial  rights 
of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  in  the  regions 
of  Eastern  Asia  and  of  India  and  the  defense  of 
their  special  interests  on  those  regions: — 

Article  I. — It  is  agreed  that  whenever,  in  the 
opinion  of  either  Japan  or  Great  Britain,  any 
of  the  rights  and  interests  referred  to  in  the 
preamble  of  this  Agreement  are  in  jeopardy,  the 
two  Governments  will  communicate  with  one 
another  fully  and  frankly,  and  will  consider  in 
common  the  measures  which  should  be  taken  to 
safeguard  those  menaced  rights  and  interests. 

Article  //. — If  by  reason  of  an  unprovoked  at- 
tack or  aggressive  action,  wherever  arising,  on 
the  part  of  any  other  Power  or  Powers,  either 
of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  should  be  in- 
volved in  war  in  defense  of  its  territorial  rights 
or  special  interests  mentioned  in  the  preamble 


226  DOCUMENTS  IK  THE  CASE 

of  this  Agreement,  the  other  High  Contracting 
Party  will  at  once  come  to  the  assistance  of  its 
ally  and  will  conduct  the  war  in  common  and 
make  peace  in  mutual  agreement  with  it. 

Article  III. — The  High  Contracting  Parties 
agree  that  neither  of  them  will,  without  con- 
sulting the  other,  enter  into  a  separate  agree- 
ment with  another  Power  to  the  prejudice  of 
the  objects  described  in  the  preamble  of  this 
Agreement. 

Article  IV.— Should  either  of  the  High  Con- 
tracting Parties  conclude  a  treaty  of  general 
arbitration  with  a  third  Power,  it  is  agreed  that 
nothing  in  this  Agreement  shall  impose  on  such 
contracting  party  an  obligation  to  go  to  war 
with  the  Power  with  whom  such  an  arbitration 
treaty  is  in  force. 

Article  V. — The  conditions  under  which  armed 
assistance  shall  be  afforded  by  either  Power  to 
the  other  in  circumstances  entered  into  the 
present  Agreement,  and  the  means  by  which 
such  assistance  is  to  be  made  available,  will  be 
arranged  by  the  military  and  naval  authorities 
of  the  High  Contracting  Parties,  who  will  from 
time  to  time  consult  one  another  fully  and 
frankly  upon  all  questions  of  mutual  interests. 

Article  VI. — The  present  Agreement  shall 
come  into  effect  immediately  after  the  date  of 
its  signature,  and  remain  in  force  for  ten  years 
from  that  date  (same  proviso  as  first  Agree- 
ment as  to  expiry). 

In  faith  whereof  the  undersigned,  duly 
authorized  by  their  respective  Governments, 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  227 

have  signed  this  Agreement  and  have  affixed 
their  seals  thereto. 

Done  at  London,  July  13,  1911. 

T.  KATO, 

The  Ambassador  of  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  o£ 
Japan  at  the  Court  of  St.  James. 

EDWARD  GREY, 
H.  B.  M.'s  Secretary  o£  State  fot  Foreign  Affairs. 


SENATE  RESOLUTION  103 

64th  Congress,  ist  Session 

IN  THE  SENATE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 
February  21,  ipi6 

Mr.  Stone  submitted  the  following  resolu- 
tion, which  was  considered  and  agreed  to.1 

RESOLUTION 

Resolved,  That  the  President  be  requested,  if 
not  incompatible  with  the  public  interests,  to 
transmit  to  the  Senate  the  correspondence,  or 
so  much  thereof  as  in  his  opinion  may  be  made 
public,  had  between  the  official  representatives 
of  the  Government  of  the  United  States  and  the 
representatives  of  the  Government  of  Korea  re- 

1  Senator  Stone  of  Missouri  was  the  Chairman  of  the 
Committee  on  Foreign  Relations. 


228  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

lating  to  the  occupation  of  Korea  and  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  protectorate  over  said  country  by 
Japan  during,  or  as  an  incident  of,  the  Russian- 
Japanese  War  of  nineteen  hundred  and  four  and 
nineteen  hundred  and  five. 


MESSAGE  FROM  THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE 
UNITED  STATES 

To  the  Senate: 

In  response  to  the  resolution  adopted  by 
the  Senate  on  February  21,  1916,  requesting 
the  President,  if  not  incompatible  with  the  pub- 
lic interests,  to  transmit  to  the  Senate  the  corre- 
spondence, or  so  much  thereof  as  in  his  opinion 
may  be  made  public,  had  between  the  official 
representatives  of  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  and  the  representatives  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  Korea,  relating  to  the  occupation  of 
Korea  and  the  establishment  of  a  protectorate 
over  said  country  by  Japan,  during,  or  as  an 
incident  of,  the  Russian-Japanese  War  of 
1904-05,  I  transmit  herewith  a  report  by  the 
Secretary  of  State  on  this  subject. 

The  report  of  the  Secretary  of  State  has  my 
approval. 

WOODROW  WILSON. 
The  White  House, 
Washington,  February  23,  1916. 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  229 

H 

TREATY  BETWEEN  THE  UNITED  STATES 
AND  CORE  A 

Peace,  Amity,  Commerce,  and  Navigation 

Signed  at  Yin-Chuen  (Gensan),  May  22, 1882. 

Ratification  advised  by  the  Senate,  January 
9,  1883. 

Ratified  by  the  President,  February  13,  1883. 

Ratifications  exchanged  at  Seoul,  May  19, 
1883. 

Proclaimed,  June  4, 1883. 

BY  THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED    " 
STATES  OF  AMERICA 

A  PROCLAMATION 

Whereas  a  treaty  of  peace  and  amity  and 
commerce  and  navigation  between  the  United 
States  of  America  and  the  Kingdom  of  Corea 
or  Chosen  was  concluded  on  the  twenty-second 
day  of  May,  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and 
eighty-two,  the  original  of  which  treaty  being 
in  the  English  and  Chinese  languages  is  word 
for  word  as  follows : 

TREATY  BETWEEN  THE  UNITED  STATES 

OF  AMERICA  AND  THE  KINGDOM 

OF  CHOSEN 

The  United  States  of  America  and  the  King- 
dom of  Chosen,  being  sincerely  desirous  of 
establishing  permanent  relations  of  amity  and 


230  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

friendship  between  their  respective  peoples, 
have  to  this  end  appointed — that  is  to  say,  the 
President  of  the  United  States— -R.  W.  Shufeldt, 
Commodore  U.  S.  Navy,  as  his  Commissioner 
Plenipotentiary,  and  His  Majesty,  the  King  of 
Chosen,  Shin-Chen,  President  of  the  Royal 
Cabinet,  Chin-Hong-Chi,  member  of  the  Royal 
Cabinet,  as  his  Commissioners  Plenipotentiary, 
who,  having  reciprocally  examined  their  re- 
spective full  powers,  which  have  been  found  to 
be  in  due  form,  have  agreed  upon  the  several 
'following  articles: 

Article  I. — There  shall  be  perpetual  peace  and 
friendship  between  the  President  of  the  United 
States  and  the  King  of  Chosen  and  the  citizens 
and  subjects  of  their  respective  Governments. 

If  other  Powers  deal  unjustly  or  oppressively 
with  either  Government,  the  other  will  exert 
their  good  offices,  on  being  informed  of  the 
case,  to  bring  about  an  amicable  arrangement, 
thus  showing  their  friendly  feelings. 

Article  II. — After  the  conclusion  of  this  Treaty 
of  amity,  and  commerce,  the  High  Contract- 
ing Powers  may  each  appoint  Diplomatic  Rep- 
resentatives to  reside  at  the  Court  of  the  other, 
and  may  each  appoint  Consular  Representatives 
at  the  ports  of  the  other,  which  are  open  to  for- 
eign commerce,  at  their  own  convenience. 

These  officials  shall  have  relations  with. the 
corresponding  local  authorities  of  equal  rank 
upon  a  basis  of  mutual  equality. 

The  Diplomatic  and  Consular  Representa- 
tives of  the  two  Governments  shall  receive 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  231 

mutually  all  the  privileges,  rights  and  immuni- 
ties without  discrimination,  which  are  accorded 
to  the  same  classes  of  Representatives  from  the 
most  favoured  nation. 

Consuls  shall  exercise  their  functions  only  on 
receipt  of  an  exequatur  from  the  Government,  to 
which  they  are  accredited.  Consular  authori- 
ties shall  be  bona  fide  officials.  No  merchants 
shall  be  permitted  to  exercise  the  duties  of  the 
office,  nor  shall  Consular  officers  be  allowed  to 
engage  in  trade.  All  ports,  to  which  no  Con- 
sular Representatives  have  been  appointed,  the 
Consuls  of  other  Powers  may  be  invited  to  act, 
provided  that  no  merchant  shall  be  allowed  to 
assume  Consular  functions,  or  the  provisions  of 
this  Treaty  may,  in  such  cases,  be  enforced  by 
the  local  authorities. 

If  Consular  Representatives  of  the  United 
States  in  Chosen  conduct  their  business  in  an 
improper  manner,  their  exequatur  may  be  re- 
voked, subject  to  the  approval  previously  ob- 
tained of  the  Diplomatic  Representative  of  the 
United  States. 

Article  III. — Whenever  United  States  vessels, 
either  because  of  stress  of  weather,  or  by  want 
of  fuel  or  provisions,  cannot  reach  the  nearest 
open  port  in  Chosen,  they  may  enter  any  port 
or  harbour,  either  to  take  refuge  therein,  or  to 
get  supplies  of  wood,  coal  and  other  necessaries, 
or  to  make  repairs,  the  expenses  incurred 
thereby  being  defrayed  by  the  ship's  master. 
In  such  event  the  officers  and  people  of  the 
locality  shall  display  their  sympathy  by  render- 


232  DOCUMENTS  E*  THE  CASE 

ing  full  assistance,  and  their  liberality  by  fur- 
nishing the  necessities  required. 

If  a  United  States  vessel  carries  on  a  clandes- 
tine trade  at  a  port  not  open  to  foreign  com- 
merce, such  vessel  with  her  cargo  shall  be  seized 
and  confiscated. 

If  a  United  States  vessel  be  wrecked  on  the 
coast  of  Chosen,  the  local  authorities,  on  being 
informed  of  the  occurrence,  shall  immediately 
render  assistance  to  the  crew,  provide  for  their 
present  necessities,  and  take  the  measures  neces- 
sary for  the  salvage  of  the  ship  and  the  preserva- 
tion of  her  cargo.  They  shall  also  bring  the 
matter  to  the  knowledge  of  the  nearest  Con- 
sular Representative  of  the  United  States,  in 
order  that  steps  may  be  taken  to  send  the  crew 
home  and  to  save  the  ship  and  cargo.  The 
necessary  expenses  shall  be  defrayed  either  by 
the  ship's  master  or  by  the  United  States. 

Article  IV. — All  citizens  of  the  United  States 
of  America  in  Chosen,  peaceably  attending  to 
their  own  affairs,  shall  receive  and  enjoy  for 
themselves  and  everything  appertaining  to 
them,  the  protection  of  the  local  authorities  of 
the  Government  of  Chosen,  who  shall  defend 
them  from  all  insult  and  injury  of  any  sort.  If 
their  dwellings  or  property  be  threatened  or 
attacked  by  mobs,  incendiaries,  or  other  violent 
or  lawless  persons,  the  local  officers,  on  requisi- 
tion of  the  Consul,  shall  immediately  dispatch 
a  military  force  to  disperse  the  rioters,  appre- 
hend the  guilty  individuals,  and  punish  them 
with  the  utmost  rigour  of  the  law.  Subjects  of 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  233 

Chosen,  guilty  of  any  criminal  act  toward  citi- 
zens of  the  United  States,  shall  be  punished  by 
the  authorities  of  Chosen  according  to  the  laws 
of  Chosen;  and  citizens  of  the  United  States, 
either  on  shore  or  in  any  merchant-vessel,  who 
may  insult,  trouble  or  wound  the  persons  or  in- 
jure the  property  of  the  people  of  Chosen,  shall 
be  arrested  and  punished  only  by  the  Consul  or 
other  public  functionary  of  the  United  States 
thereto  authorized,  according  to  the  laws  of 
the  United  States. 

When  controversies  arise  in  the  Kingdom  of 
Chosen  between  citizens  of  the  United  States 
and  subjects  of  His  Majesty,  which  need  to  be 
examined  and  decided  by  the  public  officers  of 
the  two  nations,  it  is  agreed  between  the  two 
Governments  of  the  United  States  and  Chosen 
that  such  cases  shall  be  tried  by  the  proper  of- 
ficial of  the  nationality  of  the  defendant,  accord- 
ing to  the  laws  of  that  nation. 

The  properly  authorized  official  of  the  plain- 
tiff's nationality  shall  be  freely  permitted  to  at- 
tend the  trial,  and  shall  be  treated  with  the 
courtesy  due  to  his  position.  He  shall  be 
granted  all  proper  facilities  for  watching  the 
proceedings  in  the  interests  of  justice.  If  he  so 
desires,  he  shall  have  the  right  to  be  present,  to 
examine  and  to  cross-examine  witnesses.  If  he 
is  dissatisfied  with  the  proceedings,  he  shall  be 
permitted  to  protest  against  them  in  detail. 

It  is,  however,  mutually  agreed  and  under- 
stood between  the  High  Contracting  Powers 
that  whenever  the  King  of  Chosen  shall  have 


234  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

so  far  modified  and  reformed  the  statutes  and 
judicial  procedure  of  his  Kingdom  that,  in  the 
judgment  of  the  United  States,  they  conform  to 
the  laws  and  course  of  justice  in  the  United 
States,  the  right  of  exterritorial  jurisdiction 
over  United  States  citizens  in  Chosen  shall  be 
abandoned,  and  thereafter  United  States  citi- 
zens, when  within  the  limits  of  the  Kingdom  of 
Chosen,  shall  be  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  native  authorities. 

Article  V. — Merchants  and  merchant-vessels 
of  Chosen  visiting  the  United  States  for  pur- 
poses of  traffic,  shall  pay  duties  and  tonnage 
dues  and  all  fees  according  to  the  Customs 
Regulations  of  the  United  States,  but  no  higher 
or  other  rates  of  duties  and  tonnage  dues  shall 
be  exacted  of  them  than  are  levied  upon  citizens 
of  the  United  States  or  upon  citizens  or  sub- 
jects of  the  most  favoured  nation. 

Merchants  and  merchant-vessels  of  the 
United  States  visiting  Chosen  for  purposes  of 
traffic  shall  pay  duties  upon  all  merchandise  im- 
ported and  exported.  The  authority  to  levy 
duties  is  of  right  vested  in  the  Government  of 
Chosen.  The  tariff  of  duties  upon  exports  and 
imports,  together  with  the  Customs  Regula- 
tions for  the  prevention  of  smuggling  and  other 
irregularities,  will  be  fixed  by  the  authorities  of 
Chosen  and  communicated  to  the  proper  officials 
of  the  United  States,  to  be  by  the  latter  notified 
to  their  citizens  and  duly  observed.  It  is,  how- 
ever, agreed  in  the  first  instance,  as  a  general 
measure,  that  the  tariff  upon  such  imports  as 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  236 

are  articles  of  daily  use  shall  not  exceed  an  ad 
valorem  duty  of  ten  per  centum;  that  the  tariff 
upon  such  imports  as  are  luxuries,  as,  for  in- 
stance, foreign  wines,  foreign  tobacco,  clocks 
and  watches,  shall  not  exceed  an  ad  valorem  duty 
of  thirty  per  centum,  and  that  native  produce 
exported  shall  pay  a  duty  not  to  exceed  five  per 
centum  ad  valorem.  And  it  is  further  agreed 
that  the  duty  upon  foreign  imports  shall  be  paid 
once  for  all  at  the  port  of  entry,  and  that  no 
other  dues,  duties,  fees,  taxes,  or  charges  of  any 
sort  shall  be  levied  upon- such  imports  either  in 
the  interior  of  Chosen  or  at  the  ports. 

United  States  merchant-vessels  entering  the 
ports  of  Chosen  shall  pay  tonnage  dues  at  the 
rate  of  five  mace  per  ton,  payable  once  in  three 
months  on  each  vessel,  according  to  the  Chinese 
calendar. 

Article  VI. — Subjects  of  Chosen  who  may  visit 
the  United  States  shall  be  permitted  to  reside 
and  to  rent  premises,  purchase  land,  or  to  con- 
struct residences  or  warehouses  in  all  parts  of 
the  country.  They  shall  be  freely  permitted  to 
pursue  their  various  callings  and  avocations, 
and  to  traffic  in  all  merchandise,  raw  and  manu- 
factured, that  is  not  declared  contraband  by  law. 

Citizens  of  the  United  States  who  may  resort 
to  the  ports  of  Chosen  which  are  open  to  for- 
eign commerce,  shall  be  permitted  to  reside  at 
such  open  ports  within  the  limits  of  the  con- 
cessions and  to  lease  buildings  or  land,  or  to 
construct  residences  or  warehouses  therein. 
They  shall  be  freely  permitted  to  pursue  their 


236"          DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

various  callings  and  avocations  within  the  limits 
of  the  port,  and  to  traffic  in  all  merchandise,  raw 
and  manufactured,  that  is  not  declared  contra- 
band by  law. 

No  coercion  or  intimidation  in  the  acquisi- 
tion of  land  or  buildings  shall  be  permitted,  and 
the  land-rent  as  fixed  by  the  authorities  of 
Chosen  shall  be  paid.  And  it  is  expressly 
agreed  that  land  so  acquired  in  the  open  ports 
of  Chosen  still  remain  an  integral  part  of  the 
Kingdom,  and  that  all  rights  of  jurisdiction  over 
persons  and  property  within  such  areas  remain 
vested  in  the  authorities  of  Chosen,  except  in 
so  far  as  such  rights  have  been  expressly  re- 
linquished by  this  Treaty. 

American  citizens  are  not  permitted  either  to 
transport  foreign  imports  to  the  interior  for 
sale,  or  to  proceed  thither  to  purchase  native 
produce.  Nor  are  they  permitted  to  transport 
native  produce  from  one  open  port  to  another 
open  port. 

Violation  of  this  rule  will  subject  such  mer- 
chandise to  confiscation,  and  the  merchants  of- 
fending will  be  handed  over  to  the  Consular 
Authorities  to  be  dealt  with. 

Article  VII. — The  Governments  of  the  United 
States  and  of  Chosen  mutually  agree  and  un- 
dertake that  subjects  of  Chosen  shall  not  be  per- 
mitted to  import  opium  into  any  of  the  ports 
of  the  United  States,  and  citizens  of  the  United 
States  shall  not  be  permitted  to  import  opium 
into  any  of  the  open  ports  of  Chosen,  to  trans- 
port it  from  one  open  port  to  another  open  port, 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  237 

or  to  traffic  in  it  in  Chosen.  This  absolute  pro- 
hibition which  extends  to  vessels  owned  by  the 
citizens  or  subjects  of  either  Power,  to  foreign 
vessels  employed  by  them,  and  to  vessels  owned 
by  the  citizens  or  subjects  of  either  Power  and 
employed  by  other  persons  for  the  transporta- 
tion of  opium,  shall  be  enforced  by  appropriate 
legislation  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  and 
of  Chosen,  and  offenders  against  it  shall  be 
severely  punished. 

Article  Fill. — Whenever  the  Government  of 
Chosen  shall  have  reason  to  apprehend  a 
scarcity  of  food  within  the  limits  of  the  King- 
dom, His  Majesty  may  by  Decree  temporarily 
prohibit  the  export  of  all  breadstuffs,  and  such 
Decree  shall  be  binding  on  all  citizens  of  the 
United  States  in  Chosen  upon  due  notice  having 
been  given  them  by  the  Authorities  of  Chosen 
through  the  proper  officers  of  the  United  States ; 
but  it  is  to  be  understood  that  the  exportation 
of  rice  and  breadstuffs  of  every  description  is 
prohibited  from  the  open  port  of  Yin-Chuen. 

Chosen  having  of  old  prohibited  the  exporta- 
tion of  red-ginseng,  if  citizens  of  the  United 
States  clandestinely  purchase  it  for  export,  it 
shall  be  confiscated  and  the  offenders  punished. 

Article  IX. — The  purchase  of  cannon,  small 
arms,  swords,  gunpowder,  shot  and  all  muni- 
tions of  war  is  permitted  only  to  officials  of  the 
Government  of  Chosen,  and  they  may  be  im- 
ported by  citizens  of  the  United  States  only  un- 
der a  written  permit  from  the  authorities  of 
Chosen.  If  these  articles  are  clandestinely  im- 


238  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  ' 

ported,  they  shall  be  confiscated  and  the  offend- 
ing parties  shall  be  punished. 

Article  X. — The  officers  and  people  of  either 
nation  residing  in  the  other  shall  have  the  right 
to  employ  natives  for  all  kinds  of  lawful  work. 

Should,  however,  subjects  of  Chosen,  guilty 
of  violations  of  the  laws  of  the  Kingdom,  or 
against  whom  any  action  has  been  brought,  con- 
ceal themselves  in  the  residences  or  warehouses 
of  United  States  citizens,  or  on  board  United 
States  merchant-vessels,  the  Consular  Authori- 
ties of  the  United  States,  on  being  informed  of 
the  fact  by  the  local  authorities,  will  either  per- 
mit the  latter  to  dispatch  constables  to  make 
the  arrests,  or  the  persons  will  be  arrested  by 
the  Consular  Authorities  and  handed  over  to 
the  local  constables. 

Officials  or  citizens  of  the  United  States  shall 
not  harbour  such  persons. 

Article  XL — Students  of  either  nationality 
who  may  proceed  to  the  country  of  the  other, 
in  order  to  study  the  language,  literature,  laws 
or  arts  shall  be  given  all  possible  protection  and 
assistance  in  evidence  of  cordial  good  will. 

Article  X//.— This,  being  the  first  Treaty 
negotiated  by  Chosen,  and  hence  being  general 
and  incomplete  in  its  provisions,  shall  in  the  first 
instance  be  put  into  operation  in  all  things 
stipulated  herein.  As  to  stipulations  not  con- 
tained herein,  after  an  interval  of  five  years, 
when  the  officers  and  people  of  the  two  Powers 
shallx  have  become  more  familiar  with  each 
other's  language,  a  further  negotiation  of  com- 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  239 

mercial  provisions  and  regulations  in  detail,  in 
conformity  with  international  law  and  without 
unequal  discrimination  on  either  part  shall  be 
had. 

Article  XIIL— This  Treaty,  and  future  official 
correspondence  between  the  two  contracting 
Governments  shall  be  made,  on  the  part  of 
Chosen,  in  the  Chinese  language. 

The  United  States  shall  either  use  the 
Chinese  language,  or,  if  English  be  used,  it  shall 
be  accompanied  with  a  Chinese  version,  in  order 
to  avoid  misunderstanding. 

Article  XIV.— The  High  Contracting  Powers 
hereby  agree  that,  should  at  any  time  the  King 
of  Chosen  grant  to  any  nation  or  to  the  mer- 
chants or  citizens  of  any  nation  any  right,  privi- 
lege or  favour,  connected  either  with  navigation, 
commerce,  political  or  other  intercourse,  which 
is  not  conferred  by  this  Treaty,  such  right,  privi- 
lege and  favour  shall  freely  inure  to  the  benefit 
of  the  United  States,  its  public  officers,  mer- 
chants and  citizens,  provided  always  that  when- 
ever such  right,  privilege  or  favour  is  accom- 
panied by  any  condition,  or  equivalent  con- 
cession granted  by  the  other  nation  interested, 
the  United  States,  its  officers  and  people  shall 
only  be  entitled  to  the  benefits  of  such  right, 
privilege  or  favour  upon  complying  with  the 
conditions  or  concessions  connected  there- 
with.- 

In  faith  whereof  the  respective  Commis- 
sioners Plenipotentiary  have  signed  and  sealed 
the  foregoing  at  Yin-Chuen  in  English  and 


240  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

Chinese,  being  three  originals  of  each  test  of 
even  tenor  and  date,  the  ratifications  of  which 
shall  be  exchanged  at  Yin-Chuen  within  one 
year  from  the  date  of  its  execution,  and  immedi- 
ately thereafter  this  Treaty  shall  be  in  all  its 
provisions  publicly  proclaimed  and  made  known 
by  both  Governments  in  their  respective  coun- 
tries, in  order  that  it  may  be  obeyed  by  their 
citizens  and  subjects  respectively. 

Chosen,  May,  the  22nd,  A.  D.  1882. 

[SEAL]     R.  W.  SHUFELDT,  Commodore,  U.  S.  N. 

Envoy  of  the  U.  S.  to  Chosen. 
[SEAL]     SHIN  CHEN,    CHIN  HONG  CHI, 

Members  of  the  Royal  Cabinet  of  Chosen^ 

And  whereas  the  Senate  of  the  United  States 
of  America  by  their  resolution  of  the  ninth  of 
January,  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and 
eighty-three  (two-thirds  of  the  Senators  present 
concurring),  did  advise  and  consent  to  the  rati- 
fication of  said  treaty  subject  to  the  condition 
following,  viz : 

Resolved,  That  it  is  the  understanding  of  the 
Senate  in  agreeing  to  the  foregoing  resolution, 
that  the  clause,  "  Nor  are  they  permitted  to 
transport  native  produce  from  one  open  port  to 
another  open  port,"  in  Article  VI  of  said  treaty, 
is  not  intended  to  prohibit  and  does  not  prohibit 
American  ships  from  going  from  one  open  port 
to  another  open  port  in  Corea  or  Chosen  to 
receive  Corean  cargo  for  exportation,  or  to  dis- 
charge foreign  cargo. 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  241 

And  whereas,  said  treaty  has  been  duly  rati- 
fied on  both  parts,  subject  to  said  condition, 
and  the  respective  ratifications  thereof  ex- 
changed. 

Now,  therefore,  be  it  known  that  I,  Chester  A. 
Arthur,  President  of  the  United  States  of  Amer- 
ica, have  caused  the  said  convention  to  be  made 
public,  to  the  end  that  the  same,  and  every 
clause  and  article  thereof,  may  be  observed  and 
fulfilled  with  good  faith  by  the  United  States 
and  the  citizens  thereof. 

In  witness  whereof  I  have  hereunto  set  my 
hand  and  caused  the  seal  of  the  United  States 
to  be  affixed. 

Done  at  the  city  of  Washington  this  Fourth 
day  of  June,  in  the  year  of  our  Lord  one  thou- 
sand eight  hundred  and  eighty-three  and  of  the 
Independence  of  the  United  States  of  America 
the  one  hundredth  and  seventh. 

CHESTER  A.  ARTHUR. 

By  the  President. 
FREDK.  T.  FRELINGHUYSEN, 
Secretary  of  State. 


PETITION  FROM  THE  KOREANS  OF 
HAWAII  TO  PRESIDENT  ROOSEVELT 

Honolulu,  T.  H.f 
July  12,  1905. 
To  His  EXCELLENCY, 

The  President  of  the  United  States. 
Your    Excellency, — The    undersigned    have 


242  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

been  authorized  by  the  8,000  Koreans  now  re- 
siding in  the  territory  of  Hawaii  at  a  special 
mass  meeting  held  in  the  city  of  Honolulu,  on 
July  12,  1905,  to  present  to  your  Excellency  the 
following  appeal: — 

We,  the  Koreans  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands, 
voicing  the  sentiments  of  twelve  millions  of  our 
countrymen,  humbly  lay  before  your  Excellency 
the  following  facts : — 

Soon  after  the  commencement  of  the  war  be- 
tween Russia  and  Japan,  our  Government  made 
a  treaty  of  alliance  with  Japan  for  offensive  and 
defensive  purposes.  By  virtue  of  this  treaty 
the  whole  of  Korea  was  opened  to  the  Japanese, 
and  both  the  Government  and  the  people  have 
been  assisting  the  Japanese  authorities  in  their 
military  operations  in  and  about  Korea. 

The  contents  of  this  treaty  are  undoubtedly 
known  to  your  Excellency,  therefore  we  need 
not  embody  them  in  this  appeal.  Suffice  it  to 
state,  however,  the  object  of  the  treaty  was  to 
preserve  the  independence  of  Korea  and  Japan 
and  to  protect  Eastern  Asia  from  Russia's  ag- 
gression. 

Korea,  in  return  for  Japan's  friendship  and 
protection  against  Russia,  has  rendered  services 
to  the  Japanese  by  permitting  them  to  use 
the  country  as  a  base  of  their  military  opera- 
tions. 

When  this  treaty  was  concluded,  the  Koreans 
fully  expected  that  Japan  would  introduce  re- 
forms into  the  governmental  administration 
along  the  line  of  the  modern  civilization  of 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  243 

Europe  and  America,  and  that  she  would  advise 
and  counsel  our  people  in  a  friendly  manner, 
but  to  our  disappointment  and  regret  the  Japa- 
nese Government  has  not  done  a  single  thing 
in  the  way  of  improving  the  condition  of  the 
Korean  people.  On  the  contrary,  she  turned 
loose  several  thousand  rough  and  disorderly 
men  of  her  nationals  in  Korea,  who  are  treating 
the  inoffensive  Koreans  in  a  most  outrageous 
manner.  The  Koreans  are  by  nature  not  a 
quarrelsome  or  aggressive  people,  but  deeply 
resent  the  high-handed  action  of  the  Japanese 
toward  them.  We  can  'scarcely  believe  that 
the  Japanese  Government  approves  the  out- 
rages committed  by  its  people  in  Korea,  but  it 
has  done  nothing  to  prevent  this  state  of  af- 
fairs. They  have  been,  during  the  last  eighteen 
months,  forcibly  obtaining  all  the  special  privi- 
leges and  concessions  from  our  Government,  so 
that  to-day  they  practically  own  everything  that 
is  worth  having  in  Korea. 

We,  the  common  people  of  Korea,  have  lost 
confidence  in  the  promises  Japan  made  at  the 
time  of  concluding  the  treaty  of  alliance,  and  we 
doubt  seriously  the  good  intentions  which  she 
professes  to  have  toward  our  people.  For 
geographical,  racial,  and  commercial  reasons  we 
want  to  be  friendly  to  Japan,  and  we  are  even 
willing  to  have  her  as  our  guide  and  example 
in  the  matters  of  internal  reforms  and  educa- 
tion, but  the  continuous  policy  of  self-exploita- 
tion at  the  expense  of  the  Koreans  has  shaken 
our  confidence  in  her,  and  we  are  now  afraid 


244  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

that  she  will  not  keep  her  promise  of  preserving 
our  independence  as  a  nation,  nor  assisting  us 
in  reforming  internal  administration.  In  other 
words,  her  policy  in  Korea  seems  to  be  ex- 
actly the  same  as  that  of  Russia  prior  to  the 
war. 

The  United  States  has  many  interests  in  our 
country.  The  industrial,  commercial,  and  re- 
ligious enterprises  under  American  manage- 
ment, have  attained  such  proportions  that  we 
believe  the  Government  and  people  of  the 
United  States  ought  to  know  the  true  conditions 
of  Korea  and  the  result  of  the  Japanese  becom- 
ing paramount  in  our  country.  We  know  that 
the  people  of  America  love  fair  play  and  advo- 
cate justice  toward  all  men.  We  also  know 
that  your  Excellency  is  the  ardent  exponent  of 
a  square  deal  between  individuals  as  well  as 
nations,  therefore  we  come  to  you  with  this 
memorial  with  the  hope  that  your  Excellency 
may  help  our  country  at  this  critical  period  of 
our  national  life. 

We  fully  appreciate  the  fact  that  during  the 
conference  between  the  Russian  and  Japanese 
peace  envoys,  your  Excellency  may  not  care  to 
make  any  suggestion  to  either  party  as  to  the 
conditions  of  their  settlement,  but  we  earnestly 
hope  that  your  Excellency  will  see  to  it  that 
Korea  may  preserve  her  autonomous  Govern- 
ment and  that  other  Powers  shall  not  oppress 
or  maltreat  our  people.  The  clause  in  the 
treaty  between  the  United  States  and  Korea 
gives  us  a  claim  upon  the  United  States  for 


DOCUMENTS  Itf  THE  CASE  *         245 

***.      * 

assistance,  and  this  is  the  time  when  we  need 
it  most. 

Very  respectfully, 

Your  obedient  servants, 

(Sgd.)  P.  K.  YOON, 

SYNGMAN  RHEE. 


AMERICAN  POLICY  IN  THE  CASES  OF 
KOREA  AND  BELGIUM  * 

The  Special  Envoy  of  the  Korean  Emperor 
tells  for  the  time  the  full  story  of  his  attempt  to 
get  President  Roosevelt  to  intervene  against 
Japan. 

BY  HOMER  B.  HULBERT 

A  few  weeks  ago  I  published  in  The  Times  a 
letter  asserting  that  Theodore  Roosevelt's  at- 
tack upon  President  Wilson  for  his  failure  to 
protest  against  Germany's  attack  upon  Belgium 
came  with  poor  grace  from  a  man  who  himself 
was  guilty  of  a  far  more  reprehensible  breach  of 
international  obligation  in  1905,  when  Japan 
forced  her  protectorate  upon  Korea. 

Mr.  Roosevelt  has  now  come  out  with  a  state- 
ment that  he  was  wholly  justified  in  acquiescing 
in  the  extinction  of  Korean  independence,  an(J 
1  From  the  Neiv  York  Times,  March  5,  1916. 


246  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

he  makes  the  specific  charges  that  my  statement 
was  consciously  false  when  I  said  that  he  was 
aware,  in  advance,  of  the  contents  of  the  letter 
which  I  brought  to  him  from  the  Emperor  of 
Korea.  In  view  of  this  charge  there  is  nothing 
left  me  to  do  but  to  give  a  full  and  detailed  ac- 
count of  the  entire  transaction  and  leave  it  to 
the  American  people  to  judge  whether  Korea 
received  a  fair  deal  at  the  hands  of  the  Roose- 
velt Administration. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  Japanese-Russian 
War  the  Korean  Government  declared  its 
neutrality,  but  the  Japanese  ignored  this 
declaration  and  committed  a  direct  breach  of 
international  law  in  landing  troops  on  the  soil 
of  the  peninsula.  The  fact  that  the  Korean 
army  was  too  small  to  oppose  this  act  detracts 
nothing  from  the  culpability  of  Japan.  Having 
entered  the  country  thus  illegally,  Japan 
hastened  to  make  a  treaty  with  Korea  whereby 
the  latter  virtually  became  her  ally  in  the  war 
and  put  herself  in  jeopardy  of  lawful  seizure 
and  annexation  by  Russia  in  case  of  Russia's 
ultimate  success.  In  this  treaty  Japan  specific- 
ally guaranteed  the  sovereignty  of  Korea  from 
molestation.  It  was  a  war  measure  necessi- 
tated by  the  circumstances  and  was  of  a  tempo- 
rary character  merely.  In  allowing  Japan  to 
take  charge  of  the  communications  of  the 
empire,  Korea  merely  acted  up  to  the  spirit  of 
the  alliance,  which  was  that  Japan  should  be 
given  every  facility  to  prosecute  the  war  against 
Russia.  Whether  this  was  pleasing  to  the 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  247 

Korean  Government  or  not  has  nothing  what- 
ever to  do  with  the  legal  aspect  of  the  case. 
None  of  the  treaty  powers  took  any  action  that 
indicated  in  any  way  their  impression  that  this 
treaty  was  a  genuine  impairment  of  Korean 
autonomy,  as  indeed  it  could  not  be  if  its  terms 
were  faithfully  lived  up  to.  For  Theodore 
Roosevelt  to  say  that  Japan  by  this  act  virtually 
assumed  a  protectorate  over  Korea  shows  either 
that  he  has  only  the  most  rudimentary  notions 
of  international  law  or  else  that  the  wish  was 
father  to  the  thought.  It  was  no  more  an  im- 
pairment of  Korea's  sovereignty  than  the  pres- 
ence of  British  troops  in  France  is  an  impair- 
ment of  French  sovereignty. 

But  after  the  war  was  over  it  soon  became  ap- 
parent that  Japan  had  no  intention  of  carrying 
out  her  treaty  obligations.  The  Emperor  of 
Korea  became  convinced  that  the  autonomy  of 
his  country  was  about  to  be  impaired  by  his 
ally,  the  Emperor  of  Japan.  This  being  the 
case,  the  time  had  arrived  when  the  first  clause 
in  the  treaty  between  Korea  and  the  United 
States  might  rightly  be  cited.  The  Emperor 
asked  me  to  be  the  bearer  of  a  message  to 
President  Roosevelt,  calling  upon  him  to  imple- 
ment that  clause  of  the  treaty. 

Now,  I  had  been  favourable  to  the  Japanese 
side  in  the  struggle  against  Russia,  as  is  amply 
proved  by  my  editorials  in  the  Korea  Review,  of 
which  I  was  the  editor  and  proprietor.  I  real- 
ized that  the  military  weakness  of  Korea  would 
give  Japan  a  chance  to  say  that  a  protectorate 


248  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

over  the  country  would  be  necessary  for  Japan's 
safety.  I  therefore  advised  the  Emperor  that 
his  appeal  would  be  greatly  strengthened  if  he 
should  insert  the  statement  that  if  it  seemed 
proper  to  the  United  States  and  the  other  treaty 
powers  interested,  Korea  would  consent  to  the 
establishment  of  a  joint  protectorate  over  Korea 
for  a  period  of  years  until  things  should  have 
been  so  adjusted  that  the  permanent  neutrality 
of  the  country  would  be  assured.  The  Emperor 
inserted  such  a  clause  in  the  letter.  Having 
received  this  document  for  transmission,  I  im- 
mediately went  to  the  United  States  Minister 
in  Seoul,  Mr.  E.  V.  Morgan,  and  made  a  clear 
and  full  statement  of  my  mission.  I  told  him 
I  was  about  to  start  for  America  with  a  letter 
to  President  Roosevelt  from  the  Emperor,  ask- 
ing the  American  Government  to  interfere  with 
its  good  offices  to  prevent  the  unlawful  seizure 
of  Korea  by  Japan,  which  seemed  to  be  threat- 
ening. I  did  not  propose  to  indulge  in  any 
clandestine  operations  which  might  embarrass 
my  own  Government.  Naturally  I  did  not 
make  any  public  statement  of  my  intentions,  al- 
though several  of  my  friends  in  Seoul  were 
aware  of  the  purpose  of  my  going. 

Mr.  Morgan  listened  with  interest  to  what  I 
had  to  say,  made  no  objection  of  any  kind,  and 
even  went  so  far  as  to  advise  me  that  when  I 
arrived  in  America  I  should  retain  a  good  inter- 
national lawyer  to  help  me  put  the  matter 
through.  Not  only  so,  but  he  allowed  me  to 
send  the  document  to  America  in  the  legation 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  249 

mail  pouch,  for  I  was  somewhat  in  fear  that 
the  Japanese  might  take  it  from  my  person  as 
I  passed  through  Japan  on  my  way. 

There  was  considerable  gossip  in  Seoul  over 
my  sudden  resignation  from  the  service  of  the 
Korean  Government  and  my  departure  from 
Korea  with  my  family  so  promptly,  and  the 
Japanese  doubtless  divined  the  cause  back  of  it. 
On  the  day  before  I  started  the  Japanese  Charge 
d' Affaires  in  Seoul  met  me  and  urged  me  not  to 
go,  giving  various  plausible  reasons,  and  finally 
making  some  broad  hints  at  substantial  finan- 
cial advantages  that  I  should  enjoy  by  giving 
up  my  contemplated  trip.  However,  I  went. 

I  sailed  from  Yokohama  on  the  China,  of  the 
Pacific  Mail  Steamship  Line.  Just  before  we 
sailed  a  spy  in  the  employ  of  the  Japanese  came 
aboard.  I  recognized  him,  and  just  for  the  fun 
of  the  thing  I  kept  out  of  his  way  till  just  a 
moment  before  the  anchor  was  raised.  Then 
I  came  upon  him  suddenly.  He  started  per- 
ceptibly and  stammered  out  something  about 
iny  going  on  the  China  or  the  Empress  of  China, 
which  sailed  the  same  hour.  I  laughed  and  said 
that  I  was  booked  for  the  China.  I  have  always 
regretted  that  I  did  not  change  over  to  the 
Empress  boat  after  he  went  ashore,  for  I  should 
have  reached  Washington  four  days  earlier. 
At  this  point  I  would  like  to  ask  any  reasonable 
American  citizen  whether  it  is  possible  to  be- 
lieve that  Mr.  Morgan  did  not  notify  the  Wash- 
ington Government  by  cable  and  secure  instruc- 
tions in  the  premises.  If  he  did  not  do  so  it 


250  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

was  a  gross  breach  of  diplomatic  duty.  It  is 
simply  unthinkable. 

The  Japanese  authorities  immediately  began 
to  bring  pressure  on  the  Emperor  and  his 
Cabinet  to  grant  a  Japanese  protectorate.  They 
were  met  by  a  firm  refusal.  The  Emperor  held 
firm,  and  declared  that  under  no  circumstances 
would  he  consent  to  such  an  impairment  of 
Korea's  suzerain  rights.  Again  and  again  the 
Japanese  returned  to  the  attack,  but  without 
success.  Meanwhile  I  passed  Honolulu,  San 
Francisco,  Chicago,  Pittsburg,  and  was  only 
one  day  from  Washington.  Japan  had  not  yet 
been  able  to  force  her  "  protection "  upon 
Korea.  But  it  had  to  be  done  at  any  cost, 
either  of  ethics  or  of  blood. 

That  night,  while  I  was  crossing  the  Cum- 
berland Mountains,  the  Japanese  seized  the 
palace  in  Seoul,  filled  it  with  gendarmes  and 
police,  blocked  every  approach  to  the  Emperor, 
brought  the  Emperor  and  his  Cabinet  together, 
and  peremptorily  demanded  that  they  sign  the 
death  warrant  of  Korean  independence.  The 
Emperor  and  all  his  Ministers  refused  point- 
blank.  Entreaties,  flatteries,  threats,  all  were 
unavailing.  But  the  reader  may  say,  "  How  do 
you  know?  You  were  in  America."  This  is 
how  I  know.  In  1909,  in  the  City  of  Seoul,  at 
two  o'clock  in  the  morning,  escaping  from  the 
espionage  of  fifteen  or  more  Japanese  spies,  I 
climbed  over  the  back  wall  of  my  compound, 
made  my  way  down  through  the  tortuous 
streets  of  that  city  until  I  reached  the  home  of 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  251 

Han  Kyu-Sul,  who  was  Prime  Minister  at  the 
time  the  deed  was  performed.  I  spent  the  rest 
of  the  night  with  him,  and  it  is  from  his  lips  I 
heard  the  damning  details.  All  the  older  resi- 
dents of  Seoul  knew  Han  Kyu-Sul  as  a  thorough 
gentleman,  against  whom,  even  in  that  Oriental 
country,  there  had  never  been  a  suspicion  of 
graft  or  official  indirection.  I  would  take  his 
word  as  implicitly  as  my  own  brother's.  And 
this  is  what  happened : 

The  Japanese,  made  desperate  by  the  failure 
of  cajolery  and  menace,  took  Han  Kyu-Sul,  the 
Premier,  into  a  side  room.  There  Field  Mar- 
shal Hasegawa  and  Minister  Hayashi  demanded 
his  consent.  He  refused.  Hasegawa  drew  his 
sword  on  the  unarmed  man,  but  he  stood  firm. 
They  left  him  there  under  guard  and  went  back 
to  the  rest  of  the  Cabinet.  These  men  believed 
that  Han  Kyu-Sul  had  been  killed,  and  they 
were,  from  their  standpoint,  justified  in  their 
suspicions.  I  should  have  believed  the  same 
thing.  Three  of  them  capitulated  and  signed 
the  document.  The  Emperor  never  signed  it, 
nor  did  his  Prime  Minister,  nor  were  these  three 
traitors  given  orders  by  the  Emperor  to  sign. 
It  is  said,  with  what  truth  I  cannot  say,  that  the 
Japanese  themselves  stole  the  Great  Seal  of 
State  from  the  Foreign  Office  and  themselves 
affixed  it  to  the  paper.  This  seal  was  affixed 
within  sixty  minutes  of  my  arrival  at  the  rail- 
way station  in  Washington,  D.  C. 

I  immediately  secured  the  Emperor's  letter 
from  the  friend  in  Washington,  to  whom  it  had 


252  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

been  sent,  as  I  have  said,  in  the  legation  mail 
pouch.  I  then  consulted  an  old-time  acquaint- 
ance of  mine,  who  held,  and  still  holds,  a  high 
official  position  at  Washington,  and  asked  him 
the  best  way  to  approach  the  President,  since  I 
was  unacquainted  with  the  rules  of  etiquette 
which  govern  such  transactions.  This  friend 
sent  a  message  to  the  President  telling  him  that 
I  had  arrived  in  Washington  from  the  Emperor 
of  Korea  with  an  important  communication. 
The  answer  came  back  that,  since  it  was  a  dip- 
lomatic matter,  the  President  could  not  see  me 
himself,  but  that  the  missive  should  be  taken  to 
the  State  Department. 

I  hastened  to  do  so,  but  was  told  that  the  Sec- 
retary of  State  was  extremely  busy  and  that  I 
had  better  come  the  following  day.  They  were 
too  busy  to  receive  a  message  from  a  friendly 
power  that  was  in  its  death  throes!  I  went 
straight  to  the  President's  office  building  adjoin- 
ing the  White  House  and  asked  to  see  the  Presi- 
dent's secretary.  This  was  refused  me,  but  I 
was  met  by  an  under-secretary,  whose  name  I 
never  ascertained,  who  very  blandly  said,  "  Mr. 
Hulbert,  we  know  all  about  this  letter.  You 
have  been  given  instructions  to  go  to  the  State 
Department.  Nothing  can  be  done  here." 

There  seemed  to  be  nothing  for  it  but  to  wait. 
Meanwhile  I  was  being  importuned  by  the 
newspaper  men  to  divulge  the  purpose  of  my 
coming.  Why  should  they  have  pressed  the 
matter  so  strongly?  I  had  told  no  one  of  my 
mission  excepting  those  who  would  be  discreet. 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

I  see  here  another  evidence  that  the  fact  had 
leaked  out  through  official  channels.  There- 
fore, the  men  at  the  head  of  affairs  must  have 
known  the  nature  of  my  mission.  It  is  one  of 
the  keenest  regrets  of  my  life  that  I  did  not, 
then  and  there,  make  a  full  statement  for  the 
press,  and  tell  the  American  people  that  the 
Emperor  of  a  friendly  power  was  standing  at 
the  door  of  this  Government  demanding  with- 
out avail  a  courteous  hearing.  But  I  thought  it 
would  be  discourteous  to  the  President  and  to 
the  Secretary  of  State*  to  divulge  the  matter 
before  I  had  laid  it  before  them.  Discourteous ! 
The  following  day  I  went  to  the  State  Depart- 
ment and  asked  admittance  to  the  Secretary  of 
State.  I  was  told  that  this  was  the  day  when 
the  various  Ambassadors  and  Ministers  from 
other  countries  were  accustomed  to  call  on  the 
Secretary  and  that  for  this  reason  it  would  be 
impossible  to  see  him.  I  had  better  come  next 
day!  On  that  day  the  American  Government 
accepted  Japan's  unsupported  statement  that 
the  protectorate  had  been  secured  and  that  it 
was  all  satisfactory  to  the  Korean  Government. 
Without  a  word  of  inquiry  at  the  Korean  Lega- 
tion at  Washington,  without  a  word  to  the  Em- 
peror of  Korea,  without  a  single  diplomatic  for- 
mality in  consideration  of  the  Korean  people 
and  Government,  the  American  Administration 
accepted  Japan's  bald  statement,  cabled  the 
American  Minister  in  Seoul  to  close  the  legation 
and  broke  off  friendly  intercourse  with  a  treaty 
power,  weak,  to  be  sure,  and  needing  all  things, 


254  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

but  a  power  to  which  we  had  been  saying  for 
twenty-five  years  that  America  stands  for  a 
square  deal,  for  right  as  against  mere  brute 
force,  a  power  that  had  given  to  Americans 
more  opportunities  for  productive  enterprise 
than  to  all  other  peoples  combined,  a  power  to 
which  we  had  given  our  promise  that  if  in  her 
hour  of  need  she  should  appeal  to  us  we  would 
exert  our  good  offices  in  her  behalf. 

The  next  day  I  was  allowed  to  see  the  Secre- 
tary of  State.  Assistant  Secretaries  Bacon  and 
Adee  were  present,  and  perhaps  one  or  two 
others.  I  do  not  remember. 

Now  I  had  made  what  may  be  called  a  tech- 
nical mistake.  I  had  consented  to  act  as  a  mes- 
senger from  the  Emperor  without  receiving 
from  him  any  credentials  except  the  message 
which  I  brought.  I  came  simply  to  transmit  the 
document  and  let  that  speak  for  itself.  Nor  did 
this  Government,  either  then  or  later,  question 
the  genuineness  of  that  missive,  as  indeed,  they 
could  not  well  have  done  since  it  bore  the  Em- 
peror's private  seal. 

The  Secretary  of  State  asked  Assistant  Secre- 
tary Adee  whether,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  I 
bore  no  special  credentials,  the  matter  could  be 
discussed  with  me.  The  reply  was  that  it  could 
not.  The  Secretary  of  State  received  the  docu- 
ment, then  turned  to  me  in  a  very  pointed  man- 
ner, which  may  not  have  been  but  certainly 
sounded  like  a  rebuke :  "  Mr.  Hulbert,  do  you 
want  us  to  get  into  trouble  with  Japan?  " 

Coming  upon  the  expert  decision  of  Assistant 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  265 

Secretary  Adee  that  I  was  in  no  position  to  dis- 
cuss the  matter,  this  question  nettled  me  a  trifle 
and  I  declined  to  discuss  it.  I  have  sometimes 
wished  that  I  had  not,  and  yet  perhaps  it  was  as 
well,  for  if  I  had  said  anything  it  would  have 
been  this :  "  If  it  lies  between  the  stultification 
of  the  American  Government  and  trouble  I  will 
take  the  trouble  every  time,"  but  of  course  this 
might  have  been  considered  discourteous!  I 
said  that  I  was  merely  commissioned  to  deliver 
the  document,  and  then  retired. 

I  am  told  that  a  few  days  after  this, occurred 
one  of  the  most  eminent  international  lawyers 
in  America  went  to  Secretary  Root  with  a  copy 
of  the  Korean  treaty,  placed  his  finger  on  that 
first  clause  in  which  we  guarantee  to  use  our 
good  offices  for  Korea,  and  asked  the  Secretary 
to  read  it;  and  that  when  the  Secretary  had  read 
it  he  exclaimed,  "  I  did  not  know  that  was 
there." 

The  following  day  I  received  a  cablegram 
from  the  Emperor.  It  had  been  taken  over  to 
Chefoo  by  boat  so  as  to  escape  transmission  by 
Japanese  lines.  In  it  the  Emperor  declared  that 
the  treaty  was  null  and  void,  that  it  had  been 
secured  at  the  point  of  the  sword,  that  it  had 
been  wrested  from  his  Foreign  Minister  under 
duress,  and  that  he  himself  had  never  signed  it 
or  acquiesced  in  its  signature. 

I  took  that  cablegram  to  the  State  Depart- 
ment. I  was  received  by  Assistant  Secretary 
Bacon,  who  took  the  cablegram  and  said  that  it 
would  be  put  on  file,  or  words  to  that  effect.  A 


256  DOCUMENTS  IK  THE  CASE 

few  days  later  I  received  from  Secretary  Root  a 
letter  referring  to  the  document  that  I  had 
placed  in  his  hands,  and  saying  that  since  the 
Emperor  of  Korea  had  desired  secrecy  to  be  ob- 
served and  had  already  taken  final  action  in  this 
matter  referred  to,  it  would  be  impossible  for 
the  American  Government  to  move  in  the 
matter. 

No,  our  Government  had  done  all  its  moving 
earlier  in  the  game.  Why  the  matter  of  secrecy 
should  have  been  brought  up  I  do  not  know. 
The  Emperor  is  no  such  novice  in  politics  as  to 
suppose  that  the  American  Government  could 
have  moved  to  help  Korea  without  letting  the 
Japanese  Government  suspect  that  he  (the  Em- 
peror) had  appealed  for  such  help.  They  did 
not  expect  me  to  shout  the  matter  from  the 
housetops,  I  should  fancy. 

Soon  after  this  I  returned  to  Korea.  I  was 
told  there  by  some  friends  that  Mr.  Morgan 
had,  perhaps  inadvertently,  intimated  that  "  We 
knew  that  Japan  was  going  to  take  Korea,  but 
we  did  not  expect  it  quite  so  soon." 

This  brings  up  the  question  why  it  was  that 
two  months  before  the  seizure  of  Korea  by 
Japan  the  American  Minister  at  Seoul,  Dr.  H. 
N.  Allen,  was  suddenly  recalled  and  Mr.  E.  V. 
Morgan -put  in  his  place.  I  believe  an  effort  was 
made  to  learn  the  reason,  that  the  President  and 
the  Secretary  of  State  were  non-committal,  but 
that  another  member  of  the  Cabinet  intimated 
that  Dr.  H.  N.  Allen  was  so  friendly  with  the 
royal  family  in  Seoul  that  without  3.  change  in^ 


DOCUMENTS  IX  THE  CASE  267 

the  legation  it  would  be  difficult  for  the  Admin- 
istration to  carry  out  the  policy  upon  which  it 
had  determined. 

One  question  remains.  When  was  that  policy 
determined  upon?  I  do  not  know;  but  taking 
all  things  into  consideration,  and  putting  two 
and  two  together,  I  am  forced  to  believe  that  it 
was  determined  upon  at  the  time  of  the  Ports- 
mouth Treaty. 

This  is  a  correct  account,  so  far  as  I  can  re- 
member, of  the  seizure  of  Korea  by  Japan  and 
the  part  that  our  Government  played  in  it. 
Some  of  my  statements  can  be  corroborated  by 
others,  some  rest  upon  my  unsupported  word, 
but  the  part  that  can  be  corroborated  is  suffi- 
cient to  prove  my  main  contention. 

I  am  quite  willing  to  grant  that  my  belief  in 
President  Roosevelt's  previous  knowledge  of 
the  contents  of  that  letter  rests  upon  circum- 
stantial evidence,  but  I  ask  the  American  people 
to  decide  for  themselves  whether  his  memory  is 
not,  perhaps,  slightly  at  fault  when  he  declares 
that  he  did  not  know  the  exact  wording  but  the 
essential  gist  and  purport  of  the  letter  several 
days  before  it  was  delivered.  I  trust  it  is  within 
the  bounds  of  courtesy  to  ask  him  to  tell  the 
people  of  this  country  why  the  message  from 
the  Emperor  was  held  off  for  two  days  until  he 
had  taken  action  in  the  matter.  If  he  was  at 
that  time  convinced  that  Korea's  autonomy  was 
already  injured  beyond  repair,  why  did  he  not 
receive  the  message  and  answer  it  according  to 
the  tenor  of  his  belief?  If  he  says  that  it  was 


258  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

because  I  had  no  credentials,  how  comes  it  that 
he  did  not  also  know  what  I  had  come  to  do 
without  credentials?  I  ask  him  how  it  came 
about  that  one  of  his  under-secretaries  in  the 
White  House  knew  more  about  the  contents  of 
that  letter  than  he  himself  did. 

In  conclusion,  I  may  say  that  in  my  estima- 
tion comparatively  little  blame  should  rest  upon 
Elihu  Root  in  this  matter.  He  was  necessarily 
under  instructions.  Whether  those  instructions 
were  agreeable  to  him  or  not  the  world  will 
never  know,  but  I  hope  they  were  not.  To  my 
mind  he  was  less  culpable  than  unfortunate. 


KOREA  UNDER  JAPAN1 

HENRY  CHUNG 

"  If  the  lips  are  destroyed,  the  teeth  get  cold." 
This  is  a  literal  translation  of  a  Korean  proverb, 
Chinese  in  origin.  The  Chinese  orator  and  dip- 
lomat in  the  feudal  period  of  the  Chow  dynasty 
who  originated  this  epigram  conceived,  long  be- 
fore the  birth  of  European  nations,  the  principle 
of  balance  of  power  as  necessary  to  the  peace 
and  independence  of  nations  contiguous  in  ter- 
ritory. At  the  opening  of  the  twentieth  cen- 
tury Korea  was  the  lips  and  China  was  the 
teeth.  Now  the  lips  are  destroyed,  and  the  un- 
protected surface  of  the  Chinese  teeth  are  ex- 

'From  the  Chinese  Students9  Monthly,  vol.  XIII,  No.  7, 
pp.  400-403,  May,  1918. 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  259 

posed  to  the  corrosion  of  Japanese  aggression. 
Every  Chinese  who  carries  the  welfare  of  his 
Fatherland  in  his  heart  ought,  therefore,  to 
study  with  vital  interest  the  recent  history  of 
Korea,  for  there  we  find  the  example  of  what 
may  befall  China,  unless  the  present  tendency 
of  Japanese  imperial  expansion  on  Asiatic  main- 
land is  checkmated  either  by  China  herself  or  by 
a  concerted  action  of  Western  powers  in  the 
Eastern  theatre  of  international  politics. 

In  destroying  a  nation — if  the  destruction  be 
complete — two  things  are  essential:  economic 
subjection  and  spiritual  massacre.  The  former 
is  a  comparatively  easy  matter  as  its  execution 
is  based  entirely  on  physical  force,  but  the  latter 
requires  time  and  assiduous  effort  on  the  part 
of  the  conquering  nation.  Japan,  profiting  by 
the  experience  of  the  colonizing  nations  of  the 
West,  is  applying  in  Korea  a  method  the  most 
unique  and  effective  known  in  the  history  of 
imperial  conquests.  When  Bismarck  wanted  to 
.Prussianize  Poland,  he  moved  several  million 
Germans  into  German  Poland  to  help  assimilate 
the  Poles.  Money  was  appropriated  by  the 
German  Government  to  buy  land  from  the  Poles 
for  these  newcomers.  The  Poles  clung  to  their 
lands  and  refused  to  be  assimilated,  with  the 
consequence  that  the  price  of  land  in  German 
Poland  went  up  and  the  Poles  became  prosper- 
ous. Japan  pursued  the  same  policy  in  a  more 
efficacious  way.  The  Oriental  Colonization 
Company  was  organized  under  the  direction  of 
the  government,  and  is  supported  by  an  annual 


260  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

subsidy  of  500,000  yen  ($250,000)  from  the  im- 
perial treasury.  Its  purpose  is  to  colonize 
Korea  with  Japanese  who  are  unable  to  make  a 
living  in  Japan  proper.  A  Japanese  emigrant 
is  given  free  transportation  to  Korea,  and  is 
provided  with  a  home  and  a  piece  of  land  to- 
gether with  necessary  implements  and  provi- 
sions when  he  gets  there.  He  is  expected  to  pay 
back  to  the  company  in  three  or  four  years  what 
he  thus  receives.  For  this  purpose  the  Japanese 
Government  in  Korea  confiscated  all  public 
lands  formerly  under  the  control  of  local  com- 
munities, and  all  lands  owned  by  Buddhist  tem- 
ples and  cultivated  by  Buddhist  priests.  But 
these  were  far  from  being  enough  to  meet  the 
demand.  Korea  has  an  area  of  80,000  square 
miles  inhabited  by  15,000,000  agricultural  popu- 
lation. The  Oriental  Colonization  Company 
tried  to  buy  lands  from  the  Koreans,  but  the 
Koreans  refused  to  sell  them.  Here  the  govern- 
ment aid  was  brought  in.  All  financial  machin- 
ery in  Korea  is  controlled  by  the  Bank  of 
Chosen,  a  government  bank  in  Seoul.  This 
powerful  financial  institution  through  its  branch 
banks  and  agencies  called  in  all  the  specie  in  the 
country  and  made  the  land  practically  money- 
less as  far  as  the  circulating  medium  was  con- 
cerned. Cash  the  Koreans  must  have  to  pay 
taxes  and  to  buy  the  necessities  of  life.  The 
only  way  they  could  get  money  was  to  sell  their 
real  estate.  The  value  of  land  dropped  to  one- 
half,  in  many  localities  as  low  as  one-fifth,  of  its 
original  value.  Then  the  Bank  of  Chosen  sent 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  261 

out  agents  all  over  the  country  and  bought  the 
land  for  tens  of  thousands  of  Japanese  emi- 
grants sent  over  by  the  Oriental  Colonization 
Company.  This  process  has  been  repeated  time 
and  again.  The  Koreans  know  the  game  of  the 
government,  but  they  have  no  means  to  coun- 
teract this  government  speculation.  Technic- 
ally, the  Japanese  Government  in  Korea  has 
never  carried  on  a  wholesale  confiscation  of  in- 
dividual property,  but  this  governmental  specu- 
lation is  nothing  short  of  confiscation.  Already 
more  than  one-fifth  of  the-richest  land  in  Korea 
is  in  the  hands  of  the  Japanese,  and  the  amount 
is  increasing  steadily. 

In  commerce  and  industry,  the  Japanese  have 
the  complete  monopoly.  While  Korea  was  in- 
dependent, all  nations  enjoyed  equal  commercial 
privileges.  Now  the  Nipponese  tradesmen  prac- 
tically drive  out  all  other  nationals  and  have  the 
market  to  themselves.  The  Korean  merchant 
cannot  compete  with  his  Japanese  competitor 
because  of  the  preferential  treatment  shown  by 
the  government.  All  the  rights  to  develop  the 
resources  of  the  country  are  given  to  the  Japa- 
nese, and  Korean  enterprise,  even  of  the  hum- 
blest sort,  is  insidiously  hampered  by  the  Jap- 
anese. Thus  the  Korean  people  are  reduced  to 
industrial  serfdom,  and  are  forced  to  submit  to 
Japanese  rule  through  economic  pressure. 

The  Korean  has  a  proud  history  and  a  civili- 
zation of  four  thousand  years  back  of  him,  and 
he  is  unwilling  to  abandon  his  traditional  cul- 
ture under  any  circumstances.  Something  more 


262  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

than  mere  economic  pressure  and  political  domi- 
nation is  needed  to  extinguish  the  soul  of  Korea. 
History  and  literature  are  the  records  of  past 
achievements,  and  language  is  the  medium  of 
expression  that  gives  birth  to  the  pregnant  ge- 
nius. The  Japanese  statesmen  fully  appreciate 
the  importance  of  this  triple  support  of  national 
consciousness.  They  made  a  systematic  collec- 
tion of  all  works  of  Korean  history  and  litera- 
ture in  public  archives  and  private  homes  and 
burned  them.  This  is  undoubtedly  the  greatest 
injustice  that  the  Korean  people  have  suffered 
at  the  hands  of  the  Japanese.  Korean  scholars 
consider  this  as  an  irreparable  loss  second  only 
to  the  destruction  of  the  Alexandrian  Library 
by  Omar  in  640.  Priceless  treasures  have  been 
destroyed  in  this  needless  vandalism  of  the 
Japanese.  All  Korean  periodical  literature — 
from  local  newspapers  to  scientific  journals — 
has  been  completely  stamped  out.  In  order  to 
create  in  the  West  a  favourable  impression  of 
their  rule  in  Korea,  the  Japanese  Government 
has  a  subsidized  organ,  the  Seoul  Press.  This 
daily,  published  in  English,  disseminates  only 
the  kind  of  news  that  the  Japanese  wish  to  have 
known  in  the  West.  It  is  an  official  camouflage. 
This  publicity  channel  is  further  strengthened 
by  the  "  Annual  Report  on  Reforms  and  Prog- 
ress in  Chosen,"  a  well  illustrated  volume  pub- 
lished in  English  by  the  government,  and  sent 
out  gratis  to  all  great  men  and  large  libraries  in 
America  and  Great  Britain.  These  publications 
picture  vividly  the  "  contentment  and  prosper- 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  263 

ity"  that  the  Japanese  rule  is  bringing  to  the 
Koreans.  And  what  they  say  usually  find 
echoes  in  the  West  through  a  few  men  who  have 
been  decorated  in  Japan  with  gold  war  medals 
and  the  insignias  of  the  Rising  Sun.  These 
men  take  delight  in  returning  the  favours  that 
they  have  received  in  Japan  by  singing  the  glory 
and  grandeur  of  Japanese  Asiatic  policy,  and  by 
picturing  Japanese  administration  in  Korea  as  a 
"  benevolent  assimilation."  ! 

The  Japanese  language  has  been  made  the 
official  tongue,  not  only  in  official  documents  but 
in  schools  and  public  gatherings.  Here  the 
Christian  Church  stands  as  an  obstacle.  A  vast 
majoiity  of  Korean  Christians  cannot  read 
Japanese,  and  the  church  services  cannot  be  in- 
telligibly conducted  in  a  foreign  tongue.  To 
curb  the  spreading  influence  of  Christianity  and 
to  crush  out  completely  the  one  obstacle  to  the 
denationalizing  of  Korea,  the  Governor  General 
Terauchi  (now  Premier  of  Japan),  in  1912,  in- 
stituted what  is  known  in  the  church  annals  of 
Korea  as  "The  Persecution  of  the  Church." 
Prominent  church  men,  leaders  in  Korean 
thought  and  education,  were  charged  with  con- 
spiracy and  put  in  prison,  and  their  activities 
ended.  Prominent  American  missionaries  were 
brought  in  the  trial  as  being  connected  with  the 
conspiracy  to  assassinate  the  governor  general 
of  Korea.  Here,  however,  the  Japanese  over- 

9 See  G.  T.  Ladd,  "Annexation  of  Korea:  An  Essay  in 
Benevolent  Assimilation,"  Yale  Review  n.  s.  1 : 639-656,  July, 
1912. 


264  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

stepped  themselves.  Their  charges  against  the 
Korean  church  aroused  considerable  criticism  in 
the  West,  and  when  they  saw  that  their  attempt 
was  producing  a  reaction,  they  stopped  the  per- 
secution of  the  Korean  Christians,  and  satisfied 
themselves  in  limiting  the  activities  of  the 
church.  At  present  there  is  pending  a  negotia- 
tion between  the  Japanese  authorities  and  the 
missionary  body  in  Korea  concerning  the  mis- 
sionary schools  in  the  peninsula.  The  mission 
schools  in  Korea  have  been  deprived  of  their 
former  rights  under  the  old  Korean  administra- 
tion, and  are  denied  the  privileges  that  Christian 
mission  schools  enjoy  in  Japan  proper.  They 
are  insidiously  discriminated  against  by  the  Jap- 
anese authorities  on  the  ground  that  they  serve 
as  the  hiding  places  of  Korean  nationalism.' 

Under  pretext  of  unifying  the  educational  sys- 
tem of  Korea  and  bringing  it  up  to  a  "  higher 
standard,"  the  Japanese  Government  in  Korea 
passed  educational  regulations  which  forbid  re- 
ligious services  and  the  teaching  of  history, 
geography,  and  the  Korean  language  in  all  the 
schools  in  Korea.  Furthermore,  they  provide 
that  all  Korean  schools  shall  be  under  the  strict 
supervision  of  Japanese  educators,  and  that  the 
Korean  children  shall  be  taught  to  salute  the 
Japanese  flag  and  worship  the  Japanese  Em- 
peror's tablet.  Korean  students  who  go  to 


'A  full  discussion  of  the  negotiation  between  the  Jap- 
anese authorities  and  the  missionaries  in  Korea  concerning 
the  school  regulations  is  given  by  Arthur  Judson  Brown  in 
International  Rei'iew  of  Missions,  VI :  74-99,  January,  1917. 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  265 

Japan  to  complete  their  education  are  advised 
to  attend  trade  or  technical  schools,  but  they 
are  practically  barred  from  higher  institutions 
of  learning.  It  is  almost  impossible  for  a  Ko- 
rean student  to  specialize  in  such  subjects  as  law, 
history  or  economics  in  the  Imperial  University 
at  Tokyo,  and  no  Korean  student  is  permitted 
to  go  to  Europe  or  America  to  finish  his  educa- 
tion. "  Korea  has  been  Prussianized,"  says 
Tyler  Dennett,  who  has  visited  the  East  twice, 
once  as  a  magazine  writer,  and  later  in  connec- 
tion with  the  Centenary  Commission  of  the 
Methodist  Episcopal  Church.  "  Japan  has  even 
gone  so  far  as  to  forbid  Korean  students  to 
come  to  the  United  States  to  finish  their  educa- 
tion. The  Prussianizing  of  Alsace-Lorraine 
never  went  to  such  an  extent  as  that." 

The  tragedy  in  the  case  of  the  Korean  is  that 
he  suffers  the  fate  of  a  conquered  race,  alike 
with  the  Poles  and  the  Bohemians,  yet  his  plight 
is  unknown  to  the  outside  world.  Japan  knows 
the  value  of  honourable  intentions  in  the  public 
opinion  of  the  West,  so  she,  through  the  clever 
manipulation  of  publicity  propaganda,  has  cre- 
ated an  impression  in  the  West  that  she  is  a 
gallant  knight  that  guards  Asia  from  the  Euro- 
pean dragon.  She  compares  her  position  to- 
ward Korea  and  China  with  that  of  the  United 
States  toward  the  Philippines  and  Mexico,  and 
has  announced,  through  the  Lansing-Ishii  agree- 
ment of  last  year,  her  imperial  policy  in  the 

*  Tyler  Dennett,  "The  Road  to  Peace,  via  China,"  Out- 
look, 117: 168-169,  October  3,  1917. 


266  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

East  as  the  "  Asiatic  Monroe  Doctrine."  The 
same  policy  that  undermined  Korea — the  policy 
of  an  opportunist  with  all  its  necessary  accom- 
paniment of  deceit,  cajolery,  intimidation,  and 
treachery — is  in  full  operation  in  China.  In  the 
same  manner  as  she  professed  to  guarantee  the 
political  independence  and  territorial  integrity 
of  Korea  up  to  the  very  eve  of  the  destruction 
of  Korean  independence,  Japan  now  declares 
that  "  Japan  not  only  will  not  seek  to  assail  the 
integrity  or  the  sovereignty  of  China,  but  will 
eventually  be  prepared  to  defend  and  maintain 
the  integrity  and  independence  of  China  against 
any  aggressor,"  as  Viscount  Ishii  puts  it.  In- 
deed, it  would  be  the  greatest  of  all  tragedies  in 
the  world's  history,  should  China,  the  oldest  of 
nations  and  the  cradle  of  Oriental  civilization, 
follow  the  footsteps  of  Korea  into  the  pit  of  na- 
tional destruction.  Will  China  awake  to  the 
impending  danger  before  it  is  too  late? 


THE    ROOT-TAKAHIRA    AGREEMENT    DE- 
CLARING THE  MUTUAL  POLICY  OF 
THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  JAPAN 
IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

Imperial  Japanese  Embassy,    ^*\V 
Washington,  November  30,  1918. 
SIR: 

The  exchange  of  views  between  us,  which 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  267 

has  taken  place  at  the  several  interviews  which 
I  have  recently  had  the  honour  of  holding  with 
you,  has  shown  that  Japan  and  the  United 
States  holding  important  outlying  insular  pos- 
sessions in  the  region  of  the  Pacific  Ocean,  the 
Governments  of  the  two  countries  are  animated 
by  a  common  aim,  policy,  and  intention  in  that 
region. 

Believing  that  a  frank  avowal  of  that  aim, 
policy,  and  intention  would  not  only  tend  to 
strengthen  the  relations  of  friendship  and  good 
neighbourhood,  which  have  immemorially  ex- 
isted between  Japan  and  the  United  States,  but 
would  materially  contribute  to  the  preservation 
of  the  general  peace,  the  Imperial  Government 
have  authorized  me  to  present  to  you  an  outline 
of  their  understanding  of  that  common  aim,  pol- 
icy, and  intention : 

1.  It  is  the  wish  of  the  two  Governments  to 
encourage  the  free  and  peaceful  development  of 
their  commerce  on  the  Pacific  Ocean. 

2.  The  policy  of  both  Governments,  uninflu- 
enced by  any  aggressive  tendencies,  is  directed 
to  the  maintenance  of  the  existing  status  quo  in 
the  region  above  mentioned  and  to  the  defense 
of  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity  for  com- 
merce and.  industry  in  China. 

3.  They  are  accordingly  firmly  resolved  recip- 
rocally to  respect  the  territorial  possessions  be- 
longing to  each  other  in  said  region. 

4.  They  are  also  determined  to  preserve  the 
common  interest  of  all  powers  in  China  by  sup- 
porting by  all  pacific  means  at  their  disposal  the 


268  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

independence  and  integrity  of  China  and  the 
principle  of  equal  opportunity  for  commerce  and 
industry  of  all  nations  in  that  Empire. 

5.  Should  any  event  occur  threatening  the 
status  quo  as  above  described  or  the  principle  of 
equal  opportunity  as  above  defined,  it  remains 
for  the  two  Governments  to  communicate  with 
each  other  in  order  to  arrive  at  an  understand- 
ing as  to  what  measures  they  may  consider  it 
useful  to  take. 

If  the  foregoing  outline  accords  with  the  view 
of  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  I  shall 
be  gratified  to  receive  your  confirmation. 

I  take  this  opportunity  to  renew  to  Your  Ex- 
cellency the  assurance  of  my  highest  considera- 
tion. 

K.  TAKAHIRA. 
HONORABLE  ELIHU  ROOT, 
Secretary  of  State. 


Department  of  State, 
Washington,  November  30, 1908. 
EXCELLENCY  : 

I  have  the  honour  to  acknowledge  the  receipt 
of  your  note  of  to-day  setting  forth  the  result 
of  the  exchange  of  views  between  us  in  our  re- 
cent interviews  defining  the  understanding  of 
the  two  Governments  in  regard  to  their  policy 
in  the  region  of  the  Pacific  Ocean. 

It  is  a  pleasure  to  inform  you  that  this  ex- 
pression of  mutual  understanding  is  welcome  to 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  as  appro- 
priate to  the  happy  relations  of  the  two  coun- 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  269 

tries  and  as  the  occasion  for  a  concise  mutual 
affirmation  of  that  accordant  policy  respecting 
the  Far  East  which  the  two  Governments  have 
so  frequently  declared  in  the  past. 

I  am  happy  to  be  able  to  confirm  to  Your 
Excellency,  on  behalf  of  the  United  States,  the 
declaration  of  the  two  Governments  embodied 
in  the  following  words : 

1.  It  is  the  wish  of  the  two  Governments  to 
encourage  the  free  and  peaceful  development  of 
their  commerce  on  the  Pacific  Ocean. 

2.  The  policy  of  both  Governments,  uninflu- 
enced by  any  aggressive  tendencies,  is  directed 
to  the  maintenance  of  the  existing  status  quo  in 
the  region  above  mentioned,  and  to  the  defense 
of  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity  for  com- 
merce and  industry  in  China. 

3.  They  are  accordingly  firmly  resolved  recip- 
rocally to  respect  the  territorial  possessions  be- 
longing to  each  other  in  said  region. 

4.  They  are  also  determined  to  preserve  the 
common  interests  of  all  powers  in  China  by  sup- 
porting by  all  pacific  means  at  their  disposal  the 
independence  and  integrity  of  China  and  the 
principle  of  equal  opportunity  for  commerce  and 
industry  of  all  nations  in  that  Empire. 

5.  Should  any  event  occur  threatening  the 
status  quo  as  above  described  or  the  principle  of 
equal  opportunity  as  above  defined,  it  remains 
for  the  two  Governments  to  communicate  with 
each  other  in  order  to  arrive  at  an  understand- 
ing as  to  what  measures  they  may  consider  it 
useful  to  take. 


270  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

Accept,  Excellency,  the  renewed  assurance  of 
my  highest  consideration. 

ELIHU  ROOT. 
His  Excellency 

BARON  KOGORA  TAKAHIRA, 
Japanese  Ambassador. 


M 

THE  PREMIER  OF  JAPAN  TO  THE 
AMERICAN  PEOPLE 

A  Message  from  Count  Okuma* 

I  gladly  seize  the  opportunity  to  send, 
through  the  medium  of  The  Independent,  a  mes- 
sage to  the  people  of  the  United  States,  who 
have  always  been  helpful  and  loyal  friends  of 
Japan. 

It  is  my  desire  to  convince  your  people  of  the 
sincerity  of  my  Government  and  of  my  people 
in  all  their  utterances  and  assurances  connected 
with  the  present  regrettable  situation  in  Europe 
and  the  Far  East. 

Every  sense  of  loyalty  and  honour  oblige 
Japan  to  cooperate  with  Great  Britain  to  clear 
from  these  waters  the  enemies  who  in  the  past, 
the  present  and  the  future  menace  her  interests, 
her  trade,  her  shipping  and  her  people's  lives. 

This  Far  Eastern  situation  is  not  of  our  seek- 
ing. 

1  Published  in  The  Independent  (New  York),  August  31, 
1914. 


DOCUMENTS  Itf  THE  CASE  271 

It  was  ever  my  desire  to  maintain  peace  as 
will  be  amply  proved;  as  President  of  the  Peace 
Society  of  Japan  I  have  consistently  so  en- 
deavoured. 

I  have  read  with  admiration  the  lofty  mes- 
sage of  President  Wilson  to  his  people  on  the 
subject  of  neutrality. 

We,  of  Japan,  are  appreciative  of  the  spirit 
and  motive  that  prompted  the  head  of  your 
great  nation  and  we  feel  confident  that  his  mes- 
sage will  meet  with  a  national  response. 

As  Premier  of  Japan  I  have  stated  and  I  now 
again  state  to  the  people  of  America  and  of  the  world 
that  Japan  has  no  ulterior  motive,  no  desire  to  secure 
more  territory,  no  thought  of  depriving  China  or  any 
other  peoples  of  anything  which  they  now  possess. 

My  Government  and  my  people  have  given 
their  word  and  their  pledge,  which  will  be  as 
honourably  kept  as  Japan  always  keeps  prom- 
ises. 

Tokyo,  August  24, 


N 
THE  TWENTY-ONE  DEMANDS 

Official  translation  of  Document  handed  to 
President  Yuan  Shi  Kai  by  Mr.  Hioki,  the 
Japanese  Minister,  on  January  18,  1915. 

GROUP  I 

The  Japanese  Government  and  the  Chinese 
Government  being  desirous  of  maintaining  the 


272  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

peace  of  Eastern  Asia  and  of  further  strength- 
ening the  friendly  relations  existing  between 
the  two  neighbouring  nations,  agree  to  the  fol- 
lowing Articles : 

Article  i. — The  Chinese  Government  agrees 
that  when  the  Japanese  Government  hereafter 
approaches  the  German  Government  for  the 
transfer  of  all  rights  and  privileges  of  whatso- 
ever nature  enjoyed  by  Germany  in  the  Prov- 
ince of  Shantung,  whether  secured  by  Treaty 
or  in  any  other  manner,  China  shall  give  her 
full  assent  thereto. 

Article  2. — The  Chinese  Government  agrees 
that  within  the  Province  of  Shantung  and 
along  its  sea  border  no  territory  or  island  of  any 
name  or  nature  shall  be  ceded  or  leased  to  any 
third  Power. 

Article  5. — The  Chinese  Government  consents 
to  Japan's  building  a  railway  from  Chefoo  or 
Lungkou  to  join  the  Kiaochow-Tsinanfu  Rail- 
way. 

Article  4. — The  Chinese  Government  engages, 
in  the  interest  of  trade  and  for  the  residence  of 
foreigners,  to  open  by  herself  as  soon  as  possible 
certain  important  cities  and  towns  in  the  Prov- 
ince of  Shantung  as  commercial  ports.  What 
places  shall  be  opened  are  to  be  jointly  decided 
upon  in  a  separate  agreement. 

GROUP  II 

The  Japanese  Government  and  the  Chinese 
Government,  since  the  Chinese  Government  has 
always  acknowledged  the  special  position  en- 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  273 

joyed  by  Japan  in  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern 
Inner  Mongolia,  agree  to  the  following  articles  : 

Article  i. — The  two  contracting  parties  mutu- 
ally agree  that  the  term  of  lease  of  Port  Arthur 
and  Dalny  and  the  term  of  lease  of  the  South 
Manchurian  Railway  and  the  Antung-Mukden 
Railway  shall  be  extended  to  the  period  of 
ninety-nine  years. 

Article  2. — Japanese  subjects  in  South  Man- 
churia and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  shall  have 
the  right  to  lease  or  own  land  required  either 
for  erecting  suitable  buildings  for  trade  and 
manufacture  or  for  farming. 

Article  j. — Japanese  subjects  shall  be  free  to 
reside  and  travel  in  South  Manchuria  and  East- 
ern Inner  Mongolia  and  to  engage  in  business 
and  in  manufacture  of  any  kind  whatsoever. 

Article  4. — The  Chinese  Government  agrees 
to  grant  to  Japanese  subjects  the  right  of  open- 
ing the  mines  in  South  Manchuria  and  Eastern 
Mongolia.  As  regards  what  mines  are  to  be 
opened,  they  shall  be  decided  upon  jointly. 

Article  5. — The  Chinese  Government  agrees 
that  in  respect  of  the  (two)  cases  mentioned 
herein  below  the  Japanese  Government's  con- 
sent shall  be  first  obtained  before  action  is 
taken : 

(a)  Wh'enever  permission  is  granted  to  the 
subject  of  a  third  Power  to  build  a  railway  or  to 
make  a  loan  with  a  third  Power  for  the  purpose 
of  building  a  railway  in  South  Manchuria  and 
Eastern  Inner  Mongolia. 

6     Whenever  a  loan  is  to  be  made  with  a 


274  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

third  Power  pledging  the  local  taxes  of  South 
Manchuria  and  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  as  se- 
curity. 

Article  6. — The  Chinese  Government  agrees 
that  if  the  Chinese  Government  employs  polit- 
ical, financial  or  military  advisers  or  instructors 
in  South  Manchuria  or  Eastern  Mongolia,  the 
Japanese  Government  shall  first  be  consulted. 

Article  7. — The  Chinese  Government  agrees 
that  the  control  and  management  of  the  Kirin- 
Changchun  Railway  shall  be  handed  over  to  the 
Japanese  Government  for  a  term  of  ninety-nine 
years  dating  from  the  signing  of  this  agreement. 

GROUP  III 

The  Japanese  Government  and  the  Chinese 
Government,  seeing  that  Japanese  financiers 
and  the  Hanyehping  Company  have  close  rela- 
tions with  each  other  at  present  and  desiring 
that  the  common  interests  of  the  two  nations 
shall  be  advanced,  agree  to  the  following  ar- 
ticles: 

Article  i. — The  two  contracting  parties  mutu- 
ally agree  that  when  the  opportune  moment  ar- 
rives the  Hanyehping  Company  shall  be  made  a 
joint  concern  of  the  two  nations  and  they 
further  agree  that  without  the  previous  consent 
of  Japan,  China  shall  not  by  her  own  act  dispose 
of  the  rights  and  property  of  whatsoever  nature 
of  the  said  company  nor  cause  the  said  company 
to  dispose  freely  of  the  same. 

Article  2. — The  Chinese  Government  agrees 
that  all  mines  in  the  neighbourhood  of  those 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  275 

owned  by  the  Hanyehping  Company  shall  not 
be  permitted,  without  the  consent  of  the  said 
company,  to  be  worked  by  other  persons  outside 
of  the  said  company ;  and  further  agrees  that  if 
it  is  desired  to  carry  out  any  undertaking  which, 
it  is  apprehended,  may  directly  or  indirectly  af- 
fect the  interests  of  the  said  company,  the  con- 
sent of  the  said  company  shall  first  be  obtained. 

GROUP  IV 

The  Japanese  Government  and  the  Chinese 
Government  with  the  object  of  effectively  pre- 
serving the  territorial  integrity  of  China  agree 
to  the  following  special  article : 

The  Chinese  Government  engages  not  to  cede 
or  lease  to  a  third  Power  any  harbour  or  bay  or 
island  along  the  coast  of  China. 

GROUP  V 

'Article  i. — The  Chinese  Central  Government 
shall  employ  influential  Japanese  as  advisers  in 
political,  financial,  and  military  affairs. 

Article  2. — Japanese  hospitals,  churches  and 
schools  in  the  interior  of  China  shall  be  granted 
the  right  of  owning  land. 

Article  j. — Inasmuch  as  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment and  the  Chinese  Government  have  had 
many  cases  of  dispute  between  Japanese  and 
Chinese  police  which  caused  no  little  misunder- 
standing, it  is  for  this  reason  necessary  that  the 
police  departments  of  important  places  (in 
China)  shall  be  jointly  administered  by  Japa- 
nese and  Chinese  or  that  the  police  departments 


276  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

of  these  places  shall  employ  numerous  Japanese, 
so  that  they  may  at  the  same  time  help  to  plan 
for  the  improvement  of  the  Chinese  Police 
Service. 

Article  4. — China  shall  purchase  from  Japan  a 
fixed  amount  of  munitions  of  war  (say  50  per 
cent,  or  more  of  what  is  needed  by  the  Chinese 
Government)  or  that  there  shall  be  established 
in  China  a  Sino-Japanese  jointly  worked  ar- 
senal. Japanese  technical  experts  are  to  be  em- 
ployed and  Japanese  material  to  be  purchased. 

Article  5. — China  agrees  to  grant  to  Japan  the 
right  of  constructing  a  railway  connecting  Wu- 
chang with  Kiukiang  and  Nanchang,  another 
line  between  Nanchang  and  Hangchow,  and  an- 
other between  Nanchang  and  Chaochou. 

Article  6. — If  China  needs  foreign  capital  to 
work  mines,  build  railways  and  construct  har- 
bour works  (including  dockyards)  in  the  Prov- 
ince of  Fukien,  Japan  shall  be  first  consulted. 

Article  7. — China  agrees  that  Japanese  sub- 
jects shall  have  the  right  of  missionary  propa- 
ganda in  China. 


A  RESUME  OF  JAPAN'S  PROCEDURE  IN 
CONNECTION  WITH  THE  TWENTY- 
ONE  DEMANDS * 

(a)   Presentation  of  demands  in  tzventy-one  ar- 
1From  Millard,  "Our  Eastern  Question,"  pp.  147-148. 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  277 

tides,  coupled  with  a  strong  admonition  to 
China  that  both  haste  and  secrecy  were  insisted 
on  by  Japan. 

(b)  Continuous  pressure  on  China  to  force 
her  to  concede  the  demands  en  bloc,  without  dis- 
cussion. 

(c)  Repeated  warning  to  China  not  to  inform 
other  Powers  of  the  negotiations,  even  confi- 
dentially. 

(d)  First  publications  of  news  about  the  de- 
mands were  categorically  and  officially  denied 
by  Japan. 

(e)  Newspapers  in  Japan  were  warned  by  the 
Government  not  to  publish  or  discuss   news 
about  the  demands. 

(/)  Japan's  diplomatic  representatives  abroad 
were  instructed  to  deny  and  discredit  news 
about  the  demands. 

(g)  The  Minister  at  Peking  denied  to  in- 
quiries of  other  legations  that  any  demands  had 
been  made. 

(h)  When  copies  of  the  original  demands, 
procured  from  the  Chinese  Government,  were 
received  by  other  foreign  Governments,  Japan 
still  denied  the  twenty-one  demands,  and  pre- 
sented a  list  of  eleven  articles,  omitting  the  most 
objectionable  matters. 


278  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

P 
THE  REVISED  DEMANDS 

PRESENTED  BY  MR.  HIOKI,  THE  JAPANESE  MINISTER, 
TO  THE  CHINESE  GOVERNMENT  ON  APRIL  26, 
1915,  YIELDED  TO  BY  THE  CHINESE  GOV- 
ERNMENT ON  MAY  8,  1915 

GROUP  I 

The  Japanese  Government  and  the  Chinese 
Government  being  desirous  of  maintaining  the 
peace  of  Eastern  Asia  and  of  further  strength- 
ening the  friendly  relations  existing  between 
the  two  neighbouring  nations  agree  to  the  fol- 
lowing articles : 

Article  i. — The  Chinese  Government  agrees 
that  when  the  Japanese  Government  hereafter 
approaches  the  German  Government  for  the 
transfer  of  all  rights  and  privileges  of  whatso- 
ever nature  enjoyed  by  Germany  in  the  Prov- 
ince of  Shantung,  whether  secured  by  treaty  or 
in  any  other  manner,  China  shall  give  her  full 
assent  thereto. 

Article  2. — The  Chinese  Government  engages 
that  within  the  Province  of  Shantung  and  along 
its  sea  border  no  territory  or  island  or  land  of 
any  name  or  nature  shall  be  ceded  or  leased  to 
any  third  Power. 

Article  3. — The  Chinese  Government  consents 
that  as  regards  the  railway  to  be  built  by  China 
herself  from  Chefoo  or  Lungkow,  to  connect 
with  the  Kiaochow-Tsinanfu  Railway,  if  Ger- 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  279 

many  is  willing  to  abandon  the  privilege  of 
financing  the  Chefoo-Weihsien  line,  China  will 
approach  Japanese  capitalists  to  negotiate  for  a 
loan. 

Article  4. — The  Chinese  Government  engages, 
in  the  interest  of  trade  and  for  the  residence  of 
foreigners,  to  open  by  China  herself  as  soon  as 
possible  certain  suitable  places  in  the  Province 
of  Shantung  as  commercial  ports. 

THE  FOLLOWING  TO  BE  SUBJECT  OP  AN  EXCHANGE 
OF  NOTES: 

The  places  which  ought  to  be  opened  are  to 
be  chosen,  and  the  regulations  are  to  be  drafted, 
by  the  Chinese  Government,  but  the  Japanese 
minister  must  be  consulted  before  making  a  de- 
cision. 

GROUP  II 

The  Japanese  Government  and  the  Chinese 
Government,  with  a  view  to  developing  their 
economic  relations  in  South  Manchuria  and 
Eastern  Inner  Mongolia,  agree  to  the  following 
articles : 

Article  i. — The  two  contracting  Powers  mutu- 
ally agree  that  the  term  of  lease  of  Port  Arthur 
and  Dalny  and  the  term  of  the  South  Man- 
churian  Railway  and  the  Antung-Mukden  Rail- 
way, shall  be  extended  to  ninety-nine  years. 

Article  2. — Japanese  subjects  in  South  Man- 
churia may  lease  or  purchase  necessary  land  for 
erecting  suitable  buildings  for  trade  and  manu- 
facture or  for  prosecuting  agricultural  enter- 
prises. 


280  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

Article  j. — Japanese  subjects  shall  be  free  to 
reside  and  travel  in  South  Manchuria  and  to  en- 
gage in  business  and  in  manufacture  of  any 
kind  whatsoever. 

Article  ja. — The  Japanese  subjects  referred  to 
in  the  preceding  two  articles  besides  being  re- 
quired to  register  with  local  authorities  pass- 
ports, which  they  must  procure  under  the  exist- 
ing regulations,  shall  also  observe  police  laws 
and  ordinances  and  tax  regulations  which  are 
approved  by  the  Japanese  Consul.  Civil  and 
criminal  cases  in  which  the  defendants  are  Jap- 
anese shall  be  tried  and  adjudicated  by  the  Jap- 
anese Consul ;  those  in  which  the  defendants  are 
Chinese  shall  be  tried  and  adjudicated  by  Chi- 
nese authorities.  In  either  instance  the  authori- 
ties on  the  plaintiff  side  can  send  a  delegate  to 
attend  the  proceedings;  but  mixed  civil  cases 
between  Chinese  and  Japanese  relating  to  land 
shall  be  tried  and  adjudicated  by  the  delegates 
of  both  nations  conjointly  in  accordance  with 
Chinese  laws  and  local  usage.  When  the  judi- 
cial system  in  the  said  region  is  completely  re- 
formed all  the  civil  and  criminal  cases  concern- 
ing Japanese  subjects  shall  be  tried  entirely  by 
Chinese  law  courts. 

Article  4. — The  Chinese  Government  agrees 
that  Japanese  subjects  shall  be  permitted  forth- 
with to  investigate,  select,  and  then  prospect  for 
and  open  mines  at  the  following  places  in  South 
Manchuria,  apart  from  those  mining  areas  in 
which  mines  are  being  prospected  for  or 
worked ;  until  the  mining  ordinance  is  definitely 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  281 

settled,  methods  at  present  in  force  shall  be 
followed : 

PROVINCE  OF  FENG-TIEN 

Locality                          District  Mineral 

Niu  Hsin  T'ai                  Pen-hsi  Coal 

Tien  Shih  Fu  Kou           Pen-hsi  do. 

Sha  Sung  Kang               Hai-lung  do. 

T'ieh  Ch'ang                   T'ung-hua  do. 

Nuan  Ti  T'ang                Chin  do. 
An  Shan  Chan  region     From  Liao-yang 

to  Pen-hsi  Iron 


PROVINCE  OF  KIRIN  (Southern  Portion) 

Sha  Sung  Kang  Ho-Lung  C.  &  I. 

KangYao  Chi-lin  (Kirin)  Coal 

Chia  P'i  Kou  Hua-tien  Gold 

Article  5. — The  Chinese  Government  declares 
that  China  will  hereafter  provide  funds  for 
building  railways  in  South  Manchuria;  if  foreign 
capital  is  required  the  Chinese  Government 
agrees  to  negotiate  for  a  loan  with  Japanese 
capitalists  first. 

Article  50. — The  Chinese  Government  agrees 
that  hereafter,  when  a  foreign  loan  is  to  be  made 
on  the  security  of  the  taxes  of  South  Manchuria 
(not  including  customs  and  salt  revenue  on  the 
security  of  which  loans  have  already  been  made 
by  the  Central  Government),  it  will  negotiate 
for  the  loan  with  Japanese  capitalists  first. 

Article  6. — The  Chinese  Government  declares 
that  hereafter,  if  foreign  advisers  or  instructors 
on  political,  financial,  military,  or  police  mattery 


282  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

are  to  be  employed  in  South  Manchuria,  Japa- 
nese will  be  employed  first 

Article?. — The  Chinese  Government  agrees 
speedily  to  make  a  fundamental  revision  of  the 
Kirin-Changchun  Railway  Loan  Agreement, 
taking  as  a  standard  the  provisions  in  railway 
loan  agreements  made  heretofore  between 
China  and  foreign  financiers.  If,  in  future, 
more  advantageous  terms  than  those  in  existing 
railway  loan  agreements  are  granted  to  foreign 
financiers,  in  connection  with  railway  loans,  the 
above  agreement  shall  again  be  revised  in  ac- 
cordance with  Japan's  wishes. 

Matters  Relating  to  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia 

1.  The    Chinese    Government    agrees    that 
whenever  a  loan  is  to  be  made  with  a  third 
Power,  pledging  the  local  taxes  of  Eastern  In- 
ner Mongolia  as  security,  China  must  negotiate 
with  the  Japanese  Government  first. 

2.  The    Chinese    Government    agrees    that 
China  will  herself  provide  funds  for  building 
the  railways  in  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia ;  if  for- 
eign capital  is  required  she  must  negotiate  with 
the  Japanese  Government  first. 

3.  The  Chinese  Government  agrees,  in  the 
interest  of  trade  and  the  residence  of  foreigners, 
to  open  by  herself  as  soon  as  possible  certain 
suitable  places  in  Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  as 
commercial  ports.     The  places  which  ought  to 
be  opened  are  to  be  chosen  and  the  regulations 
to  be  drafted  by  the  Chinese  Government,  but 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  283 

the  Japanese  Minister  must  be  consulted  be- 
fore reaching  a  decision. 

4.  If  there  are  Japanese  and  Chinese  who 
desire  to  cooperate  in  agricultural  enterprises, 
including  incidental  manufacture,  the  Chinese 
Government  shall  forthwith  give  its  permission. 

GROUP  III 

The  relations  between  Japan  and  the  Han- 
yehping  Company  being  very  intimate,  if  the 
said  Company  comes  to  an  agreement  with  the 
Japanese  capitalists  for  cooperation  the  Chinese 
Government  shall  forthwith  give  its  consent 
thereto.  The  Chinese  Government  further 
agrees  that  without  the  consent  of  the  Japanese 
capitalists  China  will  not  convert  the  company 
into  a  state  enterprise,  nor  confiscate  it  nor 
cause  it  to  borrow  and  use  foreign  capital  other 
than  Japanese. 

GROUP  IV 

China  to  make  a  declaration  by  herself  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  following  principle :  No  part 
of  China's  coast,  bays,  harbours  or  islands  shall 
be  ceded  or  leased  to  another  power. 

GROUP  V 

Yangtze  .Railways — to  be  confirmed  by  exchange  of 
notes 

A 

As  regards  the  right  of  financing  by  loan  the 
AVuchang-Kiukiang-Nanchang  Railways,  the 
Nanchang-Hangchow  Railway,  and  the  Nan- 


284  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

chang-Chaochow  Railway,  if  it  is  clearly  ascer- 
tained that  other  powers  have  no  objection 
China  shall  grant  the  said  right  to  Japan. 


B 

As  regards  the  right  of  financing  by  loan  the 
Wuchang-Kiukiang-Nanchang  Railways,  the 
Nanchang-Hangchow  Railway,  and  the  Nan- 
chang-Chaochow  Railway,  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment shall  promise  not  to  grant  the  said  right  to 
any  foreign  power  before  Japan  comes  to  an  un- 
derstanding with  the  power  which  is  heretofore 
interested  therein. 

Fukien — to  be  confirmed  by  exchange  of  notes 

The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  no 
power  shall  be  permitted  to  establish  along  the 
coast  of  Fu-kien  a  dockyard,  a  coaling  station 
for  military  use,  or  a  naval  base;  nor  will  any 
other  installations  for  military  purposes  be  per- 
mitted. The  Chinese  Government  further 
agrees  that  China  will  not  use  foreign  capital  to 
put  up  by  herself  the  above-mentioned  establish- 
ments or  installations. 

Mr.  Lu,  the  Chinese  Minister  of  Foreign  Af- 
fairs, stated  as  follows : 

1.  The  Chinese  Government  shall,  whenever 
in  future  it  considers  this  step  necessary,  engage 
numerous  Japanese  advisers. 

2.  Whenever  in  future  Japanese  subjects  de- 
sire to  lease  or  purchase  land  in  the  interior  of 
China  for  establishing  schools  or  hospitals  the 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  285 

Chinese  Government  shall  forthwith  give  its 
consent  thereto. 

3.  When  a  suitable  opportunity  arises  in  the 
future  the  Chinese  Government  will  send  mili- 
tary officers  to  Japan  to  negotiate  with  Japanese 
military  authorities  the  matter  of  purchasing 
arms  or  that  of  establishing  joint  arsenals. 

Mr.  Hioki,  the  Japanese  Minister,  stated  as 
follows : 

As  relates  to  the  question  of  propagating  re- 
ligion (Buddhism),  the  same  shall  be  taken  up 
again  for  negotiation  in  the  future. 


CHINA'S  REPLY  TO  THE  JAPANESE 
ULTIMATUM 

The  reply  of  the  Chinese  Government  to  the 
Ultimatum  of  the  Japanese  Government,  de- 
livered to  the  Japanese  Minister  of  Foreign  Af- 
fairs on  the  8th  of  May,  1915. 

On  the  7th  of  this  month,  at  three  o'clock 
P,  M.,  the  Chinese  Government  received  an 
Ultimatum  from  the  Japanese  Government  to- 
gether  with  an  Explanatory  Note  of  seven 
articles.  The  Ultimatum  concluded  with  the 
hope  that  the  Chinese  Government  up  to  six 
o'clock  P.  M.  on  the  9th  of  May,  will  give  a  satis- 
factory reply,  and  it  is  hereby  declared  that  if 
no  satisfactory  reply  is  received  before  or  at  the 
designated  time,  the  Japanese  Government  will 
take  steps  she  may  deem  necessary. 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

The  Chinese  Government  with  a  view  to  pre- 
serving the  peace  of  the  Far  East,  hereby  ac- 
cepts, with  the  exception  of  those  five  articles  of 
Group  V  postponed  for  later  negotiation,  all  the 
articles  of  Groups  I,  II,  III  and  IV,  and  the  ex- 
change of  notes  in  connection  with  Fukien 
Province  in  Group  V  as  contained  in  the  re- 
vised proposals  presented  on  the  26th  of  April 
and  in  accordance  with  the  Explanatory  Note  of 
seven  articles  accompanying  the  Ultimatum  of 
the  Japanese  Government  with  the  hope  that 
thereby  all  outstanding  questions  are  settled,  so 
that  the  cordial  relationship  between  the  two 
countries  may  be  further  consolidated.  The 
Japanese  Minister  is  hereby  requested  to  ap- 
point a  day  to  call  at  the  Ministry  of  Foreign 
Affairs  to  make  the  literary  improvement  of  the 
text  and  sign  the  Agreement  as  soon  as  possible. 


AMERICAN  NOTE  OF  PROTEST  IN  REGARD 

TO  THE  AGREEMENT  BETWEEN 

JAPAN  AND  CHINA 

Delivered  to  the  Chinese  Government  by  the  Amer- 
ican Minister  at  Peking  on  May  16,  1915  x 

In  view  of  the  circumstances  of  the  negotia- 
tions which  have  taken  place  or  which  are  now 

"An  identical  note  was  handed  to  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment through  the  American  embassy  at  Tokyo. 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  287 

pending  between  the  Government  of  China  and 
the  Government  of  Japan  and  the  agreements 
which  have  been  reached  and  as  a  result  thereof, 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  has  the 
honour  to  notify  the  Government  of  the  Chinese 
Republic  that  it  cannot  recognize  any  agree- 
ment or  undertaking  which  has  been  entered 
into,  or  which  may  be  entered  into  between  the 
Governments  of  China  and  Japan  impairing  the 
treaty  rights  of  the  United  States  and  its  citi- 
zens in  China,  the  political  or  territorial  in- 
tegrity of  the  Republic  .of  China,  or  the  inter- 
national policy,  commonly  known  as  the  open 
door  policy. 


S 

THE  PEKING  PETITION 

To  the  President  of  the  United  States,  Washington: 

We  whose  names  are  subscribed  to  this  peti- 
tion and  to  the  accompanying  Memorial  do  most 
urgently  beg  that  the  American  Government,  in 
compliance  with  the  high  mandates  of  the 
Christian  civilization  of  the  twentieth  century, 
and  in  defense  of  the  vital  interests  of  the  Amer- 
ican as  well  as  of  the  Chinese  republic,  and  in 
furtherance  of  the  sacred  cause  of  world  peace 
on  the  Pacific  .  .  .  will  immediately,  in 


288  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

conjunction  if  possible  with  Great  Britain  and 
.the  other  powers,  but  if  necessary  alone,  de- 
mand of  the  Chinese — not  the  Japanese — gov- 
ernment representation,  as  parties  in  interest,  in 
the  conferences  on  the  Twenty-one  Demands 
now  proceeding,  which  demands  vitally  affect 
American  and  world  interests  guaranteed  under 
the  Open  Door  Agreement.  We  further  beg 
that,  pending  the  arrival  of  such  representatives 
of  America  and  of  Great  Britain  and  other 
powers,  the  Chinese  and  Japanese  Governments 
shall  be  requested  to  suspend  negotiations,  in 
order  that  the  interests  of  all  nations  may  be 
effectively  secured  against  infringement.  And 
still  further  we  beg  that  the  governments  both 
of  China  and  Japan  may  be  notified  that  the 
presence  of  unusual  bodies  of  Japanese  troops 
on  Chinese  soil  at  this  time  not  only  embarrasses 
freedom  of  negotiations  but  constitutes  an  out- 
rage on  the  rights,  and  a  serious  menace  to  the 
peace  and  safety,  of  Americans  and  of  foreigners 
generally,  and  that  pending  the  removal  of  such 
excessive  contingents  of  Japanese  troops  all 
negotiations  should  be  suspended.  With  all 
sentiments  of  profound  respect  we  submit  this 
Petition  and  accompanying  Memorial,  claiming 
no  superior  wisdom  but  only  superior  oppor- 
tunities of  acquaintance  with  the  situation  in  its 
present  serious  aspect,  and  in  its  inevitable 
future  consequences.  We  request  that  if  not 
incompatible  with  the  public  interest  this 
Petition  arrd  Memorial,  with  our  names  at- 
tached, may  be  communicated  to  the  Associated 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  289 

Press  for  such  further  use  as  may  serve  the  in- 
terests involved. 

Peking,  Easter,  1915. 
CHARLES  F.  HUBBARD, 

Minister  of  the  Union  Foreign  Church. 
W.  A.  P.  MARTIN, 

Ex-President  of  the  Imperial  University. 
CHAUNCEY  GOODRICH, 

Chairman  of  the  Mandarin  Revision  Committee^ 
H.  H.  LOWRY, 

President  of  Peking  University. 
JOHN  WHORRY, 

Chairman  of  the  Union  Wen-Li  Bible  Revision 

Committee. 
COURTNEY  H.  FENN, 

Principal  Union  Theological  College. 
EDWARD  W.  THWING, 

Superintendent  International  Reform  Bureau. 


THE  LANSING-ISHII  AGREEMENT 

Department  of  State, 
Washington,  November  2, 
EXCELLENCY  : 

I  have  the  honour  to  communicate  herein  my 
understanding  of  the  agreement  reached  by  us 
in  our  recent  conversation  touching  the  ques- 
tions of  mutual  interest  to  our  governments  re- 
lating to  the  Republic  of  China. 

In  order  to  silence  mischievous  reports  that 
have  from  time  to  time  been  circulated,  it  is 
believed  Uy  us  that  a  public  announcement  once 


290  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

more  of  the  desires  and  intentions  shared  by  our 
two  governments  with  regard  to  China  is  ad- 
visable. 

The  Governments  of  the  United  States  and 
Japan  recognize  that  territorial  propinquity 
creates  special  relations  between  countries,  and, 
consequently,  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  recognizes  that  Japan  has  special  in- 
terests in  China,  particularly  in  the  part  to 
which  her  possessions  are  contiguous. 

The  territorial  sovereignty  of  China,  never- 
theless, remains  unimpaired,  and  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  has  every  confidence 
in  the  repeated  assurances  of  the  Imperial  Japa- 
nese Government  that,  while  geographical 
position  gives  Japan  such  special  interests,  they 
have  no  desire  to  discriminate  against  the  trade 
of  other  nations  or  to  disregard  the  commercial 
rights  heretofore  granted  by  China  in  treaties 
with  other  powers. 

The  Governments  of  the  United  States  and 
Japan  deny  that  they  have  any  purpose  to  in- 
fringe in  anyway  the  independence  or  territorial 
integrity  of  China,  and  they  declare,  further- 
more, that  they  always  adhere  to  the  principle 
of  the  so-called  "open  door,"  or  equal  oppor- 
tunity for  commerce  and  industry  in  China. 

Moreover,  they  mutually  declare  that  they 
are  opposed  to  the  acquisition  by  any  Govern- 
ment of  any  special  rights  or  privileges  that 
would  affect  the  independence  or  territorial  in- 
tegrity of  China,  or  that  would  deny  to  the  sub- 
jects or  citizens  of  any  country  the  full  enjoy- 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  291 

ment  of  equal  opportunity  in  the  commerce  and 
industry  of  China. 

I  shall  be  glad  to  have  your  Excellency  con- 
firm this  understanding  of  the  agreement 
reached  by  us. 

Accept,  Excellency,  the  renewed  assurance  of 
my  highest  consideration. 

(Signed)  ROBERT  LANSING. 

His  Excellency,  VISCOUNT  KIKUJIRO  ISHII, 

Ambassador  Extraordinary  and  Plenipotentiary 
of  Japan,  on  special  mission. 

The  Special  Mission  of  Japan, 
Washington,  November  2,  1917. 
SIR: 

I  have  the  honour  to  acknowledge  the  receipt 
of  your  note  of  to-day,  communicating  to  me 
your  understanding  of  the  agreement  reached 
by  us  in  our  recent  conversations  touching  the 
questions  of  mutual  interest  to  our  governments 
relating  to  the  Republic  of  China. 

I  am  happy  to  be  able  to  confirm  to  you,  un- 
der authorization  of  my  government,  the  un- 
derstanding in  question  set  forth  in  the  follow- 
ing terms : 

[Here  the  Special  Ambassador  repeats  the 
language  of  the  agreement  as  given  in  Secre- 
tary Lansing's  note.] 

(Signed)  K.  ISHII. 

Ambassador  Extraordinary  and  Plenipotentiary 
of  Japan,  on  special  mission, 

Honorable  ROBERT  LANSING, 
Decretory  of 


292  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

u 

THE  NEW  SINO-JAPANESE  MILITARY 
AGREEMENT 

The  Substance  of  the  Secret  Agreement  Concluded 
on  March  19,  1918,  between  Premier  Tuan  Chi-jni 
of  China  and  the  Japanese  Military  Commission 
in  Peking.1  (From  Millard's  Review,  Shanghai, 
China,  May  25,  1918.) 

Just  why  there  has  been  so  much  secrecy  con- 
cerning the  nature  of  the  negotiations  between 
Japan  and  China  which  are  now  said  to  be  ter- 
minated if  indeed  they  are  of  so  excellent  a 
nature  as  the  guarded  statements  concerning 
them  would  lead  one  to  believe,  is  rather  hard 
to  understand.  .  .  .  The  public  can  gain 
some  sort  of  an  idea  as  to  the  nature  of  the  new 
agreement  by  a  perusal  of  the  following  trans- 
lation of  the  purported  agreement  as  it  has  been 
made  public  in  some  of  the  native  newspapers : 

Article  I. — In  view  of  the  penetration  of  enemy 
influence  into  the  eastern  territory  of  Russia, 
and  of  the  likelihood  of  the  peace  of  the  two  con- 
tracting parties  being  disturbed  thereby,  China 
and  Japan  mutually  agree  actively  to  undertake 
the  obligations  of  war  participation  by  measures 
designed  jointly  to  guard  against  the  action  of 
the  enemy. 

*A  full  discussion  of  the  agreement  is  given  in  Millard's 
Review  (Shanghai),  May  25,  1918,  vol.  IV,  pp.  453-455, 
457-463,  480-483- 


DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE  293 

'Article  II. — The  two  countries  shall  mutually 
recognize  and  respect  the  equality  of  the  other 
regarding  position  and  interests  in  carrying  out 
joint  military  measures. 

Article  III. — When  it  is  necessary  to  take  ac- 
tion based  on  this  agreement,  orders  will  be 
issued  by  both  China  and  Japan  to  their  troops 
and  people,  calling  on  them  to  be  frankly  sincere 
in  dealing  with  each  other  in  the  area  of  mili- 
tary operations;  and  the  Chinese  officials  shall 
cooperate  and  assist  the  Japanese  troops  in  the 
area  involved  so  that  there,  may  be  no  hindrance 
to  military  movements.  Japanese  troops  shall 
on  their  part  respect  Chinese  sovereignty  and 
shall  not  cause  any  inconvenience  to  the  Chinese 
people  by  violating  local  customs  and  traditions. 

Article  IV. — Japanese  troops  in  Chinese  terri- 
tory shall  withdraw  from  China  as  soon  as  war 
is  ended. 

Article  V. — If  it  be  found  necessary  to  send 
troops  outside  of  Chinese  territory,  troops  will 
be  jointly  sent  by  the  two  countries. 

Article  VI. — The  war  area  and  war  respon- 
sibilities shall  be  fixed  by  mutual  arrangement 
of  the  military  authorities  of  the  two  countries 
as  and  when  occasion  arises  in  accordance  with 
their  respective  military  resources. 

Article  VII. — In  the  interests  of  convenience, 
the  military  authorities  of  the  two  countries 
shall  undertake  the  following  affairs  during  the 
period  necessary  for  the  execution  of  joint 
measures: — 

1.  *  The  two  countries  shall  mutually  assist 


294  DOCUMENTS  IN  THE  CASE 

v 

and  facilitate  each  other  in  extending  the  means 
of  communications  (post  and  telegraph)  in  con- 
nection with  military  movements  and  trans- 
portation. 

2.  When  necessary  for  war  purposes  con- 
struction operations  may  be  carried  on  and  the 
same  shall  be  decided,  when  occasion  arises,  by 
mutual  consent  of  the  chief  commanders  of  the 
two   countries.     The    said   construction-opera- 
tions shall  be  removed  when  the  war  is  ended. 

3.  The  two  countries  shall  mutually  supply 
each  other  with  military  supplies  and  raw  mate- 
rials for  the  purpose  of  jointly  guarding  against 
the  enemy.     The  quantity  to  be  supplied  shall 
be  limited  to  the  extent  of  not  interfering  with 
the  necessary  requirements  of  the  country  sup- 
plying the  same. 

4.  Regarding  questions  of  military  sanita- 
tion in  the  war  area  the  two  countries  shall 
render  mutual  assistance  to  each  other. 

5.  Officers    directly    concerned    with    war 
operations  shall  mutually  be  sent  by  the  two 
countries  for   cooperation    (the  two  countries 
shall   exchange   staff  officers   for   military   co- 
operations?).    If  one  party  should  ask  for  the 
assistance  of  technical  experts,  the  other  shall 
supply  the  same. 

6.  For  convenience;  military  maps  of  the 
area  of  war  operations  will  be  exchanged. 

Article  VIIL— When  the  Chinese  Eastern  Rail- 
way is  used  for  military  transportation,  the  pro- 
visions of  the  original  treaty  relating  to  the 
management  and  protection  of  the  said  line  shall 


DOCUMENTS  Itf  THE  CASE  295 

be  respected.  The  method  of  transportation 
shall  be  decided  as  occasion  arises. 

Article  IX. — Details  regarding  the  actual  per- 
formance of  this  Agreement  shall  be  discussed 
by  mutual  agreement  of  the  delegates  appointed 
by  the  Military  Authorities  of  the  two  countries 
concerned. 

Article  X. — Neither  of  the  two  countries  shall 
disclose  the  contents  of  the  Agreement  and  its 
appendix,  and  the  same  shall  be  treated  as  mili- 
tary secrets. 

Article  XL — This  Agreement  shall  become 
valid  when  it  is  approved  by  both  governments 
after  being  signed  by  the  military  representa- 
tives of  the  two  countries.  As  to  the  proper 
moment  for  the  beginning  of  war  operations, 
the  same  shall  be  decided  by  the  highest  organs 
of  the  two  countries.  The  provisions  of  this 
Agreement  and  the  detailed  steps  arising  there- 
from shall  become  null  and  void  on  the  day  the 
joint  war  measures  against  the  enemy  end. 

Article  XII. — Two  copies  of  the  Chinese  and 
of  the  Japanese  text  of  this  Agreement  shall  be 
drawn,  one  of  each  shall  be  kept  by  China  and 
Japan.  The  Chinese  and  Japanese  texts  shall 
be  identical  in  meaning. 


Selected  Bibliography 

i.    BIBLIOGRAPHIES 

There  are  no  general  bibliographies  covering  the 
Orient.  Trie  following  are  a  few  of  the  most  im- 
portant on  special  topics  and  countries : 

Courant,  M.,  Bibliographic  Coreanne  (3  Vols., 

Paris,  1896). 

Select  List  of  Books  (with  references  to  peri- 
odicals) Relating  to  the  Far  East,  and  Select 
List  of  References  on  Chinese  Immigration, 
compiled  by  A.  P.  C.  Griffin,  Library  of  Con- 
gress, Washington,  1904. 
Japan  Year  Book,  bibliography  (Tokyo). 
Von  Wenckstern,  F.,  Bibliography  of  the  Japa- 
nese Empire  (Vol.   i,  Leiden,  1895;  Vol.  2, 
Tokyo,  1907). 

Bibliographies  appear  at  the  end  of  each  coun- 
try in: 

The    Encyclopedia    Britannic  a    (nth    edition, 

London,  1910). 

The  New  International  Encyclopedia  (2d  edi- 
tion, New  York,  1914). 
Statesman's  Year  Book  (London). 
For  all  books  published  on  the  subject  in  the  British 
Empire  consult: 

British  Museum  Catalogues  (London). 

The  Publishers'  Circular  ltd.  (Fetter  Lane,  E.  C., 

London). 

For  American  publications  consult : 
Book  Review  Digest  (monthly)  and  Record  of 
Cumulative  Book  Index   (annual),  published 
by  the  H.  W.  Wilson  Co.,  White  Plains,  N.  Y. 
296 


SELECTED  BIBLIOGRAPHY  297 

Publishers'  Trade  List  Annual  and  The  Pub- 
lishers' Weekly,  published  by  the  R.  R.  Bow- 
ker  Co.,  New  York  City. 

United  States  Catalogue  of  Books  in  Print  (Jan. 
i,  1912). 

United  States  Library  of  Congress  Catalogue. 


II.    SOURCES 

Treaties,  Documents,  Government  Reports,  Mem- 
oirs, etc. : 

Drage,  Geoffrey,  Russian  Affairs,  Appendix, 
647-729  (London,  1904). 

Hertlet,  China  Treaties:  Treaties,  etc.,  between 
Great  Britain  and  China,  and  between  China 
and  Foreign  Powers,  3d  Edition,  2  Vols. 
(London,  1908). 

McKenzie,  F.  A.,  The  Tragedy  of  Korea,  Ap- 
pendix, 263-312  (New  York,  1907). 

Mannix,  W.  F.,  Memoirs  of  Li  Hung  Chang 
(New  York,  1913). 

Millard,  Thomas  F.,  Our  Eastern  Question,  Ap- 
pendix, 393-543  (New  York,  1916). 

Pooley,  A.  M.,  The  Secret  Memoirs  of  Count 
Tadasu  Hayashi  (London,  1915). 

Consult  also  the  United  States  Statutes  at  Large, 
Diplomatic  Correspondence,  Foreign  Relations, 
Consular   and    Trade   Reports    (Government 
Printing  Office,  Washington). 
The  Bureau  of  Statistics  has  published : 

Commercial  China  in  1904:  Area,  Population, 
Production,  Railways,  Telegraphs,  and  Trans- 
portation Routes,  and  Foreign  Commerce  and 
Commerce  of  the  United  States  with  China 
(Summary  of  Commerce  and  Finance,  Jan- 
uary, 1904). 

Commercial  Japan  in  1904:  Area,  Population, 
Production,  Railways,  Telegraphs,  and  Trans- 
portation Routes,  and  Foreign  Commerce  and 


298  SELECTED  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Commerce  of  the  Unitel  States  with  Japan 
(Summary  of  Commerce  and  Finance,  Feb- 
ruary, 1904). 
Much  source  material  will  be  found  in  the 

British  Parliamentary  Papers,  China. 

British  Foreign  Office  Reports  on  the  Trade  of 
Korea,  Annual  Series. 

British  Annual  Consular  Reports  (London). 

Chinese  Imperial  Customs  Reports  (Shanghai). 
Japanese  Official  Publications  (Tokyo)  : 

Constitution  of  the  Empire  of  Japan  (1889). 

Financial  and  Economic  Annual  of  Japan. 

Reports  of  the  Various  Government  Departments 
(annual). 

Returns  of  the  Foreign  Commerce  and  Trade  of 

Japan  (annual). 

The  Japanese  Government  also  publishes  the  fol- 
lowing books  primarily  for  the  purpose  of  informing 
the  Western  public : 

Annual  Report  on  Reforms  and  Progress  in 
Chosen  (Seoul). 

Korea  Year  Book  (Seoul). 

An  Official  Guide  to  Eastern  Asia:  Vol.  I.,  Man- 
churia and  Chosen;  Vols.  II.  and  III.,  Japan; 
Vol.  IV.  China  (Tokyo  and  London,  1916). 

III.    SECONDARY  WORKS  ON  POLITICAL,  HISTORICAL, 

ECONOMIC,  AND  DIPLOMATIC  RELATIONS 
A.  Histories: 

Boulger,  Demetrius  C,  The  History  of  China, 

revised  edition  (London,  1900). 
Brinkley,    Frank,   Japan   and   China,    12   Vols. 

(London,  1903-1904). 

Gnffis,  William  Elliot,  Corea,  the  Hermit  Nation 
(New  York,  1897). 

The   Mikado's   Empire,    2,    Vojs.    (New 
York,  1904). 

Hosi«,  Alexander,  Manchuria:  Its  People,  Re- 
sources,  and  History  (London,  1901). 


SELECTED  BIBLIOGRAPHY  299 

Hulbert,  H.  B.,  The  History  of  Korea,  3  Vols. 

(Seoul,  1905). 

Longford,  Joseph  H.,  The  Story  of  Old  Japan 
(London,  1910). 

The  Story   of  Korea    (New  York, 
1911). 

Macgowan,  J.,  A  History  of  China  from  the 
Earliest  Days  Down  to  the  Present  (London, 
1897). 

McLaren,  Walter  W.,  A  Political  History  of 
Japan  During  the  Meiji  Era,  1867-1912  (New 
York,  1916). 
Parker,  Edward  H.,  China,  Past  and  Present 

(London,  1903). 

Williams,  Samuel  W.,  A  History  of  China  (New 
York,  1897). 

The  Middle  Kingdom,  2  Vols.  (New 
York,  1883). 

B.  American  Relations  with  the  Far  East : 
Callahan,  J.  M.,  American  Relations  in  the  Pa- 
cific and  the  Far  East  (Baltimore,  1901). 

Colquhoun,  A.  R.,  Greater  America  (New  York, 

1904). 
Coolidge,  A.  C,  The  United  States  as  a  World 

Power  (New  York,  1908). 
Fish,  Carl  Russell,  American  Diplomacy  (New 

York,  1915). 
Foster,  John  W.,  American  Diplomacy  in  the 

Orient  (New  York,  1903). 
Latane,   J.    H.,   America   as   a    World   Power 

(American  Nation,  XXV.,  New  York,  1907). 

C.  American- Japanese    Relations    Including    the 
Question  of  Japanese  Immigration,  Naturalization  in 
America,  etc. 

Flowers,    Montaville,    Japanese    Conquest    oft 
American  Opinion  (New  York,  1916). 


300  SELECTED  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Gulick,  Sidney    L.,  The   American   Japanese 

Problem  (New  York,  1914). 
"       American  Democracy  and  Asiatic  Citi- 
zenship (New  York,  1918). 
Kawakami,  K.  K.,  American  Japanese  Relations 
(New  York,  1912). 
Asia  at  the  Door  (New  York,  1914). 
Japan  to  America,  edited  by  Naoichi  Masaoka 

(Japan,  1915). 
Mills,  Harry  Alvin,  The  Japanese  Problem  in  the 

United  States  (New  York,  1914). 
Nitobe,  Inazo  O.,  Intercourse  between  the  United 

States  and  Japan  (Baltimore,  1891). 
America  to  Japan,  edited  by  Lindsay  Russell 

(New  York,  1915). 
Steiner,  J.  F.,  The  Japanese  Invasion  (Chicago, 

1917). 

Treat,  Payson  J.,  Early  Diplomatic  Relations 
between  the  United  States  and  Japan  (Balti- 
more, 1917). 

[Books  on  Chinese  Immigration  are  not  listed  in 
this  bibliography.  Those  who  desire  to  study  the 
subject  should  consult  Select  List  of  References  on 
Chinese  Immigration,  compiled  by  A.  P.  C.  Griffin, 
Library  of  Congress,  Washington,  1904.] 

D.  China- Japanese  War: 

History  of  Peace  Negotiations  between  China 

and  Japan,  officially  revised  (Tientsin,  1895). 

United  States  Foreign  Relatio ns,  1894,  appendix  i. 

"  Vladimir/'  The  China- Japanese  War  (London, 

1896). 


E.  Boxer  War : 

British    Parliamentary   Papers    (1900),    China, 

Nos.  3,  4. 
Clements,   Paul    H.,    The  Boxer  Rebellion:  A 


SELECTED  BIBLIOGRAPHY  301 

Political  and  Diplomatic  Review  in  Columbia 
University  Studies  in  History,  Economics  and 
Public  Law,  Vol.  66  (New  York,  1915). 

Martin,  W.  A.  P.,  The  Siege  in  Peking  (New 
York,  1900). 

Rockhill,  W.  W.,  Report  on  Affairs  in  China, 
published  in  Foreign  Relations  (1901). 

Thompson,  H.  C,  China  and  the  Powers  (Lon- 
don, 1902). 

F.  Russo-Japanese  War: 

Asakawa,  K.,  The  Russo-Japanese  Conflict:  Its 

Causes  and  Issues  (New  York,  1904). 
Hershey,  Amos  S.,  The  International  Law  and 

Diplomacy  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War  (New 

York,  1906). 
Kuropatkin,  A.  M.,  The  Russian  Army  and  the 

Japanese  War  (London,  1909). 
McCarthy,  Michail  J.,  The  Coming  Power  (Lon- 
don, 1905). 
Ross,  C,   The  Russo-Japanese  War   (London, 

1912). 
Sedgwick,    F.    R.,    The    Russo-Japanese    War 

(New  York,  1909). 
Smith,  F.  E.,  International  Law  as  Interpreted 

during    the    Russo-Japanese    War    (Boston, 

1907). 
War  Department,  U.  S.  Army,  fipitome  of  the 

Russo-Japanese  War  (Washington). 

G.  Political  and  Economic  Questions : 
Blakeslee,  G.  H.  (Editor),  China  and  the  Far 

East  (Clark  University  Lectures,  New  York, 

1910). 
Brown,  Arthur  Judson,  The  -Mastery  of  the  Far 

East  (New  York,  1919), 
Colquhoun,  A.  C^  The  Mastery  of  the  Pacific 

(New  York,  1902). 


302  SELECTED  BIBLIOGBAPHY 

Douglas,  R.  K.,  Europe  and  the  Far  East  (Lon- 
don, 1913). 
Gulick,  Sidney  L.,  The  White  Peril  in  the  Far 

East  (New  York,  1905). 
Harding,  Gardner  L.,  Present-day  China  (New 

York,  1916). 
Hornbeck,  Stanley  K.,  Contemporary  Politics  in 

the  Far  East  (New  York,  1916). 
Hozumi,    N.,    The   New   Japanese   Civil   Code 

(Tokyo,  1904). 

Hsu,  Mongton  Chih,  Railway  Problems  in  China 
(Columbia  University  Studies  in  History, 
Economics,  and  Public  Law,  Vol.  66,  New 
York,  1915). 

Japan  Year  Book  (Tokyo). 
The  Japan   Directory    (annual),   published   by 

Japan  Gazette  (Yokohama). 
Kent,  P.  H.,  Railway  Enterprise  in  China  (Lon- 
don, 1907). 

Knapp,  A.  M.,  Feudal  and  Modern  Japan  (Bos- 
ton, 1897). 
Lawton,    Lancelot,   Empires   of   the   Far  East 

(Boston,  1912). 
Lee,   Homer,   The   Valor  of  Ignorance   (New 

York,  1909). 

Lenox,  Simpson  Bertram,  Manchu  and  Musco- 
vite (New  York,  1904). 
The  True  in  the  East  and  Its  Aftermath 
(New  York,  1907). 

The  Coming  Struggle  in  Eastern  Asia 
(New  York,  1908). 

Little,  A.,  The  Far  East  (London,  1905). 
McKenzie,  F.  A.,  The  Tragedy  of  Korea  (New 
York,  1907). 

The    Unveiled    East     (New    York 
1907). 

Mahan,  A.  T.,  The  Problem  of  Asia  and  its 
Effect  on  International  Policies  (Boston, 
1900). 


SELECTED  BIBLIOGEAPHY  303 

Martin,  W.  A.  P.,  The  Awakening  of  China 

(New  York,  1907). 
Millard,  Thomas  R,  The  New  Far  East  (New 

York,  1906). 

"      America  and  the  Far  Eastern  Question 
(New  York,  1909). 

Our   Eastern    Question    (New   York, 
1916). 

Democracy  and  the  Eastern  Question 
(New  York,  1919). 

The  New  Atlas  and  Gazetteer  of  China,  pub- 
lished by  the  North-China  Daily  News  (Shang- 
hai, 1917). 
Norman,  Henry,  The  Peoples  and  Politics  of  the 

Far  East  (New  York,  1895). 
Okuma,  Count  Shigenobu,  Fifty  Years  of  New 
Japan,  English  version  edited  by  Marcus  B. 
Huish,  2  Vols.  (London,  1909). 
Porter,  Robert  P.,  Japan,  the  New  World  Power 

(Londpn,  1915). 

Reinsch,  Paul  S.,  World  Politics  (New  York, 
1900). 

Intellectual  and  Political  Currents  in 
the  Far  East  (New  York,  1911). 
Wagel,  S.  R.,  Chinese  Currency  and  Banking 

(Shanghai,  1915). 

China  Year  Book,  edited  by  H.  G.  W.  Wood- 
head  and  H.  T.  Montague  Bell  (London). 
Yen,  H.  L.,  A  Survey  of  Constitutional  Develop- 
ment in  China  (New  York,  1911). 


IV.    BOOKS  OF  TRAVEL,  DESCRIPTION,  AND 

I NTERPRETATION 

Allen,  Horace  N.,  Things  Korean  (New  York, 

1908). 

Ball,  J.  D.,  Things  Chinese  (Hongkong,  1903). 
Birth,  J.  G.,  Travels  in  North  and  Centra] 

(London,  1902). 


304  SELECTED  BIBLIOGKAPHY 

Bishop,  Isabella  Bird,  Unbeaten  Tracks  of  Ja- 
pan, 2  Vols.   (fourth  edition,  London, 

1885). 

Korea    and    Her    Neighbors,    2    Vols. 
(London,  1897). 

The  Yangtze  Valley  and  Beyond,  2  Vols. 
(New  York,  1900). 

Chamberlain,  B.  H.,  Things  Japanese  (fifth  edi- 
tion, London,  1905). 
Clarke,  J.  I.   C,  Japan  at  First  Hand   (New 

York,  1918). 

Davidson,  J.  W.,  The  Island  of  Formosa  (Lon- 
don, 1903). 

Dickinson,  G.  Lowes,  Letters  from  a  Chinese 
Official  (New  York,  1903). 
An  Essay  on  the  Civilization  of  India, 
China,  and  Japan  (London,  1914). 
Fang,  Wu  Ting,  America  Through  the  Specta- 
cles of  an   Oriental  Diplomat   (New  York, 
1914). 
Finck,  Henry  T.,  Lotus  Time  in  Japan  (New 

York,  1898). 

Griffis,  W.  E.,  The  Religions  of  Japan   (New 
York,  1895). 

The    Mikado — Institution    and    Person 
(Princeton  University  Press,  1915). 
Gulick,   Sidney  L.,  Evolution  of  the  Japanese 

(New  York,  1903). 

Hamilton,  Angus,  Korea  (London,  1903). 
Hearn,  Lafcadio,  Glimpses  of  Unfamiliar  Japan 

(New  York,  1894). 
"       Japan:   An    Attempt    at    Interpretation 

(New  York,  1904). 
Hulbert,  H.  B.,  The  Passing  of  Korea  (New 

York,  1906). 
Kemp,  E.  G.,  The  Face  of  Manchuria,  Korea, 

and  Russian  Turkestan  (London,  1912). 
Lowell,  Percival,  Chosen:  the  Land  of  Morning 
Calm  (London,  1886). 


SELECTED  BIBLIOGEAPHY  306 

Mabie,  H.  W.,  Japan  To-day  and  To-morrow 

(New  York,  1914). 
Martin,  W.  A.  P.,  The  Lore  of  Cathay  (New 

York,  1901). 
Nitobe,  L,  Bushido  (New  York,  1905). 

"      The    Japanese    Nation    (New    York, 

1912). 
Ross,  E.  A.,  The  Changing  Chinese  (New  York, 

1911). 

Scherer,  James  A.  B.,  Japan  To-day  (Philadel- 
phia, 1904). 

Young  Japan  (Philadelphia,  1905). 
Smith,  Arthur  H.,  Village  Life  in  China  (New 

York,  1899). 

Starr,  Frederick,  Korean  Buddhism  (Boston, 
1918). 

V.    NEWSPAPERS  AND  MAGAZINES  DEVOTED  TO  FAR 
EASTERN  AFFAIRS 

A.  Published  in  the  West: 

Asia:  Journal  of  the  American  Asiatic  Associa- 
tion (monthly,  New  York). 

The  Asiatic  Review  (formerly  The  Asiatic 
Quarterly,  published  every  six  weeks,  Lon- 
don). 

The  Chinese  Review  (monthly,  London). 

Japan  Society  Bulletin  (published  by  the  Japan 
Society  of  America,  New  York). 

Revue  d'Asiatique,  published  by  La  soceite  del 
Asiatique  (monthly,  Paris). 

B.  In  China : 

(i)  Periodicals: 

The  Chinese  Recorder  (monthly,  Shanghai). 

The  Chinese  Social  and  Political  Science 
Review  (quarterly,  Peking). 

The  Far  East  (monthly,  Shanghai). 

The  Far  Eastern  Review  (weekly,  Shang- 
hai). 


306  SELECTED  BIBLIOGEAPHY 

Millard's  Review  (weekly,  Shanghai). 
The  National  Review  (monthly,  Shanghai). 
North-China  Herald  (weekly,  Shanghai). 
(2)  Dailies: 

China  Press  (Shanghai). 
North-China  Daily  News  (Shanghai). 
Peking  Gazette  (Peking). 
Peking  Daily  News  (Peking). 
Shanghai  Gazette  (Shanghai). 

.  C  In  Japan  : 

(1)  Periodicals: 

The  Far  East  (weekly,  Tokyo). 
The  Japan  Magazine  (monthly,  Tokyo). 
The  New  East  (monthly,  Tokyo). 
Oriental  Economist  (trimonthly,  Tokyo). 
Tokyo  Economist  (weekly,  Tokyo). 

(2)  Dailies: 

Japan  Advertiser  (Tokyo). 

Japan  Chronicle  (formerly  Kobe  Chronicle, 

Kobe). 

Japan  Gazette  (Yokohama). 
Japan  Mail  (Tokyo). 
Japan  Times  (Tokyo). 
Kobe  Herald  (Kobe). 
Nagasaki  Press  (Nagasaki). 

D.  In  Korea: 

The  Korea  Magazine  (a  monthly  started  by 
American  missionaries  in  Korea,  January, 
1917,  devoted  to  ancient  culture  and  civiliza- 
tion of  Korea;  published  in  Seoul). 

Seoul  Press  (an  English  daily  subsidized  by  the 
Japanese  Government;  published  in  Seoul). 


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